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A CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL RESERVE-FEDERAL OPEN MARKET 
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES IN TtlE POST-ACCORD 
PERIOD: 1953-1969
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The March 1951 Accord between the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury officially freed the Federal Reserve from the "obligation" to 
support the price level of United States Government security issues.
This allowed the Federal Reserve to return to the administration of 
monetary matters. Since that time, a tremer'jus volume of written 
material and speculation has appeared concerning the process the "Fed" 
has employed in analyzing the current state of the economy. Also under 
scrutiny has been the method the Fed employs to determine how its policy 
efforts affect, or will affect, the various factors and sectors within 
the economy.
A significant portion of this discussion has centered on the 
Federal Open Market Committee's choice of the variables which it uses 
as indicators of the current economic situation and of the impact of 
monetary policy on this situation. These indicators have been subdivided 
into many different categories depending upon such factors as their 
position in the economic framework, how long a time span must elapse
2before they reflect a policy action, how well they reflect this action, 
and how effectively the Fed can control their movements. Many different 
economic variables have been proposed as being: (l) the "best" indicator
of the current effect of a given policy action; (2) the "most appropri­
ate" target toward which the Fed should direct its actions and from which 
the Fed could judge the effectiveness of its actions; or (3) the "primary" 
economic objective which the Fed attempts to correct or to maintain 
within some suitable range.
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to examine various 
aspects of this indicator problem. Initially the contrasting theories 
which have led to this confusion are discussed and a general justifica­
tion for the alternative proposals is observed. Then the problem is 
analyzed in terms of finding the "best" indicator, the "most appropriate" 
target, and the "primary" economic objective for the analysis of the 
effects that monetary policy have on the economy as a whole. Finally, 
several of these "optimal" variables are used to establish a system 
which is designed to evaluate the potential effects of any given level 
of policy action.
This study is divided into two major topic areas. Thus, it 
seemed appropriate that the two areas should be segmented into separate, 
though not totally independent, sections. The first section attempts 
to compare and contrast various problem areas in the analysis and 
implementation of monetary policy with reference to the selection.of the 
appropriate indicators. The second seeks to establish an empirical 
basis for the analysis of the potential effects of a policy action.
The latter would enable the Federal Reserve to include this evidence as
3part of the justification for the decision regarding the correctness 
of a proposed policy position.
The first chapter in the opening section discusses; the organi­
zation and operations of the Federal Reserve and the Federal Open Market 
Committee; the historical development of the policy "tools" which these 
two bodies utilize to effect a change in, or a continuation of, the 
current level of policy action; and the problems implicit in defining 
and quantifying the length of the policy lag— from the origin of the 
need to the recognition of the effects of a policy action.
The next chapter begins with a rather in-depth comparison of the 
neo-Keynesian versus the monetarist approaches to stabilization policy.
It explains the theoretical background behind each viewpoint and gives 
explicit examples of how followers of the two approaches are led to quite 
contradictory conclusions and actions. Then, based on these differing 
frameworks, the analysis accounts for the selection of dissimilar indi­
cators and targets of policy activity. Finally, a rather laconic look 
at the development of the several "ultimate objectives," from the incep­
tion of the Federal Reserve through the period presently under consider­
ation, is presented.
The second section seeks to evaluate monetary policy action from 
a different perspective. In the first chapter of this section, a brief 
discussion of the evolution of econometric models and of their relevance 
is followed by the development of an econometric model which specifically 
emphasizes the financial (monetary) sector. The intent of this model is more 
than simply to specify a functional relationship for a group of endogenous 
variables. Its purpose is to evaluate the importance and contribution of
umovements in several of the key economic variables toward determining 
the expected level of reaction of the policy indicators and targets, 
the primary tools of policy action, and the levels of the proxies for 
the "ultimate" objectives. The policy indicators and targets employed 
in this model include changes in the demand for free reserves, for the 
components of the money supply, and for commercial bank loans. The 
primary tools of policy action are open market operations and the dis­
count rate. Changes in the level of required reserves against deposits 
and selective credit controls are used too infrequently to be included 
endogenously; and moral suasion is far too qualitative a factor to be 
measured adequately in any form. The levels of the proxies for the ulti­
mate objectives which are endogenously determined within this model are 
income and its components, and the annual rate of change in prices; 
other proxies are included exogenously. In many respects, this model 
parallels that of Teigen (1969).
The next chapter amplifies upon the results of the preceding 
chapter. Using the structural parameter estimates of the equations, an 
analysis is made of the demand and income elasticities for the endogenous 
variables with respect to a given level of change in some predetermined 
variables which are of particular interest to the monetary policy-maker. 
The balance of the chapter contains a fairly-detailed multiplier analy­
sis of the effects on the endogenous variables of a unit change in the 
level of several of the exogenous variables. These multipliers reflect 
the long-run effects of a sustained unit change in the predetermined 
variable. If the series converges (as one would a priori expect), the 
system is assumed to be stable; if not, the system is assumed to be
5unstable. These long-term effects are also of particular interest to 
the policy-maker. An analysis of these should play a key role in the 
determination of the most appropriate monetary (and fiscal) policy com­
bination to put into affect at any point in time.
The final chapter primarily synthesizes the conclusions which 
are drawn from the empirical analysis of the second section. Based on 
the results from the estimation of the model and from the calculations 
of the elasticities and multipliers, several inferences are made con­
cerning the principal determinants of the level of demand for money and 
bank loans. Then various elements of Federal Reserve activity are 
analyzed. Conclusions regarding the choice of indicators, targets, and 
objectives are drawn, and the general trend of open market and discount 
rate activities of the Fed are observed. These trends indicate, among 
other things, that the discount rate, not open market operations, might 
be the primary tool used to effect "dynamic" changes in policies activi­
ties over the quarter (three months).
SECTION ONE
QUALITATIVE POLICY EVALUATION
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND TO THE ANALYSIS OF POST-WAR 
MONETARY POLICY ACTIVITIES
Monetary policy in the last twenty years has, again, assumed a 
large part of the responsibility for short-term economic stabilization. 
This has resulted primarily because of the lengthy initial lag and gen­
eral inflexibility of fiscal policy and the addition of new national 
economic goals since World War II (reasonably stable but sufficient 
economic growth, and an international balance of payments). With this 
responsibility has come the question of how effectively monetary policy 
can guide the economy along these desired policy roads. The basic 
argument in favor of its use has been its flexibility. The real issues, 
however, are whether monetary actions are appropriate at the time they 
are taken, and whether, when the resulting effects work themselves out, 
the consequences stabilize the economy or simply serve to reinforce 
instability.
If the economy contains forces which tend to make its fluctua­
tions self-correcting, then unless the correcting mechanism requires an 
extensive time lag before its effects are felt there is no real need for 
any form of stabilization activities. The fact that the economy on its 
own will bring about this correction precludes the need for any type of 
policy action. If, instead, the economy appears to be subject to a
7
8considerable amount of under- or unemployment disequilibrium forces, as 
is assumed in the body of Keynesian economics, more or less continuous 
stabilization actions may be required to promote the desired economic 
goals. And if a long lag exists between the initiation of a policy action 
and the first evidence of its effects, any actions taken toward stabil­
ization are questionable. In this case, the question relating to the
appropriateness of policy actions which are "leaning against the wind" 
may be complicated by the inability to forecast such factors as : when
the action needs to be taken; when the action will be, or begin to be, 
effective; what type of action to take; what magnitude of action is 
called for; what differential effects to expect; etc.
The primary functions of stabilization policy are to maintain a
high level of resource utilization, especially full employment; and to 
keep the price level stable. Price level stability implies the necessi­
ty of keeping the value of money constant. Economic growth is an essen­
tial part of achieving these goals. Given the appropriate policy tools 
full employment and price stability can be compatible with a whole spec­
trum of growth rates; the types of policy instruments to be employed 
serve to determine, to a large degree, the appropriate rate of growth.
The proper role of public policy must be to supplement the economy at 
times when it fails to achieve full employment and/or price stability; 
also when the rate of growth is less than optimal.
To determine the significance of the effect that a change in the 
short-run target or some non-controlled variable will have on the over­
all economic picture, the Federal Reserve must, explicitly or implicitly, 
specify its view of the transmission mechanism through which these short-run
changes are thought to ultimately affect long-run developments. Money 
creation is a relatively short-run phenomenon, resulting generally from 
open market purchases by the Federal Reserve or loans by commercial banks, 
However, the effects of its creation are felt or observed on the ulti­
mate economic objectives only after filtering down through a lengthy 
economic framework (which describes the linkage of short-run occurrences 
to long-run effects). That there are lags in this framework, between 
the initial policy action and the final effects of this action on the 
ultimate goals, is well-recognized.
The Organization and Operations of the 
Federal Open Market Committee
The manager of the System Open Market Account is the agent through 
whom all system open market operations are carried out. He also maintains 
the "Trading Desk" for the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)^ at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The FOMC, through its periodic direc-
2
tives to the Account manager, attempts to direct the conduct of monetary
^The Federal Open Market Committee is composed of the seven mem­
bers of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, plus five of the twelve 
presidents of the district Federal Reserve Banks. These five are the 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who is a permanent 
member, and four other presidents who are selected on a rotating basis.
All of the presidents are eligible to attend the FOMC meetings and par­
ticipate in the discussions; only the five presidents and the seven 
Board members are allowed to vote on policy matters, including the con­
tent of the directive.
2
The directives, either implicitly or explicitly, establish the 
policy guidelines to be followed. These guidelines reflect the desired 
levels of such short-term, operational variables as specific levels of 
free reserves, member bank borrowing from the Federal Reserve, and money 
market prices (interest rates). Prior to June 22, 1955j there were two 
directives issued: one from the full FOMC to its Executive Committee
(EC); the other from the Executive Committee to the manager of the Sys­
tem's Account. Both directives were, except for the operating statement,
10
policy toward sometimes divergent ends. It seeks to maintain, over the 
current policy period (usually three to four weeks), specified conditions 
in the money market while also seeking to accommodate a general expan­
sion in aggregate hank reserves. Except when policy is in a state of 
change, the FOMC takes such actions as it deems necessary to maintain 
stabilized conditions in the money market. The daily operations for the 
System Account are usually conducted with the intent of maintaining a 
desired degree of ease or restraint on both bank reserve positions and 
the general money market condition. At the same time it would seek to 
provide additional, or absorb excess, reserves in the short-run as required 
by the daily demand for cash and by other factors which affect reserve 
levels (e.g., float, and the Treasury's balances at the Federal Reserve 
Banks). Therefore, most open market operations are undertaken simply to 
maintain some desired net reserve position by allowing for these short-term
couched in very general terms. At the June 22 meeting, it was felt that 
consolidation into a single, two-paragraph, general summary of the con­
siderations implicit in the chosen course of action and the specific 
operating directive would provide a better indication of FOMC thinking. 
This should serve as a guide in conducting Account operations while 
allowing the Account manager a wide latitude within which he could use 
his discretion to determine the appropriate actions to take toward 
assuring the desired policy position. This admixture of general and 
specific statements constituted the form of the directives until I9 6 2.
Since the almost complete revision of the directive format in 
early I962, the first paragraph has been used to state the ultimate 
goals and intermediate objectives of the System. It has also outlined 
the major economic conditions currently faced by the nation. The second 
contains the specific operating instructions (generally mentioning 
desired money market tone, interest rates, growth of the money supply 
and/or bank credit and reserves, etc.). Since I966, a "proviso clause" 
has also been included in the second paragraph; this is intended to pro­
vide the Account manager with more latitude in directing policy opera­
tions . Through this action they hoped that he could alter money market 
pressure in either direction to accommodate changes in the growth of 
bank credit or changes in the intermediate guides which were not expected 
or desired before the next regular FOMC meeting.
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and seasonal changes, many of which are fully expected before they 
occur. This is the basis of the FOMC's "defensive" aspect of policy 
operations.
In addition to this day-to-day function of maintaining an orderly 
and smoothly-operating money market mechanism (the defensive aspect), the 
FOMC also seeks to contribute toward achieving the nation's longer-run 
economic goals (the "dynamic" aspect of its actions). These concepts of 
"defensive" and "dynamic" policy actions, introduced by Robert Roosa 
(1956) to delimit the contrasting operations, were defined as:
. . . the defensive side of the Federal Reserve System's duties—  
defending against those seasonal, regional, or perhaps accidental 
causes of sudden stringency that arise in the process of issuing 
currency, or clearing checks, or meeting net flows of funds among 
regions (or vis-a-vis other countries), for example, and which might 
by unhappy coincidence aggravate, or even ignite, a financial and 
economic crisis. . . .  A more sensitive monetary control mechanism 
was wanted, to make greater use of the latent potential of a frac­
tional reserve banking system in resisting inflation and deflation 
and facilitating economic growth. That shift-over from a purely 
defensive to what might be called a dynamic conception of Federal 
Reserve responsibility . . . found full legislative expression in 
the Banking Act of 1935»
The System's defensive aim is to help keep the machinery of the 
money market working smoothly in distributing and allocating the 
market's stock in trade within any given period; its dynamic aim 
is to exert through the money market whatever degree of pressure 
upon bank reserves, liquidity, and the general availability of 
credit is required for stability without inhibiting sustainable 
economic growth.
Although the pursuit of defensive operations accounts for most 
of the policy open market operations, Roosa points out that " . . .  there 
has in fact been a fusion of both types of responsibility. The upper­
most concern at the 'Trading Desk' every day is that the prevailing 
degree of pressure intended . . . shall emerge from the day's confusion 
as a dominating force." He further notes that:
12
it has long since become second nature to the operating personnel 
to handle each problem with its defensive and dynamic aspects joined 
together . . . recognizing that System Account purchases or sales, 
while always made with a view to effecting the general degree of 
reserve pressure intended by the Committee, can never be taken alone 
as a signal of the actual credit policy being pursued.
Monetary policy makers are, naturally, quite concerned with the 
dynamic aspect. However, open market operations, the basic instrument 
used to pursue these goals, appear to be conducted almost solely in 
response to short-run stimuli— basically money market pressures, credit 
conditions, and short-term interest rates. These dynamic goals must be 
viewed over a considerably longer time-perspective than that required 
for the execution of short-run policy operations. Therefore, although 
monetary policy can contribute toward the achievement of these goals, it 
is unrealistic to expect policy actions taken in the financial sector to 
always exactly achieve a specific effect upon such "real" variables as 
production, employment, and industrial output. There are too many non- 
controllable variables in the linkage between the initial action and its 
ultimate effects.
It has only been in the post-World War II era that the Federal 
Reserve has been held responsible for aiding in, if not totally respon­
sible for, the achieving of national economic goals such as those estab­
lished by Congress in the Employment Act of 19^6. Prior to the Accord, 
Federal Reserve actions along these lines were constrained on occasion 
by the "obligation" to support the price, and, therefore, also the interest 
rate, levels of government securities. The 1951 Accord represents the 
formal statement of an end to this tradition of price support for Treasury 
obligations. Official support did not seem to stop until March 5, 1953, 
when the Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee reflected that the
13
FOMC and the EC directives were changed from . .to maintain orderly 
conditions in the Government securities market ; . . to . to
correcting a disorderly situation in the Government securities market; 
. . . "  However, FOMC activities subsequent to this have made it appear 
that, even through the beginning of 1970, the FOMC has continued to 
facilitate Treasury activities in the money market (Keran and Babb, I969). 
This is accomplished by easing, or at least not changing, money market 
conditions around the time scheduled for a Treasury financing or refund­
ing action. This use of the "even-keel" objective seems to have often 
postponed adjustments to monetary policy action— some of which might have 
proved quite necessary at the time— until the Committee meeting following 
the completion of such activities. In at least one case (1959) this pre­
vented possible correction of monetary policy direction and pressure for 
fully five consecutive months (Minutes).
Although varying degrees of control over the several ultimate 
objectives is attributed to Federal Reserve monetary policy actions, the 
FOMC does not appear to consider, in its decision-making process, all of 
these as equally important objectives. The same holds true for control­
ling the movements of various indicator and target variables . The mone­
tary authorities, at least theoretically, attempt to achieve several 
economic objectives at the same time. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that the most appropriate measure which would indicate when a change in 
the level or direction of monetary policy is necessary, is quite 
uncertain. It depends on the theoretical assumptions. A lack of ambiguity 
would imply that all the objectives considered indicated the need for a 
policy change at (approximately) the same time and in the same relative
l4
direction.
In an attempt to reconcile the relatively incompatible goals of 
price stability, a low rate of unemployment, and a satisfactory level of 
economic growth (and, occasionally, balance of payments stability),
Willes (1967-11) finds that the Federal Reserve has " . . .  accepted the 
proposition that monetary policy should have a stimulating influence 
during periods of decline in general economic activity and a restraining 
influence during periods of economic expansion." Thus, it appears that 
" . . .  the Federal Reserve geared changes in the direction of monetary
■3
policy primarily to changes in the phase of the business cycle.
Between Committee meetings, the members are kept current on
developments in the economy by their own research staffs as well as by
that of Board of Governors. Each day, in the process of determining
the appropriate reserve position, given the level of System policy then
being effected, the Account manager consults with at least one member
of both the Board of Governors and the Federal Reserve Bank presidents
in his "11 a.m. telephone conference." In this way, changes in economic
and/or money market conditions are discussed and the desired daily
reserve position is agreed upon, subject to last-minute changes in other 
A
factors. As these conditions change, the Account manager brings this 
to the attention of the Open Market Committee members. If the change is 
large enough or sufficiently rapid to cause some degree of concern with 
respect to the current policy directive, the Account manager or any
There are, however, certain qualifications to this statement 
which Willes recognizes in a footnote and includes in a later chapter.
^For a discussion of many of the factors the Account manager con­
siders before making his decisions, see: Roosa (1956) and Rouse (1968).
15
member of the FOMC may request a special meeting of the Committee to 
discuss the consequences of the recent changes.
During much of the post-Accord period, it appears that the Fed­
eral Reserve, through the FOMC, has consistently relied on basically two 
short-run dynamic target variables as a means of measuring the need for, 
and the results of, its combined policy actions. The main target for 
dynamic operations has been the general condition of the money market, 
usually measured in terms of relative "ease" or "tightness." This is an 
abstract measure of aggregate variables primarily represented by the 
spectrum of interest rates on important short-term market instruments 
and by differing levels of credit availability. "Free reserves" is the 
other principal target. A change in dynamic policy has generally been 
reflected by a similar movement in both of these.
Other variables in the linkage of open market operations to their 
intermediate effects which today are recognized as analytically quite 
important (e.g., total reserves, bank credit, money supply, etc.) were 
originally not targets which the FOMC specified or even used with any 
degree of frequency. They were simply part of the "feel" of the market. 
In i960, the behavior of total reserves and non-borrowed reserves began 
to show up in the FOMC directives; in late I96I, references to a desired 
level (or growth) in reserves began to appear (Minutes). With the evolu­
tion of the "proviso clause," policy actions began to be conditioned by 
developments in commercial bank credit, represented by a "bank credit 
proxy.
^This is usually measured as a monthly average of daily figures 
on total member bank deposits. See: Burger and Ruebling (19?0).
l6
Obviously, an important composite indicator used by the Account 
manager and the FOMC to gauge money market conditions is the daily report 
on, as well as the past and predicted future course of, various measures 
of bank reserve position and the changes in the factors which affect 
these reserves. The other important composite indicator has been money 
market pressure. The Federal Reserve appears to combine the movements 
of several variables to form some sort of qualitative measure of this 
guide. These variables include the interest rates on money market 
instruments and a description of the cash positions of the money market 
banks and firms, especially Government security dealers. Andersen and 
Levine (1966) attempted to measure this degree of pressure by combining 
twelve money market time-series' into two measures of pressure: one, ap
index of New York City money market pressure; the other, an index of 
"nation-wide" money market pressure.^ Each of these time series is a 
measure either of the adjustments in liquidity positions which result 
from changes in the availability of funds to the money market firms, or 
in the cost of their making these adjustments.
By outwardly espousing an eclectic approach to its monetary role 
in the economic scheme of things, the Federal Reserve has consistently 
avoided making any formal or precise statement concerning either the 
quantification of target variables or the theoretical framework by which
^These factors are: the Treasury bill rate; free reserves; the
basic reserve position (deficiency) and the borrowings from the Federal 
Reserve by eight New York money market banks ; the basic reserve position 
and the borrowings from the Federal Reserve Banks by thirty-eight other 
money market banks outside New York City; all member bank borrowings from 
the Federal Reserve Banks; the positions of major Government securities 
dealers ; the Federal Reserve discount rate; the Federal funds rate; and 
the interest rate on four-to-six month commercial paper. Also see:
Rouse (1968). He specifies many of these same factors.
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it judges its potential impact or determines its behavior. This frame­
work would provide the linkages between their instruments and the 
desired effects on the ultimate goals. As Professor Guttentag (1966) 
puts it:
. . . concerning the 'money market strategy,' which was used 
exclusively during 1953-60 and in modified form thereafter, the main 
weakness of the strategy . . .  is its incompleteness, i.e., the 
fact that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) does not set 
specific quantitative target values, for which it would hold itself 
accountable, for the money supply, long-term interest rates, or any 
other 'strategic variable' that could serve as a connecting link 
between open market operations and system objectives; rather it 
tends to rationalize the behavior of these variables after the fact.
The degree to which this is true, as evidenced by the "feel" of the market
leeway given the Account manager, is illustrated by the "proviso clause"
in the second paragraph of the "Current Economic Policy Directive" to the
Account manager from the FOMC; and by the following from Purposes and
Functions (1963) and Roosa (1956).
A given level of net reserves at one point may be associated 
with a faster or slower rate of growth in bank credit than the same 
level of net reserves at another time because of differences in the 
strength of credit demand, the level and structure of interest rates, 
and market-expectations— all of which affect bank preferences for 
free reserves . . . even in the short run the significance of any 
given net reserve figure must be assessed alongside a broad assort­
ment of other information that bears on what is typically alluded 
to as the "tone" and "feel" of the money market. . . .  In executing 
policy it is essential to have these intermediate indicators of 
money market atmosphere. . . . For this reason Committee instruc­
tions have typically directed the Account manager to seek more, less, 
or about the same amount of reserve availability and money market 
ease or tightness as has been prevailing. Decisions as to the pre­
cise size, timing, and direction (purchase or sale) of any market 
operations needed to implement these instructions are left to the 
discretion of the Account Manager. . . .
There is no better description for this process than "getting 
the feel" of the market. It is the combination of both, the pro­
jections (?f reserves, etcT] as modified or confirmed by the "feel," 
which provides the basis for deciding what action, if any, is to be 
taken in carrying out the instructions of the Federal Open Market 
Committee.
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Monetary Policy Tools of the 
Federal Reserve
Most of the Federal Reserve's existing tools were developed early 
in the evolution of the System. It is not surprising that the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913 specified the use of the discount rate to accommo­
date the credit needs of business and commerce by providing funds at the 
request of the member banks. The equivalent of this rate was the main 
policy instrument of the Bank of England. And the trading in self- 
liquidating, short-term paper was already well-established at the time. 
This was the origin of the "real bills" doctrine.
The Federal Reserve Banks were allowed to trade in the open 
market, mostly in eligible paper and securities. This reflected an 
attempt to increase earnings by employing idle funds and not the desire 
to use these operations for policy purposes. The monetary effects of open 
market transactions, however, were noticed fairly quickly. As more 
Banks indicated their preference for using open market transactions rather 
than the discounting regulation as an instrument to control interest 
rates and credit availability, this trading was centralized at the Bank 
in New York to avoid competing among themselves.
Coordination of these two tools for policy purposes began in the 
early 1920's. Since the public did not initially consider open market 
operations as an indication of policy actions, these were used to test 
the reaction to policy moves. Once this initial reaction was observed, 
if additional action was needed, or if a reversal was required, the 
discount rate would be changed to effect the desired result. Other ways 
of coordinating the effort were to let the discount borrowing supply 
seasonal needs and offset irregular needs with open market operations;
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or to use OMO to increase the supply of funds in order to reduce the 
level of discount borrowing.
In the process of discharging its primary "fiscal function" 
during war-time, that of facilitating the Treasury's financing activi­
ties (a function which was delegated to it by the Treasury during World 
War l), the System not only provided new market instruments but it also 
exercised considerable market control over interest rates. In addition, 
dvu'ing hostile periods, the Federal Reserve made a great deal of use of 
moral suasion in an attempt to retard the rapidly expanding use of pri­
vate credit for nonessential purposes and for speculation. This involved 
both limiting the amount of discounting which banks had access to from 
the Federal Reserve and attempting to restrict the amount of credit pro­
vided by the commercial banks. Selective credit controls were thus born 
when some Banks began to require more than 100 percent collateral for 
discounts and advances. In the 1920's, reserve requirements were used 
as a method of securing deposits against loss. But it was not until the 
late 1920's that the Federal Reserve specifically began to use reserve 
requirements to control speculative uses of credit.
During the "Great Depression,” it appeared to the analysts of
that day that none of the existing monetary policy tools were very
effective. The large increase in credit availability in the early stages
of the depression, the subsequent increase in activity of open market
operations, and the intentional build-up of excess reserves did not do
much to stimulate business and economic recovery to any significant 
7
degree. Finally, in an effort to absorb excess funds, the Federal
7
'Many monetarists, especially of the group closely associated 
with Professor Friedman, do not visualize the depression developments
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Reserve, in 1936-7, raised the reserve requirements. This worked only 
temporarily since neither discount rate changes nor open market opera­
tions were effective as long as banks did not need to borrow, or be 
supplied, funds.
Again, during World War II, the System's activity was mainly 
oriented toward assisting in financing of the war as well as providing 
a sizable portion of the necessary funds. Part of this function included 
stabilizing the market for Government securities. Selective credit con­
trols were again used and expanded. After the war, the "pegged" interest 
rate schedules were retained to facilitate monetization of the debt.
The Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord of 1951 finally permitted the Federal 
Reserve to return to controlling the money supply and bank reserves. At 
various times after that, policies regarding the use of the discount 
function were based on "bills only" or "bills usually." But these poli­
cies were officially ended by the last of 1961.
The Lag and Its Measurement in Monetary Policy 
Although there exists a vast spectrum of estimates establishing 
the "true" length of the lag in monetary policy, it is significant that 
most of the researchers reach the conclusion of either a short (a few 
months) or a long lag (fifteen to eighteen months or more), with seldom
in this way. From their viewpoint, excess reserves remained negligible 
and the money supply declined in response to a continued decline in the 
level of Federal Reserve credit outstanding. Because of this, a liquidity 
crisis arose. These, together with intensified financial and economic 
weakness, contributed to the overall financial collapse. This approach 
sees Che renewed open market purchases, which increased the money supply, 
as preventing further deterioration. The monetary collapse, to this 
group, was not a result of, but a large contributing factor in, the over­
all economic contraction. See Chapter VII of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 
for a full discussion of this viewpoint.
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anyone proposing one of an intermediate length. The extent of the lag 
depends on how it is defined, what empirical data are used to illustrate
g
it, and the particular research method chosen, among other factors.
In 1$64 the Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, 1936- 
1960, and Its Executive Committee, 1936-1955, were made available to 
the public by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Since that time several studies of the Federal Open Market Committee's 
behavior have been conducted, using these Minutes to interpret and evalu­
ate the actions taken by the FOMC. These actions were judged against 
the policy-discussion and actual economic developments which occurred 
prior to each of the Committee meetings. These studies have typically 
been related to an investigation of the "true" length of the "inside
lag.
The "inside lag" is a measure of the time elapsed between the 
occurrence of an initial change in general economic activity and the 
taking of a positive action to alter the direction and/or magnitude of 
monetary policy action. This lag is more often analyzed in terms of its 
two components: the "recognition lag"-— the length of time between the
economic change and the Committee's recognition of that change — and the 
"action lag"—"the duration between the Committee's recognition of the 
change and the consequent alteration of monetary action.
The dating of a major change in the direction or levels of general 
economic activity is compared with various reference points which are
O
See Sections I and III of Mayer (I967) and Chapter II of 
Schneider (1968).
^Among these, two of the better studies are by Willes (1967-II) 
and Hinshaw (1967).
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determined by relating them to important dates in the FOMC's decision 
process. These changes in economic activity are usually assumed to coin­
side with the peaks and troughs in the National Bureau of Economic 
Research reference cycle series. The most important of the FOMC's 
reference dates, which have been obtained from the Minutes, the Annual 
Reports of the Board of Governors (1947-I969), and the "Record of Policy 
Actions" (1965-1969)9 are: when the change, or the prospect of change,
is first mentioned by a Committee member; when the full Committee gen­
erally recognizes the possibility or probability of such a change; 
when the change is confirmed by the Committee; and when positive action 
is taken to offset or compensate for this change in economic activity.
In a highly simplified form, the various major components of the 
total lag may be represented by Figure 2-1. This serves to illustrate 
the alternative stages at which an economic analysis of a particular 
policy action may be carried out. The indicators are short-run financial 
variables which first reflect the effects of a policy action. The inter­
mediate variables are a group of both financial and "real" sector vari­
ables which are affected by the policy action after a longer period. And 
the economic objectives are those variables which the original policy 
action was designed to have an effect on. These various aspects are 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. Figure 2-2 presents a 
more explicit view of these components, as visualized by Frazier and 
Yohe (1966).
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FIGURE 2-1
THE TIME SEQUENCE OF THE LAG BETWEEN A NEED FOR 
POLICY ACTION AND THE FINAL RESULTS^
NEED FOR POLICY ACTION
i
POLICY ACTION
I
ACTION REFLECTED IN THE INDICATORS
1
REFLECTED IN THE INTERMEDIATE VARIABLES
i
RESPONSE OF THE "REAL" VARIABLES
i
RESPONSE OF THE ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
INSIDE LAG
INTERMEDIATE LAG
OUTSIDE LAG
Source: Author.
^At each level after the initiation of the policy action, there 
is a possibility of feedback effects on at least one of the previous 
levels from the reactions of any specific level. And there are exogenous 
forces acting on the various levels, especially on the "real" variables 
and economic objectives, which cannot be accounted for but which might 
be offset by policy action if forecast.
2
There is some disagreement concerning the point at which the 
outside lag is terminated. Some reference this point at the time when 
some response is reflected in the "real" variables; others use the begin­
ning of noticeable effects on the economic objectives; and still others 
use the peak in the noticeable effects on these objectives as the 
"appropriate" reference point.
2k
FIGURE 2-2
M ONETARY PO LICY : T IM E  LAG PRO BLEM S 
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Monetary Policy; Some Time Lags.
Source: W, J. Frazier and W. P. Yohe, Introduction to the Analy­
tics and Institutions of Money and Banking, Princeton, 1966, p. 586.
CHAPTER III
DIFFERENT THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ANALYSIS OF 
MONETARY POLICY ACTIVITY
Albert Burger (l97l) has presented an apt analogy to explain the 
"implementation problem" of monetary policy by equating it to the heating 
of a room with a steam furnace. Mr. Homeowner, the policymaker, seeks 
to maintain a comfortable temperature level in his room. He uses his 
room thermometer to determine whether or not the furnace is keeping the 
room at a desired temperature level. This is analogous to the FOMC 
using its measuring devices— e.g., the consumer price index, constant 
dollar GNP, unemployment rate— to determine if the financial sector is 
keeping the real sector policy objectives— e.g., employment, prices, 
output— within some desired range. If the individual wants to raise the 
temperature level in the room, he advances the heat control gauge, and, 
after a lag, again consults the thermometer to determine whether or not 
the action he took was sufficient. Similarly for the FOMC as they would 
increase the use of their policy instruments— basically open market 
operations, the discount rate, and reserve requirements on demand and 
time deposits. If the action was not sufficient, he would further 
advance the level of the gauge and, after another lag, again consult the 
thermometer.
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If the policymaker is not certain that his furnace is efficient 
and operating correctly, he may install at least two gauges at inter­
mediate positions in the process to improve his control. He may intro­
duce a fuel flow gauge to measure the amount of flow between the fuel 
supply and the furnace, and a steam pressure gauge to measure the 
efficiency of operation of the furnace. In the case of certainty these 
measuring devices were not necessary. Continuing the analogy, the indi­
cators of monetary policy, like the fuel flow gauge, are measures that 
provide information concerning the current effect of the newly-actuated, 
or of the existing level of, monetary (as well as fiscal) policy actions 
on the financial sector. These indicators are often "operational tar­
gets" which the Federal Reserve attempts to control on a day-to-day basis, 
They may also include variables over which the Federal Reserve feels it 
has relatively effective control but which are measured for the policy 
affect on them only after a short lag (a few days to a week or a little 
more). Policy targets are analogous to either (or both) the steam pres­
sure gauge or the thermometer— both being intermediate measuring devices. 
These reflect the current effect of the financial sector, including the 
movements of the policy instruments, on the real sector. The ultimate 
goals of a policy action correspond to a comfortable room temperature 
level.
Theoretical Framework Linkages 
In theory, one could determine the framework assumed by the 
Federal Reserve in its economic analysis by tracing the effects of 
specific monetary policy action from its inception, which generally 
involves changes in the levels of the policy tools, to its denouement.
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as evidenced by changes in the ultimate objectives. However, nothing 
like a concensus exists concerning the exact specification of this link­
age.
There appears to be general agreement that the original effects 
arising from monetary policy actions exert their primary influence on, 
and are transmitted by changes in, supply schedules and the prices of 
financial assets. The changes in the former initially are due to an 
adjustment in the availability and/or cost of member bank reserves.
Those in the latter are represented by interest rate changes. Both sets 
of changes are brought about by portfolio adjustments which are made 
necessary because the policy action created an initial, or a larger, 
disequilibrium in some market(s). A change in the supply schedules or 
in the prices of financial assets may cause a modification in the exist­
ing levels of money and/or bank credit as well as reaction movements in 
these schedules and prices because of their basic interrelationships. 
These changes are then disseminated through portfolio adjustments of 
both the banking sector (central and commercial) and the private sector.
As these adjustments are made, they affect interest rates, the 
general availability of credit, and the relative prices of both real 
and financial assets. These effects, together with those resulting 
from the reaction and readjustment of potentially all of the relevant 
economic variables in the system, are eventually transmitted to the 
ultimate policy objectives via some economic framework. Although this 
generalized discussion of the transmission process may, in principle at 
least, present an acceptable summary of the theory implicit in most of 
the popularly-proposed theoretical approaches, the exact specifications
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of the linkages differ significantly. The way one postulates the frame­
work depends, to a large extent, on his monetary theory "bent."
The "strict-Keynesian" interpretation maintains that monetary 
policy is not important except as it facilitates fiscal policy operations—  
"money does not matter." Neglecting this, however, the theoretical 
importance assigned to changes in monetary policy (generally, changes in 
the "money supply") ranges from "money matters little" to the polar case 
that "money is all that matters." The basic neo-Keynesian theory, which 
considers fiscal policy to be the best approach to stabilization of the 
economy, recognizes that monetary policy can also be effective in stabil­
ization; but it is not as efficient since fiscal policy is assumed to 
more directly affect the ultimate economic objectives (e.g., consumption 
and investment) and to have a shorter time-lag. The initial effects of 
a monetary policy action are assumed to be reflected by changes in interest 
rates. The implication of this for "countercyclical stabilization poli­
cies" is that restrictive monetary policy is reflected in high and/or 
rising interest rates while a policy of relative ease is identified 
with low and/or falling interest rates.
The monetarist position considers monetary policy to be the most 
important, though not necessarily all-important, approach to stabiliza­
tion policy (Fand, 1970-1 and II; Davis, 1969). It measures the initial 
effects of monetary policy by changes in monetary aggregates (typically, 
the monetary base). Restrictive monetary policy is exemplified by a 
declining aggregate, often accompanied by a low and/or falling interest 
rate; a rising monetary aggregate, and possibly also a high and/or 
rising interest rate, reflects relative policy ease.
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Thus, which basic theoretical framework one adopts in describing 
the channels through which monetary policy actions are transmitted, 
determines the relative importance he assigns to the money supply as 
opposed to interest rate or other variables as an indicator of the 
effectiveness of those specific actions. If one adopts the basic neo- 
Keynesian version, he then assumes that changes in the money supply 
affect output and/or prices in the short-run only through its effect on 
the interest rates of a group of financial assets (principally Government 
and corporate bonds). The emphasis is on the substitution between money 
and securities. Income and total net worth positions are not assumed 
to be immediately and directly affected by changes in the money supply.
If they were affected to the extent that the demand for money increased 
to exactly the new level of the supply of money, interest rates would 
remain unchanged. But the essence of the "liquidity" (Keynes) or "sub­
stitution" effect is that, since income and net worth positions are not 
so affected, interest rates must change in the opposite direction from 
the money supply change if the substitution is to bring about the equal­
ity between the demand for and supply of money.
The liquidity preference theory of interest rate determination 
seeks to equate changes in the nominal, as well as the real (due to the 
assumption of a constant price level), money supply to equivalent changes 
in the demand for real balances. In terms of this theory, the demand 
for money, which is assumed to be relatively interest-inelastic, is shown 
to determine the level of "the" interest rate. Since business investment 
and government spending are considered the basic factors determining 
economic growth, the interest rate change results in changing investment.
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This, in turn, eventually manifests itself in changes in economic 
activity. In simplified form, this might appear as:
Open Interest
Market >.Money Supply ►   >»Investment--- ^-Income
É # I t  5Operations
This should not, however, be interpreted to mean that a change in the 
money supply will only be reflected by changes in the interest rate. 
Certainly it will affect also the levels of consumption and other forms 
of investment. This is only meant to expose the primary influence which 
Keynesian theory hypothesizes will evolve from a change in the money 
supply. Therefore, the effectiveness of monetary policy in the short-run 
is measured by the magnitude of the change in "the" interest rate due to 
a change in the money supply. It is also measured by the size of the 
change in investment resulting from the interest rate change.
Monetarists, on the other hand, postulate that changes in the 
money supply will directly affect not only the yields on financial 
assets, but also other prices, spending on goods and services, and the 
yields on real assets. By assuming a relatively-more interest-elastic 
demand for money, "the" interest rate is regarded as simply another 
price*-the price of holding real balances ; the demand for money will 
determine the desired level of real balances rather than the level of 
interest rate. This position adds to the Keynesian substitutability, 
which initially is strictly between money and financial assets, the 
possibility of substituting between money and/or financial assets and 
"real" assets. Thus, for an initial increase in the supply of money, 
income and net worth positions (as well as the interest rate) may both 
be affected. The individual may reestablish portfolio balance by purchasing
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either financial or real assets, or both, in addition to increasing his 
holdings of cash balances.
The immediate impact of an increase in the money supply, result­
ing from open market purchases, is to increase the demand for and prices 
of real as well as financial assets. It is possible that if one purchases 
a real asset, which carries no explicit yield, the effect on the price 
level might precede that on the interest rate if the demand for bonds is 
not also changed initially. More normally, however, one should expect 
that the interest rate will react, if not prior to, at least simultane­
ously with the reactions of other prices and the rates of return on other 
assets. The price of money, then, is really just an exchange price with 
respect to other commodities, both financial and real.
With an increase in the money supply, increases are initially- 
experienced in nominal relative to real cash balances, and in expendi­
tures relative to income. The attempt to eliminate some of the excess 
cash balances results in increased spending or increased purchases of 
capital or output, all of which result in changes in relative prices.
This stimulates borrowing and production. Banks respond by increasing 
loans, and there is an increase in the demand for labor and other 
resources. This leads to additional spending and more demand for credit. 
Eventually this results in further increases in output and a general 
rise in the price level. Although a diagrammatic representation of the 
monetarist linkage is not as straight-forward as in the Keynesian case, 
it may be adequately illustrated by:
Open
Market  >»Money Supply
Operations
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'Financial Asset Yields > 
Other Prices 
Spending on Goods and 
Services 
^Yields on "Real" Assets^
■Income
The monetarist's emphasis is on the long-run income and price- 
expectations effects. An income effect originates when changes in the 
money supply result in similar movements in the level of income. Income 
is directly affected by the production of additional capital goods. This 
occurs because changes in the money supply cause interest rates to vary, 
thus changing the spread between interest rates and the rate of return 
on capital. Income is probably also affected indirectly by changes due 
to the multiplier effect. The price-expectations (Fisher), or wealth, 
effects arise if changes in the money supply produce changes in nominal 
income that result mainly from price changes at a rate that is expected 
to continue into the future. Real assets would change in value relative 
to the liabilities created to purchase them— therefore, net worth would 
be changed (Gibson, 1970).
Thus, it is possible that a change in the money supply may affect 
the prices of all assets and the desired level of real balances (since 
money is also a substitute for real assets) as well as that portion of 
the portfolio which is spent on goods and services. All of this could 
occur without having to change the interest rate level, although because 
it affects the implicit yield on real assets, it will also affect 
the implicit yield on financial assets. For this to occur, however, 
the liquidity effects must be exactly offset by a combination of the 
income and price-expectations effects. More generally, though, it 
is recognized that interest rates will usually move immediately in the
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direction opposite to the money supply change. Since these interest 
rate movements alter the amount of money demanded, a change in the 
demand for money will not have to he as large proportionally as the inter­
est rate change in the Keynesian case. Thus, the monetarists also recog­
nize the possibility of an inverse relationship between changes in the 
money supply and interest rates, at least initially. However, in suc­
cessive periods, the increased levels of expenditures and income change 
may serve to create income and price-expectations effects which exceed 
the liquidity effects, thus justifying a return to, or an increase to 
some level above, the initial interest rate level.
In summary, a comparison of these two basic frameworks reveals 
that in the neo-Keynesian approach, the interest rate serves to equate 
the supply of and the demand for money, either in nominal or "real" 
terms. Since a change in nominal money is assumed to directly affect 
interest rates but not price levels, the price level is determined 
exogenously by wage and cost factors. The price level in the monetarist 
approach serves to equate the supply of and the demand for real balances; 
"the" interest rate is the part of this price that is determined by the 
nominal money stock. Thus, where the neo-Keynesian emphasis is on the 
substitution between money and financial assets resulting from an ini­
tial change in the money stock, the monetarist emphasis is on the wealth 
and income effects of the money supply change. Both hypothesize an 
initial opposite movement between money and interest rates. But when 
the income and wealth effects cause income and price-expectations to 
change at or above the new rate of money supply change, interest rates will 
reverse direction and approach the original level if this new rate of
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monetary change is maintained.^
These crucial differences account for the divergent interpreta­
tions of interest rate movements. The neo-Keynesian's negative corres­
pondence between changes in the money supply and changes in interest 
rates is due to the assumed price rigidities. This does not imply that 
prices are fixed; it means that they are determined by factors which are 
exogenous to the financial sector. The negative relationship still holds 
given flexible prices. The monetarist's hypothesis of a correspondence 
between money and price movements results from the direct relation 
between the nominal stock of money and the "price" of this money and 
other assets (Fand, I97O-I).
Havrilsky (1968) appears to present an approach which incorporates 
features of both major theoretical frameworks into a description which 
may be more acceptable to the "eclectic" policy-maker;
I believe the linkage between monetary policy action and the 
target-variables and goal-variables is as follows. Open market 
transactions in short-term securities affect money market condi­
tions (marginal reserve measures, short-term interest rates, etc.); 
after a short lag total reserves and the monetary base respond; as 
bank purchases or sales of earning assets eventually respond, the 
money supply and short-term interest rates are affected; effects 
are transmitted in the market after a lag to long-term interest 
rates and a range of credit conditions. Certain components of 
investment spending respond after a lag to the changed short- and 
long-term interest rates and credit terms via the cost effect as 
well as the effect on the price of real assets relative to their 
supply price. There may, in addition, be a wealth effect wrought 
by changes in the stock of financial assets. Eventually aggregate 
investment and aggregate consumption respond and finally the goal- 
variables of policy are affected. This final reaction overlooks 
the earlier response of certain measures of the balance-of-payments 
problem to the change in short-term rates.
In an attempt to analyze the strategy of the Federal Reserve's
^For a detailed development of these effects see: Gibson (1968,
1970); Davis (1968); and Fand (1970-1 and II).
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policy-oriented activities, Professor Guttentag (1966) developed a dia­
grammatic approach which, although admittedly highly simplified, out­
lines the basic framework of policy action and reaction:
Day Week Month Quarter Quarter
Open Money Free Total Money Gross
Market- >■ Market»-  ^ Reserve— ^ Reserves —  - ^ Supply — ^National
Operation Condition Product
In spite of the fact that there exist arguments concerning the proper
entries in this example (which was designed to show a "money supply
strategy"), it still adds some perspective to an analysis of policy
operations.
Tobin (1969) attempts to clarify the linkage problem by saying
that:
From a policy maker's standpoint , . . instruments are variables 
he controls completely himself. Targets are variables he is trying 
to control, that is, to cause to reach certain numerical values, or 
to minimize fluctuations. Intermediate variables lie in-between. 
Neither are they under perfect control nor are their values ends in 
themselves. Generally, these intermediate variables are of interest 
when two conditions are met: (l) they are easier to control than
the target variables, and (2) they are links in the chain of causa­
tion from instruments to goals.
Figure 3-1j although altered in content somewhat from Townsend's (l970) 
original version, presents a proposed outline delimiting several com­
ponents of the "linkages" at each level of the analysis. No cause-effect 
relationship is intended between the variables simply because they 
happened to be placed on the same line ip the Figure.
When looked at from a somewhat different perspective, an analysis 
of the economy's adjustment to a policy action (or a sequence of such 
actions) may appear as a series of simultaneously-determined, momentary 
values for the variables in the system. Starting from a point of general
FIGUEE 3-1
POLICY TOOLS, INDICATORS AND TARGETS
POLICY TOOLS
MONETARY VARIABLES "REAL VARIABLES"
INTERMEDIATE ULTIMATE INTERMEDIATE ULTIMATE
Open Market 
Operations
Federal Reserve 
Credit 
Outstanding
Money Supply
Expenditures on 
Consumer 
Durables
Gross National 
Product
Discount Rate Total Member Bank Reserves Bank Credit
Business 
Investment in 
Plant and 
Equipment
Industrial
Production
Legal Required 
Reserve Ratip Free Reserves Interest Rates
Residential
Construction Unemployment Rate
Regulation Q
Long-term 
Government 
Bond Prices
Retail Sales Consumer Price Index
Selective
Credit
Controls
Stock Market 
Prices
Balance of 
Payments
uoo\
Source: W. S. Townsend, "Monetary Policy and Economic Objectives: A Suggested Framework for
Analysis," Southern Journal of Business, April, I970, p. 11$.
Altered by the addition of several entries.
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equilibriim with this system of equations approach, a policy action
induces responses which affect, and are affected hy, the movements and
values of the other variables within the system. Given the initial
2
assumption that the underlying economic situation does not change, the 
economy is assumed to be initially in equilibrium. It is also assumed 
to remain generally in equilibrium although observed values of the endo­
genous variables may differ significantly from the predicted values due 
to random errors. Thus, the economy as a whole is assumed to be in at 
least temporary equilibrium even though several, if not all, of the 
endogenous variables may be experiencing a momentary disequilibrium. 
Therefore, this general approach requires less actual attempt to specify 
the exact framework or components of this linkage.
An example might dwell on the equality of the supply of and 
demand for nominal money balances. The systems approach involves finding 
a functional relationship for both the supply of and demand for money, 
and then postulating that the two are equal. The simpler technique 
involves either supposing one to be exogenously determined (e.g., the 
money supply) and assuming it to be equal to the functional relationship 
of the other (e.g., the demand for money), or proposing that both are 
exogenously determined and always equivalent.
Alternative Indicators of Policy Effects
"No subject is engulfed in more confusion and controversy than 
the measurement of monetary policy. Is it tight? Is it easy? Is it
2
This assumes a given level of technology, and given institu­
tional and behavioral constraints, all of which are expressed in the 
model by parameters.
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tighter than it was last month, or last year, or ten years ago? Or is 
is easier? Such questions receive a bewildering variety of answers . . . "  
(Tobin, 1969) • Indicators of monetary policy are measures of the direc­
tion and extent to which monetary policy has changed in recent periods. 
They serve much the same function for monetary policy as the fun­
employment budget position or the level of autonomous spending does for 
fiscal policy. The variables which are used as indicators are often 
required to play a dual role: (l) to provide an ordinal scale against
which the direction and magnitude of various possible policy actions may 
be assessed and compared (indicator); (2) to act as a desired level toward 
which Federal Reserve operations in the money market may be directed in 
the presence of uncertainties that exist in the economy as well as in 
the theoretical framework (target).
The problem is not only descriptive but normative ; that is, we 
all want an indicator of ease or tightness not just to describe 
what is happening, but to appraise current policy against some cri­
terion of desirable or optimal policy. We want to be able to say 
whether policy is too easy or too tight, and we appeal to indicators 
to support such a judgment. (Tobin, I969)
During the 1953-69 period under consideration, measures of money 
market conditions were widely used both inside and outside the Federal 
Reserve as indicators because, in large part, they were thought to play 
an important role in the transmission process. In the day-to-day oper­
ations in this market for cash balances and close cash substitutes (both 
of which are used by banks to satisfy their liquidity requirements), the 
most often mentioned indicators of money market conditions are the 
liquidity positions of money market institutions and the degree of pres­
sure or ease on the money market itself. The main component of the 
measure of liquidity positions is the level of reserve availability.
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This is usually measured in terms of the value, relative change, or rate 
of change of its proxy, free reserves.
The FOMC generally instructs the Account manager to seek more, 
or less, or about the same amount of reserve availability and money 
market ease or tightness as has been prevailing. Most of the actions 
the FOMC takes are to correct or allow for daily, seasonal, or other 
short-run reserve changes (e.g., changes in the levels of currency, 
float, monetary gold stock). Therefore, the FOMC is more interested in 
maintaining the supply of reserves available to facilitate bank demand 
and credit growth at some desired level than it is in the overall volume 
of open market operations. This is evidenced by the establishment of an 
approximate growth objective for reserve availability in the policy 
directive. This was done to avoid over-emphasis on free reserves; its 
effectiveness toward this end, however, is questionable as was especially 
apparent during the 1950’s and early 1960's. Thus, the marginal measures 
of bank reserve position, or, more correctly, of reserve availability, 
are said to basically reflect sizable short-run changes in reserve needs.
There are three primary factors used to gauge the demand for 
available reserves— the levels of excess reserves, borrowed reserves, and 
net free or net borrowed reserves. Excess reserves represent the differ­
ence between the total reserves available and those that are required as 
"margin" against demand and time deposits in member banks. Borrowed 
reserves is usually a measure of the level of discounts and advances 
granted by the Federal Reserve Banks to provide banks with reserves on a 
"loan" basis when needed. The difference between these two levels is a 
measure of free reserves— a positive value indicates net free reserves;
ko
a negative value, net borrowed reserves. As the most often used proxy 
for the measure of reserve availability, an increase in free reserve is 
considered to reflect an increased availability of marginal reserves for 
credit expansion. An increase in net borrowed reserves signifies 
decreased marginal availability. But free reserves is not a good measure 
by itself since it does not necessarily reflect either the level of 
demand for credit or the bank's demand for free reserves (as evidenced 
by the tremendous amount of net free reserves in the early and middle 
1930’s). Therefore, although it may be a sensitive short-run guide to 
open market operations, it must be considered in conjunction with devel­
opments in the money market and the economy, as well as with changes or 
trends in the basic measures of reserve availability: total reserves,
required reserves, and nonborrowed reserves (the difference between total 
reserves and member bank borrowing of reserves from the Federal Reserve
O
Banks). These basic measures, however, are not sensitive enough to be 
daily indicators. Their importance as indicators of basic changes in the 
overall reserve base is reflected in their trend and in the magnitude of 
their change.
The other important component of the measure of liquidity posi­
tions is typically thought to be the volume of net Federal funds pur­
chases.^ This is generally considered to be a sensitive indicator of
-3
For a more detailed analysis of reserve availability, see:
Fry (1963) and Keir (1963).
^Federal funds are reserve deposit balances maintained either at 
the Federal Reserve Banks or in the vaults of member banks. These funds 
are deposit accounts which are traded between banks having excess reserve 
positions and those with deficient positions. This trading enables those 
banks with deficient positions to meet the minimum legal reserve position 
requirements over the two week period. See: Anderson, et.al. (1959) and.
Willes (no date).
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current changes in bank reserve positions and reserve availability since 
it is one frequently proposed measure of the supply and demand for 
excess reserves. Although this source of reserve adjustment was previously 
thought to be available primarily to large money market banks, the high 
interest rates payable on the loan of these excess reserves, especially 
in the relatively recent past, has drawn smaller banks (particularly 
those which traditionally have a net excess position) into the market as 
well.
"Money market pressure" is the general designation for the other 
overall indicator of money market conditions. The degree of pressure is 
determined by the size of the net reserve adjustments necessary to main­
tain at least a minimum required position and/or by the cost of making 
these adjustments to a bank's liquidity position. Each of the components 
of this index provide a measure of at least one of these. Thus, pres­
sure is high when the demand for money market funds (reserves) is more 
than the available supply at the existing interest rate (cost), and con­
versely. There appear to be at least seven basic factors which are 
often combined to provide an index of money market pressure; the inter­
est rate on three-month Treasury bills; the interest rate on Federal 
funds, and sometimes also the volume; the trend of free reserves; the 
reserve position of major money market banks; the level of member bank 
borrowings from the Federal Reserve Banks; the discount rate at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York; and, the interest rate on four-to-six 
month commercial paper.^
^Perhaps the most in-depth study of the components of the "feel 
of the market" has been conducted by Andersen and Levine (I965, I966), 
and Levine (1969). The Federal Reserve also lists the rate on three-month
k2
The Federal funds rate and the discount rate are the real costs 
of adjusting reserve positions; as these rates increase, pressure 
increases. However, the Federal funds rate becomes a less sensitive 
measure of pressure as it approaches the discount rate level because 
this rate has traditionally been considered the ceiling rate on Federal 
funds. The Treasury bill rate and the rate on four-to-six month commer­
cial paper represents the alternative or opportunity cost options avail­
able to banks to adjust their reserve positions. If "opportunity rates" 
are high, the cost of obtaining borrowed or purchased reserves is high; 
therefore, money market pressure is high. The measure of the trend in 
free reserves is the only inverse relationship. As the trend level 
rises, pressure decreases, and as it falls, pressure increases.
The reserve position of the major money market banks (not, there­
fore, restricting this simply to New York City banks) is determined by 
subtracting the level of their net purchases of Federal funds from the 
level of their free reserves. This measures the extent to which total 
reserves of these banks are insufficient to at least cover the necessary 
level of their required reserves. The larger the deficiency, the greater 
the money market pressure. This index is often combined with a measure 
of the borrowings of these banks from the Federal Reserve. If the bor­
rowings are large and the deficit quite large, a significant degree of 
pressure is felt; but, if the borrowings are small, this pressure is 
lessened. The overall level of total member bank borrowing is an impor­
tant factor in its own right. Although it is a component of free
Euro-dollars (see: Federal Reserve Statistical Release No. H. 9 "Weekly
Summary of Banking and Credit Measures").
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reserves, when it is associated with high levels of interest rates and 
a general inavailability of reserves, it provides a potent measure of 
market pressure.
In addition to these components of money market pressure, there 
also exists a largely amorphous measure often referred to as the "feel," 
or "tone," or "behavior" of the money market. The Account manager, 
through the "Trading Desk,"^ maintains continuous contact with the money 
and capital markets. In addition to frequent reports on the level or 
changes in the components of the measure "liquidity positions of money 
market institutions" and on the factors dealing with market pressure, 
the Account manager receives many additional pieces of information.
Although they can be listed, the importance of these cannot be adequately 
assigned (at least not on a quantitative basis). Certainly one of the 
most important factors in this "feel" is the financial position of the 
dealers in U.S. Government securities. This is measured by the ease of 
financing, through call loans, the dealer's inventory, and by the magni­
tude of the borrowings of these dealers.
In discussing "A'Day's Work' at the Trading Desk," Roosa (1956) 
indicates that there are many other factors, in addition to the measures 
of money market pressure, that receive attention. A partial listing of 
these would include: (l) preliminary closing figures on the Treasury's
balances for the previous day and the prospects for the present day; (2) the 
necessity of stabilizing the market prior to or following a Treasury 
security issue, or compensating for other Treasury activities; (3) the
^The "Trading Desk" is the operating arm of the FOMC, carrying 
out the daily analysis as well as the daily operations within the instruc­
tions of the FOMC. See: Roosa (1956).
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advisability of "rolling-over" maturing banker's acceptances; (k) the 
movement of prices in the various sectors of the Government securities 
market (with special emphasis on some issues, e.g., three-month Treasury 
Bills) and the Federal Funds market, as well as price movements in 
corporate and municipal bond markets, and the activity on the various 
stock exchanges; and (5) projections of factors affecting bank reserve 
positions daily for the next four weeks.
Then, during the "11 o'clock telephone conference," policy action 
for the day is decided upon subject to unexpected changes which may 
result in overall pressure deviating from that which is expected. The 
amount of latitude given the Account manager, through his use of the 
"feel of the market," allows him to adjust his operations in an attempt 
to bring these deviations back into line.
In addition to all this, the FOMC's directive since May 10, I966, 
has contained a "proviso clause" which has been stated in terms of "bank 
credit." This is a variable which is often classified as a monetary 
aggregate rather than strictly as a money market indicator. This is 
yet another attempt to provide flexibility in the Account manager's 
operations. He can alter the guidelines concerning money market pres­
sure in order to compensate for a deviation of the actual reserves avail­
able from the desired level which was projected for that period at the time 
the directive was originally issued. The actual measure of bank credit, 
total loans and investments of commercial banks (adjusted), is available 
only on the call date— the last Wednesday of the month. Therefore, the 
Federal Reserve adopted the measure "average daily total member bank 
deposits subject to reserve requirements (adjusted for nondeposit items)"
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to serve as the hank credit proxy. But, as before, the Account manager 
must, when possible, receive clearance during the "11 o'clock telephone 
conference" before changing the money market pressure target.
As a result of the growing analytical acceptance of the "mone­
tary" approach during the l^SO's, monetary policy, as well as theory, 
has experienced an increased rejection of the relative importance of 
money market condition variables as indicators of the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. These measures have too often failed to accurately 
predict the actual or relative movements in the ultimate objectives 
which have occurred at some later time. Also, there has appeared to be 
a growing recognition that, since free reserves is not generally included 
in explicit statements of most theoretical frameworks, it should not con­
tinue in its position as a primary indicator and/or target in the link­
age. It should be replaced by some variable or group of variables which 
hold a more important place within this structure. Instead of these 
condition variables, the "monetarists" have substituted some level of, 
or rate of change in, a monetary aggregate. And, in general, the policy 
makers have at least begun to take cognizance of this type of measure. 
Examples of these aggregates include "narrowly defined money,"
(demand deposits plus currency outstanding), "broadly defined money,"
Mg (M^ plus time deposits), still broader definitions of the money sup­
ply, time deposits,bank credit (total member bank deposits, or total 
member bank deposits plus nondeposit items— the "bank credit proxy"), 
the volume of bank assets, and the volume of U.S. Government demand 
deposits at member banks. The monetarist's analysis maintains that the 
behavior of the monetary aggregate has important effects in determining
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the behavior of the ultimate objectives. Therefore, as Meltzer (1968) 
points out, a monetary aggregate that is often chosen is the rate of
growth of the money supply (either or Mg).
Research suggests also that the growth rate of the money supply, 
currency and demand deposits, is the least unreliable of the cur­
rently available indicators of monetary policy. The growth rate 
of the money supply is not an ideal indicator since it is affected 
by fiscal policies and by other changes that are not closely related 
to current monetary policies. However, all of the variables commonly 
used as indicators such as free reserves, market interest rates, bank 
credit, and the bank credit proxy suffer from the same defect to
greater degree. The growth rate of the money supply provides a more
reliable scale of the thrust of monetary policy than the alternatives 
mentioned.
Others, recognizing that the response of such intermediate vari­
ables to policy action reflects not only the results attributable to these 
actions but also to those which may be ascribed to exogenous factors, 
find this sufficient justification to reject the use of these variables 
as indicators. Realizing that a more expedient measure of the effective­
ness of monetary policy would be one which isolates the former effects, 
many have chosen a variable that is more closely controlled by the Fed­
eral Reserve; one for which relatively accurate data is available about 
it and its components quite frequently. The figure generally adopted is 
the monetary base (or its almost equivalents, adjusted monetary base or 
high-powered money). Figure 3-2 presents Andersen's (1967) generalized 
outline on the calculation of the monetary base; he later (1968) speci­
fied this process in greater detail (Figure 3-3)•
Brunner and Meltzer (1964) and Dewald (1963), who are among a 
large and growing contingent of "quantity-watchers"— those who follow 
the money supply (as opposed to the "price-watchers" who follow the 
interest rates)— propose that some measure of the reserve base be the
FIGURE 3-2
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Source: L. C. Andersen, "Three Approaches to Money Stock Deter­
mination," Review— Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, October, I967, p. 8.
^Altered to eliminate the numbers, totals, and description of the 
types of data and the period to which the data referred.
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Adjusted monetary base equals the sum of member bank reserves 
plus currency held by the public, minus borrowed reserves (TR - MBB + CC) 
= unborrowed reserves plus currency held by the public (UBR + CC). This 
is the variable which is assumed to be the proxy for open market opera­
tions .
FIGURE 3-3
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Source : L. C. Andersen,"Federal Reserve Defensive Operations and Short-Run Control of the Money
Stock," Journal of Political Economy, March/April, I968, p. 278.
^Altered to eliminate the numbers, totals, and description of the types of data and the period 
to which the data referred.
Friedman and Schwartz exclude float in calculating this. Usually it is included.
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replacement for free reserves. Free reserves, they feel, has a signifi­
cantly smaller degree of relation with the money supply than do any of 
the various types of reserve base measures. However, as Dewald (I966) 
points out, they are quick to reject the money supply as an indicator:
. . . the quantity of money . . . need Qio^ be a correct indicator 
of the expansionary or contractionary influence of monetary policy. 
Despite an increase in high-powered money, the money supply may 
decline as the result of a decline in the rate of interest on private 
securities, and . . .  as the result of a decrease in the private 
security rate relative to the rate of interest on time deposits, if 
time deposits are good substitutes for private securities. Thus, 
the test of an expansionary monetary policy is not an expanding money 
supply as interest rates decline due to a decline in planned expen­
diture. But an expanding money supply ceteris paribus would provide 
some assurance that open market purchases by the central bank or 
reductions in required reserve ratios were exerting an expansionary 
effect. It is also true that the test of an expansionary monetary 
policy is not a decline in the private security rate of interest.
. . . Hence the test of an expansionary policy is again found in 
the changes in the variables that are controlled by the monetary 
authorities . . .
However, it is important to note that a decline in the rate of 
interest on private securities may give less information about the 
expansionary influence of monetary policy actions than an increase 
in the money supply does. In face of decline [sic] in planned 
expenditure and no change in other behavioral relations, an increase 
in the money supply would be a sign of an expansionary monetary 
policy. But a decline in the rate on private securities might mask 
contractionary policy actions that hold rates from falling as far 
as they otherwise would.
It is necessary to measure the expansionary effect of monetary 
policy in terms of changes in policy-controlled variables. Thus 
. . . the quantity of money . . .  is fno^ a sure measure of the 
expansion of policy actions. A parallel argument applies to the 
measurement of contractionary monetary policy actions.
Free reserves, interest rates, the money supply, bank credit, 
and the rate of change in the money supply are five of the most often 
suggested indicators to measure the relative impact of monetary policy. 
But each of these is an endogenous variable, so that current movements 
in them are partly due to feedback from the financial and/or "real" 
markets. The fluctuations of M^, as Brunner and Meltzer (I967) explain.
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are due to policy effects, feedback effects, and the influence of fiscal 
policy and noncontrollable exogenous variables— mainly the decisions of 
the Treasury, commercial banks, nonbank financial institutions, and non- 
financial business and consumers. The same general statement also must 
hold for changes in interest rates— probably the most popular indicator—  
and for free reserves— the most often used indicator. So also for Mg 
and the rate of change in the money supply. And as Hendershott (1967) 
points out, the monetary base and its variants are also far from being 
exogenous. As such, all these variables could prove to be misleading 
indicators. But the Federal Reserve's ability to control the levels of 
the monetary base, or its variants, determines the extent to which it is 
a relatively good measure.
Still other scholars propose that the indicator should be totally 
unaffected by exogenous forces— it should reflect only the results of 
policy actions. Since the policy-maker seeks to judge the appropriate­
ness of the potential effects of a given policy action by the reaction 
he observes in his indicator(s), he may be misled if the effects of the 
exogenous forces so dominate the true policy effects that the guides 
give him incorrect signals. The indicator in this case is all-important. 
Not only is it affected more quickly, but it also should reflect only the 
reaction to the policy action. Many investigators have tried to estab­
lish a set of standards by which one could select the most appropriate 
indicator(s), given the theoretical framework one assumes.^
^For example, see Saving (I967) and Havrilsky (1967). It should 
not be inferred by the reader that these considerations are ranked in 
any specific order (e.g., order of importance); a meaningful ordering 
in terms of importance results from the user's own assumptions reflect­
ing his personal evaluation (utility).
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If it is possible to draw a consensus concerning these stand­
ards, it might contain some or all of the following components: (l) the
indicator should be readily and easily observable, and reasonably subject 
to Federal Reserve control; (2) it should clearly reflect not only 
changes in the market situation and the policy tools, but also the 
expected effects of the policy action on the target(s), intervening 
"real" variables, and ultimate goals; (3) it should not be affected by 
the exogenous variables, the effects of which are part of what is measured 
by the target variable(s); (U) it should be related to the decision­
maker’s hypothesized linkage and his knowledge about the economy in gen­
eral; (5) it should minimize the amount of knowledge he is assumed to 
have concerning the economic framework; and, (6) if the exogenous vari­
ables do affect the indicator, the magnitude of this effect, when com­
pared with that due to the policy action, should be relatively small.
Thus, what is actually wanted is a variable which is endogenous only to 
the effects of monetary policy actions— one that is exogenous to all 
other effects. However, since any set of standards would probably be 
objected to by some investigators, the choice of an "optimal" indicator 
remains largely one which is based on a subjective evaluation of the 
alternatives by the policy-maker. The choice is made on the basis of 
the individual's, or group's, utility function, given the constraints 
imposed by the economy and/or by other external forces.
In terms of some combination of the above standards, the money 
supply, interest rates, bank credit, free reserves, and the rate of 
change in the money supply are again rejected, and for much the same 
reason as before. Not only are these variables subject to influences
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from factors which are not strictly a part of policy action— the exo­
genous variables— but there also are several leakages in the transmis­
sion linkage between the policy action and the effect on the indicator. 
The individuals supporting this view typically propose some form of a 
reserve aggregate as the proper indicator. Those aggregates often pro­
posed include total reserves, nonborrowed reserves, or one of these 
adjusted for legal reserve requirement changes.^ Davis (l9T0) and 
Saving (1967), among others, also include the measure of the monetary 
base in this grouping of reserve aggregates.
Total reserves is a composite of all the influences operating on 
the reserve base. It is recognized that all these indicators, includ­
ing total reserves, are affected to varying degrees by forces other than 
those attributable directly to policy action (e.g., float, monetary gold 
flows, member bank borrowings, disintermediation, changing Treasury 
deposit balances, and changes in the demand for currency). But it is 
felt that the Federal Reserve is substantially able to forecast fluctu­
ations in most of these forces. Through its defensive operations, the 
Fed can offset most, if not all, of these fluctuations.
The Fed uses open market operations to dampen the fluctuations 
in member bank borrowing. To this extent, therefore, it appears that 
nonborrowed reserves is not an appropriate indicator. Nonborrowed 
reserves experiences large fluctuations— due to the immediate effect of 
Federal Reserve actions upon it— which are not offset to the extent that 
these same fluctuations are in total reserves or the monetary base.
^For an example of each see Davis (19TO), Havrilsky (1967), Ham- 
berger (1970), and Hendershott (1969).
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When looked at from the perspective of the "standards," no indi­
cator yet proposed could strictly he acceptable to all. And this is not 
too surprising. If one defines, as the monetarists do, the money supply 
to be a rather stable function of the monetary base because of the 
Federal Reserve's defensive activity, (B • m = m ),^ then the two should 
have quite similar patterns of movement. As Guttentag (1966) states:
Since under the money market strategy the Federal Reserve more 
or less autonomously accommodates changes in the demand for deposits 
— in effect, the system "feeds in" reserves as the banks demon­
strate they are prepared to use them— an association is generated 
between actual changes in deposits and in nonborrowed reserves (or 
related reserve base measures). The result is a high statistical 
correlation found by Brunner and Meltzer and by Meigs between the 
money supply and various reserve base measures.
As has been shown in Figure 3-3, many of the components compris­
ing the measures of the monetary base and high-powered money are quite 
the same ones used to calculate the values for total reserves and free 
reserves. Thus, their movements over time would tend to have a rela­
tively high correlation (this may be especially true in the case when 
they are all adjusted). And, it is fairly obvious that changes in 
interest rates (and some say the term structure of interest rates) and 
in the rate of change in the money supply, monetary base, total reserves, 
and bank credit (or its proxy) are all interrelated. They should, there­
fore, have relatively similar patterns of fluctuations (fluctuations in 
interest rates will be opposite in direction, however). This further 
complicates the choice of strictly one variable to serve as "the"
0
Defining the money supply (m ) as a product of base money (b ) 
and a money supply multiplier (m), where m is a function of consumer 
preferences between currency and demand deposits, and between demand and 
time deposits, bank preferences for excess reserves, and the differences 
between required reserve ratios for demand and time deposits. For an 
analysis see Weintraub (1967).
indicator.
Teigen (1968) has expressed a position on the selection of "the" 
indicator which seems well-taken. The problem, however, is that he does 
not indicate which, if any, of the indicators is preferable.
I believe, first of all, that the role of monetary policy in 
stabilization is too complex to be captiored in any single variable, 
and if any strictures are imposed upon the monetary authorities in 
this respect, their essence should be that the authorities are 
enjoined from focusing on any one variable as an indicator. In 
fact, I feel that some of the past problems with monetary policy 
have arisen precisely because the Federal Reserve System has 
depended so heavily on a single variable, free reserves, as a policy 
indicator. . . . The System now seems to realize that it must look 
seriously at many other variables, and I doubt that policy decisions 
will be faulty in the future to the same degree as in the past, at 
least on this account. Those who advocate the use of simplistic 
single indicators, however, apparently believe (without solid empir­
ical evidence) that we cannot learn, either from careful empirical 
study or even from past policy mistakes, and now wish to perpetuate 
the kind of approach to policy which has proven to be so inadequate 
in the past.
Alternative Intermediate Targets
It is seldom true that the initial effects of a policy action 
act directly upon the "ultimate economic variables" without at least 
first passing through a portion of the maze of intervening economic 
relationships which exist between and among both financial and "real" 
variables. Therefore, the desired results of an initial action are not 
usually visible immediately. Sometimes the lag between the taking of an 
action and the observation of the results of this action, as reflected 
by movements in these "ultimate" variables, is quite lengthy. This lag, 
which is not only often sizable but also subject to rather large varia­
tion in its length, presents another very real source of problems in the 
stabilization effort. If an initially incorrect action is taken, or one 
which was originally correct later proves to be inappropriate or
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ineffective, the inability to detect this until some future period when 
the effects on the ultimate variables becomes visible places added hard­
ships on the stabilization effort.
In an attempt to reduce the degree of uncertainty in this pro­
cess, the FOMC chooses policy targets (variables which are intermediate 
in the linkage, but more proximate to the ultimate variables than are 
the indicators). The value, or the rate of change in the value, of these 
targets serves as an indication of whether the total influence of the 
financial sector on the economy is becoming, as a whole, more or less 
expansionary. The actual values of these target variables are compared 
with their theoretical ("ideal") values— given the desired results from 
the policy action— to determine the correctness and adequacy of the chosen 
policy. If these developments are not satisfactory, the policy tools 
may be continuously adjusted, subject to a lag both for action and 
reaction, until the chosen variables reach or approach the target levels. 
There is, however, a lack of agreement on which intermediate variables 
or group of variables are "ideal" targets: market interest rates, the
money supply, bank credit, or some combination of these or other measures. 
Brunner and Meltzer (1969) aptly point out one of the major problems in 
identifying the proper target of policy action.
There is only a superficial relation between the central banker's 
use of money market variables and interest rates as targets or 
indicators and the economist's use of interest rates as an indicator 
of monetary policy. Central bankers are accustomed by habit and 
past experience to equate the effects of monetary policy with the 
effects such policy has on the banking system and the money market. 
Economists, on the other hand, generally emphasize the effects of 
monetary policy that spread beyond the banking system and the money 
market to affect output, employment, and the price level.
The way one interprets the actions and short-run results of monetary
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policy depends, to a large extent, on the target(s) he employs. The 
short-run targets of the FOMC may, at least implicitly, be predetermined 
by the linkages it theorizes for the transmission of monetary policy 
actions. The typical neo-Keynesian approach identifies "market interest 
rate" levels as the most appropriate target, or group of targets, by 
which both to gauge the short-run effectiveness of a policy action and 
to estimate the correctness of the policy in terms of its projected 
ultimate effects. This results from the neo-Keynesian theory's empha­
sis on interest rate changes as the central feature of the adjustment 
process and from the assumption that the transmission of the effects of 
a policy action to the ultimate objectives is carried out basically by 
changes which result from, or coincide with, the interest rate fluctu­
ations. It is also claimed by this theory that interest rates provide 
the best variable to link the financial and "real" sectors of the economy. 
If one employs changes in market interest rates as the target, he recog­
nizes that his counter-cyclical policy operations will result in pro- 
cyclical changes in interest rates.
Those adopting a monetarist approach to theory propose the money 
supply, changes in the money supply, or some other such monetary aggre­
gate as the most appropriate target since the money supply plays the 
central role in their linkage (especially in the direct effects on income 
and prices). The change in the nominal money supply initially upsets 
the balance between actual relative to desired levels of financial and 
real assets. This brings about adjustments to these levels which affect 
prices and income directly. Thus, they view countercyclical policy action 
as inducing countercyclical movements in the money supply. "The monetarist
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thesis," states Brunner (1969), "attributes the largest weight with 
respect to price movements to changes in the money supply, and with 
respect to output and employment to accelerations (decelerations) of 
the money supply."
If monetary policy, through its effects on portfolio balance, 
is altered such that there exist excess nominal cash balances and the 
public wishes to exchange part of these for "real" assets, the produc­
tion of real assets results in increases in income and investment.
Whether one looks at this process of portfolio change as being brought 
about through interest rate changes or through changes in the money supply 
makes little difference at the theoretical level. It does, however, make
a difference at the policy level.
Following Mayer (1968), if the potential rate of return on invest­
ment increases, any attempt to stabilize monetary conditions by stabil­
izing the interest rate could serve to destabilize income. Stabilizing 
the money supply would not. As the rate of return on "real" assets 
rises, the whole structure of interest rates, ceteris parabis, would tend 
to move in the same direction. As the cost of borrowing to finance
capital investments increased, the incentive to do so would decrease
until a theoretical position of stability was reached at which it was 
no longer profitable to borrow to invest in "real" assets at the higher 
rate of return. Thus, the rise in the interest rate, in itself, was 
potentially stabilizing. But an attempt to stabilize the interest rate 
at any other level would be destabilizing. Stabilizing the money supply 
would let interest rates "freely fluctuate" to achieve their "equilibrium 
position." If the desire for cash balances increases, stabilizing interest
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rates would tend to stabilize income, while stabilizing the money supply 
could be destabilizing in terms of income. In this case, stabilizing 
the rate of interest would involve supplying enough money to satisfy 
the desire for increased money balances. This action would be potentially 
stabilizing. Stabilizing by controlling the money supply would, if the 
demand for nominal balances continued to be greater than the quantity 
supplied, be destabilizing because the interest rate could be continu­
ously (or nearly so) increasing.
Neo-Keynesian theory assumes that the "real" rate of interest 
(interest on physical capital) is relatively stable; it would, therefore, 
assume the latter case to be true. The monetarists, on the other hand, 
postulate a relatively stable demand function for money. They, therefore, 
assume the former case. But it is uncertain which of these is the more 
stable.
If a consensus could be arrived at which would establish criteria 
for selecting the best target variable one might find that the optimal 
target variable;^ (l) must have a well-defined position in the theoreti­
cal framework and be highly correlated with both the real variables and 
the ultimate objectives; (2) is one which the Federal Reserve is able to 
control within some definite limits; and (3) should adequately reflect 
the condition and current state of the financial sector.
In the often cited Compendium . . . (1968), question three con­
cerned the details of the proposal to give the President the power to 
establish guidelines for the Federal Reserve in its conduct of monetary
^For examples of attempts to establish these criteria see especi­
ally: Havrilsky (1965), Gaines (I968), and Morrison (1968).
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policy. In a summary of respondent views:
By a more than 2 to 1 majority, respondents favored making the 
growth of the money supply or its cognate, base money, the target of 
monetary policy. The larger part of the minority was eclectic. . . .
Respondents in the majority group differed in respect to the 
details of managing the growth of the money supply. . . . there 
were differences about how to specify the guidelines for money 
supply growth. Roughly half of the group favored [the President, 
through the power given in H.R. 1]] specifying a target percentage 
change in money supply for 6 months to a year ahead. . . . Other 
plans of this type which were advanced by respondents would require 
the monetary authorities to generate whatever money supply growth 
it takes (l) to keep the rate of unemployment under some desired 
maximum, say U percent, or (2) to prevent the price level from rising 
faster than some,.md.nimum rate, say 3 percent per year for the CPI.
The other half of the many respondents urging the adoption of a 
money supply target recommended that the Congress or the President 
set guidelines for money supply growth in terms of a band or range 
of percent per annum values [3 to 3 and 2 to 6 percent were the 
most popular range^ . . .
A few respondents here recommended setting a quasi-permanent 
relatively-narrow band of values for monetary growth and instructing 
the Federal Reserve to stay within this range. The range would be 
adjusted outward only if it was proved to be clearly inappropriate 
by a persistent inflationary trend or persistent unemployment. But 
others wanted the range reviewed each year. Still another strategy 
that was suggested called for specifying a fairly broad range of 
allowable money supply growth and using triggers to collapse the 
range. Thus, the maximum allowable range of money supply growth 
might be set as zero to 10 percent per year. And the Federal Reserve 
would be directed to reduce the upper limit to, say, 8 percent when 
the CPI advances more rapidly than 2 percent per year and by 1 
additional percentage point for every additional point of inflation. 
In the same way the lower limit of allowable money supply growth 
would be set at, say, 2 percent per year when the rate of unemploy­
ment reached 3 percent and raised one point for every point rise in 
unemployment. Last, some suggested trying to hit an interest rate 
target subject to the constraint that monetary growth stay within a
specified r a n g e . ^0, 11
^^The questionnaires were sent to the seven members of the Board 
of Governors, the twelve Reserve Bank presidents, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, members of the Council of Economic Advisors, and 125 leading 
academic, bank, and research monetary economists. The responses com­
prise the contents of the Compendium on Monetary Policy Guidelines and 
Federal Reserve Structure Pursuant to H.R. 11 (1968).
^^This summary of respondent views to Question 3, concerning the 
nature of the details which the President should include or consider
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Thus, there appears to be substantial agreement to make some 
measure of the money supply the exclusive, or at least the primary, 
short-run target of monetary policy. The narrow definition of the money 
supply (M^) has traditionally been the money supply measure. But the 
exceptional growth of time deposits— much of which is nearly-perfectly 
substitutable for money— which now represent a sizable proportion of 
total deposits, has caused many people to include it (either in total 
or in some percentage form) in the definition of money (Mg). Others 
(e.g., Gurley and Shaw) have extended this definition much further.
There are occasions when interest rates are a more appropriate 
target— when balance-of-payments difficulties are the most pressing 
problems. Otherwise, and to some extent during this exception as well, 
interest rates are easily misleading indicators of the policy effect. 
There are other problems with defining "the" interest rate to be con­
sidered. There are many different rates which could be relevant and some 
are difficult to measure. If the Federal Reserve watches only the short­
term rates, it can easily be misled. There usually is no distinction 
made between "nominal" and "real" rates of interest (especially is this 
true in the Keynesian and neo-Keynesian system). If prices are rising, 
any attempt by the Federal Reserve to stabilize the nominal rate may be 
wasted effort since many investors are thought to follow the real rather 
than the nominal rate. Nor is the interest rate a very good target since 
it is only one of several cost factors— a partial measure of the cost
when establishing guidelines on monetary policy, was written under the 
supervision of Robert Weintraub (pp. 13-15). See page l8 of the Compen­
dium for a listing of the respondents, classified broadly by which view 
of the appropriate target they held.
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of borrowing. When all of these factors are combined, they provide 
a measure of the state of the market.
The analysis of Friedman, Brunner and Meltzer, and others have 
cast considerable doubt on the ability of interest rates, free reserves, 
excess reserves, and money market conditions to effectively be a mean­
ingful target. "Liquidity” is such an amorphous concept that it is 
rarely even considered today as it was in the past. Although bank credit 
(which may be a proxy for "liquidity”) is often associated with money, 
no empirically meaningful relationship appears to exist between them.
But even if one did exist, bank credit would probably only serve as a 
proxy for the money supply. Why look at a proxy when one can just as 
easily watch the primary figure? In addition, it is felt that the money 
supply is under much tighter control of the Federal Reserve than is bank 
credit. Other individuals propose the monetary base or one of its 
variants, including total bank credit, as a target. But the monetary 
base is just a variable used to control the money supply and not a target.
In answer to question 1 .3 of the Compendium (l$68) concerning 
monetary guidelines (specification of a target variable, how it or the 
range around it was determined, and the circumstances under which the 
guidelines could be violated), William McC. Martin, then Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in summary responded:
In seeking guidance for the conduct of monetary policy, there­
fore, incoming information on both financial quantities and financial 
prices must be assimilated and interpreted. Movements in financial 
quantities— such as total bank reserves, the money, (sic) stock, 
commercial bank time deposits, and claims against nonbank intermedi­
aries— on the one hand, together with indications of cost and avail­
ability of credit on the other, must be evaluated jointly to assess 
what effects monetary policy currently is having on the total supply 
of funds, its distribution among the various sectors of the economy, 
and hence on the availability of funds to finance spending.
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This interpretation must, of necessity, seek to evaluate the 
behavior of financial variables in light of underlying real devel­
opments in markets for goods and services. It is particularly impor­
tant to distinguish between the variations in demands for and sup­
plies of credit that are produced by changes in decisions to spend 
on goods and services, and those associated with the public's desire 
to rearrange financial asset portfolios, corporate mergers, and sim­
ilar transactions. Decisions giving rise to the first kind of vari­
ation in credit conditions can lead directly to economic instability. 
The latter class of decision does not directly alter the pace of 
economic expansion, but the resulting side effects in financial mar­
kets may do so. The appropriate monetary policies to be followed, 
in response to an observed variation in credit demands or supplies, 
depend on which of these two classes of decisions is responsible.
In the final analysis, evaluation of whether monetary policy has 
contributed positively to economic stabilization cannot be judged 
simply on the behavior of financial variables, no matter how care­
fully they are interpreted. The ultimate test of monetary policy 
is the extent to which it has succeeded in promoting our national 
economic goals of maximum practicable employment, reasonable price 
stability, and a strong dollar at home and abroad.
Development of the "Ultimate Objectives"
The ultimate economic goals of governmental activity, including 
the use of stabilization policy (should) consist of promoting the general 
economic welfare and bringing about an equitable distribution of income. 
The emphasis on one policy objective relative to another, or a group of 
others, has shifted markedly over time. During the 19th century, the 
primary problem of economic concern ranged from the results to be expected 
from continued underproduction (e.g., Malthus) to the need to maintain a 
fully-employed economy; and from the requirements necessary to achieve 
and sustain adequate economic growth (e.g.. Smith) to the problems of 
inflation (e.g., Ricardo). Today, generally stated, the basic economic 
objectives of governmental actions are thought to be to maintain full 
(or nearly so) employment, a stable rate of growth in employment and 
production, widely-shared income and distribution, a relatively stable 
price level, and international balance and cooperation. At the same time
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they must preserve a condition of economic and political freedom within 
which the market mechanism can he allowed to "freely" allocate resources 
and output, subject to the "proper" amount of governmental coordination 
and regulation. The changing socio-economic-political situations deter­
mine, to a large extent, the importance attached to each of these objec­
tives .
The 1913 Act which established the Federal Reserve System 
stressed the importance of using discounts and advances to maintain 
"sound credit conditions, and ^o^ the accommodation of commerce, indus­
try, and agriculture." Instead of making the Federal Reserve System 
responsible for the goals and objectives which today are usually imputed 
to its control. Congress felt that the Federal Reserve should be more 
concerned with business conditions and the general inelasticity of credit 
and money. This followed quite closely the example of the Bank of England, 
and for good reason. About the only central banking experience any of 
the Governors of the newly-formed System had revolved around experience 
with and/or at the Bank of England (Anderson, I965) • It is not, there­
fore, surprising to note that the administration of the discount rate 
was the primary monetary weapon. This was also the case at the Bank of 
England at the time. Nor is it difficult to understand the adoption of 
the "real bills" doctrine, the basic modus operandi of the Bank of England 
at that time. This policy assumed that through the passivity of the 
banks and the extensive use of short-term, self-liquidating notes, the 
appropriate amount of money necessary to maintain high-level production 
and stable business and price level conditions would emerge. It was not 
until the 1930's that this doctrine was ostensibly abandoned, apparently
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because of the failure of the "invisible hand." But this abandonment 
was by no means permanent since this doctrine, in the form of "bills 
only," or its surrogate, "bills usually," reappeared later; it was "put 
to rest" again in the early 1960's.
When the United States entered World War I in 1917? the Secre­
tary of the Treasury transferred to the Federal Reserve the fiscal respon­
sibility for facilitating the Treasury's financing (handling both the 
original sales and the maintaining of markets for Government securities). 
Performance of this fiscal function, together with a corollary function 
of stabilizing interest rates (especially those on Government securities) 
at "reasonable levels," became the primary objective. Providing for 
credit availability was secondary.
The sudden surge of spending and credit expansion in the post- 
World War I period resulted in a sharp increase in the price level, 
reaching a peak before mid-1920. This was followed by an even more pro­
nounced decline in prices in the early 1920's. Among other things, this 
acute, but not unexpected, price swing reemphasized the need for a policy 
action which was aimed at maintaining some specific degree of price level 
stability, the primary economic objective of that time.
After the 1920-1921 depression period, the Federal Reserve began 
to redefine the objectives and guides of their policy actions in light 
of the changing economic situation. Given the "demise of the gold 
standard" as official backing for the dollar, the easing of the post-War 
economic crisis, and the lessened need to assist in the Treasury financing, 
the Federal Reserve could, for the first time, turn its attention pri­
marily toward solving domestic economic problems (Anderson, I965).
Changes in the volume of credit and in the way credit was used
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were the most significant monetary policy guides. Basically this 
reflected the fact that the linkage between Federal Reserve actions— the 
discount rate changes primarily, supplemented by moral suasion and open 
market operations— and their effects on the monetary variables was fairly- 
well developed. That between the monetary variables and the real vari­
ables was much less certain. Although the economic system was thought to 
be relatively stable, concern over price stability and the avoidance of 
crucial fluctuations in business conditions continued to be high on the 
priority list of policy goals. Consistent with these goals, the desira­
bility of maintaining stability in production and employment also became 
apparent. So, also, was concern over gold flows and international economic 
conditions in general. As was noted earlier, the obligation to aid in 
the Treasury's financing activities was only occasionally important over 
the entire period; but when it was, it held a position of preeminence 
above almost all the other goals.
In spite of the Federal Reserve's efforts to assure credit avail­
ability and a liberalized discount policy, the collapse of the economy 
in the late 1920's and early 1930's soon made it evident to many indi­
viduals that monetary policy was not, by itself, adequate to forestall 
the accompanying economic problems. The prolonged period of economic 
impotence and stagnation, and the existence of widespread unemployment, 
together with the continued failures in the financial sector, led to the 
recognition that easy money could not, by itself, stimulate business 
recovery. Modern-day "classisists" (or, perhaps more appropriately, 
Friedmanites) would not agree with this analysis. In their view, mone­
tary policy was too restrictive because interest rates were too low and 
the money supply was reduced rather than allowed, or forced, to grow.
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In these terms, they feel that a less restrictive policy approach would 
have prevented many of these economic problems. But to the classisists 
of that day— many of whom were the Keynesians of the following period—  
it appeared that fiscal policy presented a more effective approach 
toward a stabilization policy which could be aimed at restoring the 
economy. Therefore, monetary policy should be relegated to the position 
of a policy tool which, by virtue of its relative ineffectiveness during 
this period, should be used basically to facilitate fiscal policy and to 
impose selective credit controls.
The Federal Reserve's efforts during World War II were, once 
again, directed mainly toward assisting in financing the war effort and 
aiding in the stabilization of the Government securities markets. In 
the post-war period, to avoid the expected recession and the return to 
high levels of unemployment, coordination of economic policy became 
highly important. Aware of the potential for inflation that had been 
created by the war— large amounts of liquid assets, high income levels, 
and pent-up demand— the Federal Reserve "pegged" the price, and, there­
fore, also the interest rate, of Government securities at war-time levels 
and tried to manage the economy from this framework. It is questionable 
whether this added significantly to the stabilization effort since it 
was eventually realized that interest rate fluctuations play an important 
role in corrective monetary policy action. However, the Federal Reserve 
was explicitly saddled with this chore until the 1951 Accord. During this 
period, monetary policy actions were, generally, ineffective.
Congress passed the Employment Act in 19^6 . This Act represented 
the premier statement of the expressed objectives for the economy as they
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were visualized at that time:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing policy and 
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable 
means consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential 
considerations of national policy, with the assistance and coopera­
tion of industry, agriculture, labor, and state and local govern­
ments, to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and 
resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining, in a manner 
calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and the 
general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful 
employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, 
willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, pro­
duction, and purchasing power.
Goals during the period of the 1930's through the early 1950's 
underwent a substantial change in composition and ordering. Maintaining 
full employment was by far the most important; price stability was a much 
less important second. Economic growth was also recognized as a policy 
goal although not so much a monetary as a fiscal goal. And there was 
little concern over gold problems and international balance of payments 
problems (except perhaps how to handle the large inflows of gold).
Based upon the prevailing Keynesian analytic framework, there 
was a significant improvement in the theory of the linkage between the 
monetary sector and the "real" sector. The quantity of money was dropped 
as the connecting variable and interest rates and credit conditions were 
substituted as the critical variables. During most of this period, 
monetary policy did not matter much in the theoretical construct; fiscal 
policy was almost all-important.
During the period of the 1950's and I96O's our knowledge of the 
linkage continued to grow significantly through extensive research, 
especially into the link between the monetary variables and the "real" 
variables. Unfortunately, there has not existed anything like a consensus 
view of the "true" monetary theory. The quantity theorists (except for
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the polar position held by some "Friedmanite" scholars) appear to be
gaining more general theoretic support. But this support is tempered
by the recognition that interest rates and credit conditions still appear
to have direct and significant impact on investment; this, at the next
level, affects the ultimate objectives. Thus, we may be witnessing the
evolution, or rebirth, of the eclectic approach to the analysis of policy
actions. This approach combines the Keynesian and quantity theories.
Throughout the l$60's, there has existed a multitude of explicit
economic objectives: reasonably-full employment; satisfactory growth of
consumption and income; orderly growth of output consistent with high-
level utilization of the economy's resources; and stability of the price
12
level and balance of payments around some desired level or growth rate. 
While money market conditions are not mentioned as often or explicitly 
as before, they still carry considerable weight as objectives that widen 
the scope of the Federal Reserve's policy responsibility: provision of 
liquidity in its function as the "bank of last resort" (to insure the 
flexibility of financial institutions); insuring and stabilizing the 
market for Government securities; promoting the welfare of certain finan­
cial institutions (e.g., savings and loans) by preventing them from get­
ting "locked-in" by long-term, low interest rate assets; and, encouraging 
the growth of interest-sensitive sectors of the economy (e.g., new housing
no
starts). The first two of these have a well-documented history as 
12
For a good description of the goals, from the Federal Reserve's 
point of view, for the l$lL-l$64 period, see Anderson (1965).
no
Kejran and Babb (I969) explicitly include these last four policy 
goals in their analysis of Federal Reserve activity during the 1933-1968 
period.
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goals; the latter two are of relatively recent origin.
Given this multiplicity of goals, the question of compatibility 
is a very real problem. Generally, the Federal Reserve appears to believe 
that these goals are compatible and interrelated. This expression of 
compatibility, however, is easy to understand inasmuch as if they believed 
that the achievement of these goals was not compatible, the Federal 
Reserve would be required to explicitly choose among these goals accord­
ing to some utility function. Since Congress originally delegated to 
the Federal Reserve the authority for monetary policy manipulation, but 
did not, and still has not, provided them with a guideline concerning 
priority of the objectives, the Federal Reserve must operate as though 
there is no basic incompatibility. However, Mark Willes (I967) has 
shown that the FOMC, in its conduct of monetary policy operations, has 
tended to attach greater priority to achieving price stability than to 
full employment. This results in a built-in tight money bias as a result 
of their employing a "business cycle framework" for determining the 
appropriate time to change monetary policy. They direct changes in 
monetary policy to be effected only after they observe a change in gen­
eral economic activity— the business cycle.
As Willes (1967) has noted, price stability was probably chosen 
as the primary objective because not only was it relatively easy to 
define (in terms of the consumer or wholesale price index or the GWP 
price deflator), but it was also a well-known objective. It may have 
been felt that this was one objective which would be relatively easy to 
achieve with a minimum of interference with the other objectives. How­
ever, as the intra- and intersector linkages have become better known
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and understood, this assumption of minimum interference has received less 
explicit usage.
Thus, it is fairly generally recognized that the attempt to 
achieve these goals simultaneously is not without basic conflict. The 
goal of full employment, which usually includes an inflationary bias, 
implies the willingness to accept some degree of price level change.
So, also, a rapid economic growth and a high-level of resource utiliza­
tion may create inflationary pressures which increase the difficulty of 
maintaining price stability. Other famous examples of this basic conflict 
in the selection of appropriate goals appear in the Phillips curve trade­
off between wages and employment and the "Lipsey curve" (Lipsey, I96O, 
and Reuber, 196U) for the trade-off between unemployment and the rate of 
price inflation.
Given the existence of this conflict, it appears that, instead 
of the Federal Reserve choosing one or two objectives to which they give 
sole priority, if necessary to the exclusion of all others, they have 
followed a program that may be described as: "as soon as it appears that
we are approaching a position which may result in our achieving one or 
a group of compatible goals, we turn our attention to another (group).
If the position or direction of the primary objective begins to deteri­
orate, then we return to it and, once more, give it our highest priority 
until the desired direction or position is again attained."
SECTION TWO
QUANTITATIVE POLICY EVALUATION
CHAPTER IV
A MODEL OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL SECTOR, I953-I969
Partly as a result of an increased emphasis in current economic 
theory on policy applications and on the interrelationships between vari­
ous economic quantities, both within as well as outside the realm of 
what is often called "effective policy control," the popularity of eco­
nometric models has mushroomed. Another factor in this evolution has 
been the recent, significant improvement in quantitative techniques, 
especially in estimation methods. By viewing the economy as a system of 
quantifiably-determinable relationships between measurable magnitudes of 
several economic variables, attempts have been made to determine some 
"optimal policy mix." Under ideal conditions, this mix should achieve, 
or aid in the achievement of, desired levels of the various policy goals, 
and hopefully also aid in stabilizing, or approaching stability in, the 
business cycle. However, this emphasis on the quantitative aspects of 
the problem should not result in a corresponding deemphasis of the prob­
lems relating to uncertainty, risk, and error. Duesenberry and Klein 
(1965) are quick to point this out;
^The main constituents of these "ideal conditions" appear to be 
a ceteris parabis (or mutatis mutandis) assumption concerning the myriad 
factors which have varying effects upon several of the economy's main 
components, and an assumption that the past represents an accurate (and 
valid) basis from which to predict the future.
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Many questions of economic policy turn on the relative magni­
tudes of the parameters in some relationship, or set of relation­
ships, among economic variables. . . . The goals of economic policy 
are usually stated, albeit somewhat vaguely, in terms of the numeri­
cal rate of growth of GKP, the price level, the rate of unemployment 
and the numerical state of the balance of payments. Discussion of mea­
sures to achieve those goals (^oweveiQ involves judgements about the 
response of various economic magnitudes to previous policy actions.
Elements of Econometric Models
In theory, each individual economic relationship, which repre­
sents only a small finite part of the complex behavior and/or interaction 
of all the distinct household, business, and governmental units, could 
be brought together in the form of a system of equations. However, the 
enormous size and complexity of this "Walrasian" approach would make 
this aggregation virtually impossible to accomplish. Also, it would not 
be easy to draw any meaningful results from this approach. In an attempt 
to make the system more manageable and possible, several of the rela­
tionships are combined (e.g., the household, business and governmental 
sectors; the several components of income ; and the demand and supply for 
money and related variables). Also the equations may be hypothesized 
to be linear— or nearly so— and expectations may be assumed to be ade­
quately represented by some proxy variable.
Many considerations act to determine the appropriate number of 
equations to include in the system. One usually finds that the smaller 
the number of equations, the higher the required degree of aggregation 
and the lessened degree of accuracy and usefulness that can be claimed 
for the results. The larger the number of equations, the more compli­
cated it becomes to collect the data, establish widely-acceptable rela­
tionships, handle the computations, and make meaningful, generalized
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statements concerning the findings which evolved from the model.
Although the component structures of econometric models differ 
in many ways, each represents an attempt to establish interrelationships 
between the "real" and the monetary sectors. There appear to be two 
basic approaches which have been used so far in handling this problem:
(l) relating the real sector to variables which are considered exogenous 
to this sector; or (2) relating the real and monetary sectors to vari­
ables, generally from both sectors, which are taken as given. Both 
approaches seek to use the inter- or intra-sector feedbacks, as well as 
the direct effects of some change in an exogenous variable to analyze the 
sensitivity to change of other economic quantities and relationships 
within the hypothesized economic structure. The degree of decomposition 
of the basic structural relationships within the model also vary signifi­
cantly— from the basic Keynesian three equation model:
C = a + bY
1 = 1
o
Y = C + I
to the highly complex Brookings model (I965, I969) which in 19^5 had 
"upward of a hundred and fifty questions . . . ultimately achieving 
thirty-two sectors on the production side . . . similar decompositions 
on the side of final demand. . . . "
It seems, however, that the most "popular" structural size for
2
current models ranges between either 15-20 or 35-50 equations. Models
^See, for example: Ando and Goldfeld (1966); deLeeuw (1965,
1969); deLeeuw and Gramlich (I968); Goldfeld (1966); Teigen (1969); Sur­
vey of Current Business (I966); Wharton Forecasting Model (1968); Yohe, 
et.al. (1968); and Nerlove (1962).
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smaller than this appear to he too insensitive or not sufficiently able 
to discern movements within important components of the major economic 
relationships. Larger models suffer from problems relating to degrees 
of freedom, identification, and estimation (because of nonlinearities, 
multicollinearity, misspecification, etc.).
Three primary examples of "small" models which incorporate both 
a "real" and a financial sector were developed by deLeeuw (1965),
Goldfeld (1966, revised by Goldfeld and Ando, I968), and Teigen (I96U, 
1969). Goldfeld’s influence on the later Teigen model is unmistakable; 
and both of these reflect at least a part of deLeeuw’s development.
The system of equations to be used in the following discussion is the 
author's attempt to improve upon the revised Teigen model (a listing of 
which appears in Appendix A). This approach was adopted not only to 
obtain structural or reduced-form parameter estimates, but also to esti­
mate the total, impact, and interim (lagged) multipliers which result 
from a given level of change in one of the exogenous variables. From 
both of these an indication of how effective the FOMC has been in its 
policy analysis and activities should become apparent.
Basic Structure of the Model
As with most econometric simulations of this type, the model 
assumes a basically short-run, demand-oriented approach; the supply side 
is generally exogenously determined. And as Nerlove (1962) has pointed 
out for all models of this type :
(the) design of an econometric model depends on a series of com­
promises among: (a) the structure of the economy to be described;
(b) the multiple, and often partially conflicting, objectives of the 
model . . . And (c), the availability of data. . . .  it is an unfor­
tunate fact of life that the last of the three tends to dominate.
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Before presenting the model, a few preliminary comments on its 
derivation are called for. The simulations represent quarterly parameter 
estimates for the period 1953-196$. 1953 represented a logical starting
point for several reasons. Perhaps the most significant was that, although 
the "Fed" and the Treasury reached an "Accord" in early 1951, it was not 
until early 1953 that support for the government securities market was 
dropped in favor of acting only to correct a "disorderly" government 
securities market. 1953 marked the first fully-effective year of Governor 
William McC. Martin as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (1969 was also his last full year).
1953 also represented to many the first post-World War II year 
in which the country had returned to a degree of "normalcy." The whole 
period encompassed a time during which "Keynesian-type" indicators of 
monetary policy action were followed quite closely. Beginning in early- 
1969, there was an evident shift in emphasis toward greater use of mone­
tary aggregates as policy indicators. This period also represented 
really the first time that monetary policy had regained a recognized, 
meaningful, place in policy-making since the pre-Depression period. The 
period extended through (or at least into) a time when many were again 
beginning to believe that monetary policy was nearly, if not totally, 
all-important.
In most econometric models, for ease of assumption and simplicity 
of explanation, a simple Koyck-type lag structure is chosen and the equa­
tion is structured as a first-order difference equation plus some con­
stant. This theorizing is based on the assumption that a one period lag 
of the endogenous variable adequately accounts for the distributed lag
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of effects» These effects arise as a result of the influence that pre­
vious period levels of the endogenous variable have upon the current 
level or change. The Koyck lag structure assumes that a uniformly- 
declining amount of importance is assigned to the effects of previous 
period levels.
The estimation of the model was subject to all the "special 
problems of a quarterly model" specified by Nerlove (1962). Interpolation 
was required to change annual series of productivity and yield on time 
deposits to a quarterly basis. The mathematical interpolation form (the 
simplest form discussed) was chosen, subject to all the errors and biases 
implicit in this form. Seasonally adjusted data were used although it 
was recognized that after adjustment it is often difficult to determine 
how the adjustment affected the information available from the new series.
The problem of serial correlation arises as a result of certain 
variables which were not, but which should have been, included in the 
specification of a particular equation. Although the effects of this 
omission may, at least partially, "wash out" during the estimation, the 
error terms of the equations may still be serially correlated through 
time and across the sectors. Two additional points about this problem 
need to be made: (l) it is generally assumed that the shorter the time
interval, the more highly correlated a variable is assumed to be with 
its own past values ; and, (2) the Durbin-Watson d statistic is only a 
test for the first-order serial correlation— the lag structure of the 
model is not necessarily of the first difference type. Finally, the 
dynamic nature of the model is emphasized by the degree of the lag 
structure. A question arises concerning whether it would have been more 
advisable to use a distributed rather than a discrete lag structure.
78
Actually "both types of lags were employed (vis., permanent income, the 
divisor of the proxy for the expected rate of change in income, etc.).
The sources and types of data employed are described in Appendix 
C. Unless otherwise indicated, the data are quarterly values which are 
seasonally adjusted at annual rates. All flow variables and the non­
ratio stock values are in billions of current dollars. All interest 
rates, reserve requirements, and rate of change variables (including 
proxies) are stated in terms of percent per annum (e.g., = 3*50).
The proxy for the balance of payments problem is also stated in percent 
per annum terms. The short-term interest rate, which was used to repre­
sent the international rate attracting foreign investments, was multi­
plied times a dummy which assumed the value of zero (o) for the years 
when the U. S. did not experience balance of payments problems (1953- 
1960) and unity (l) for the years after that (196I-I969). The multipli­
cative interest rate variables were an exception; they were reduced to 
percentages and then multiplied times income (^^ x Y ). The change in 
the rate of productivity is in index number terms (1955 = lOO) as is 
the variable measuring the rate of capacity utilization in the "big 
three" sectors of the economy. A listing of the variables used in the 
model follows; they are explained in more detail in Appendix C. 
Endogenous Variables;
ADD = quarterly change in demand deposits
ACC = quarterly change in coin and currency
ATD = quarterly change in time deposits
AFR = quarterly change in free reserves
AL = quarterly change in bank loans 
OMO = proxy for open market operations
r, = discount rate at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
d
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Y = income (gross national product)
= consumption of nondurable goods and services 
= consumption of durable goods 
= residential fixed investment
nrI = nonresidential fixed investment
AI^ = quarterly change in nonfarm business inventory
CHP = annual rate of change in prices
Exogenous Variables;
r^ = short-term interest rate (yield on Treasury bills) 
r^ = long-term interest rate (yield on Government bonds) 
r^^ = yield on time deposits
TRM = term structure of interest rates (r^ - r^)
ART = change in the required reserve ratio against time deposits 
L = level of commercial bank loans 
AY = quarterly change in income 
Yp = permanent income
WDY = proxy for the expected annual rate of change in income in 
the next quarter
= exogenous expenditures
INV = level of all manufacturing inventories
AProd = productivity change
CAP = rate of capacity utilization
B-P = proxy for the balance of payments problem
Each equation was estimated by both single-equation and two-
stage least-squares methods. Since most of the equations contain at
least one other simultaneously-determined (endogenous to the system)
variable, the propriety of the single-equation estimation method was
questionable. On the other hand, however, the use of the two-stage
estimation method was also not without problems. Multicollinearity, non-
linearities, and structural lags of a not-necessarily exponential type
tend to make the two-stage estimates ambiguous. Duesenberry and Klein
(1965) have pointed up further estimation problems to which both
8o
estimation methods are subject. The accuracy of the parameter estimates 
may also be affected by the problems of identification, bias, misspecifi­
cation, and serial correlation.
The initial attempt to specify an acceptable combination of vari­
ables for a particular equation involved testing the specification that 
Teigen (1969) adopted. In many cases a poor statistical "fit" was 
expected because the endogenous variables of some equations were differ­
ent than those used by Teigen. After this initial test, a variety of 
alternative specifications for the same equation were tried. This 
involved the addition of variables which seemed to be theoretically 
relevant or which might serve as proxies for other relevant variables.
It also meant trying alternative ways of specifying a variable (e.g., 
quarterly or annual change) or various methods of combining variables.
If none of these alternatives improved the statistical signifi­
cance of the equation or of the variable, that variable was dropped.
The process of selecting the "best" specification of a particular equa­
tion, or for testing the appropriateness of a variable, involved apply­
ing the rather standard statistical criteria of: the correctness—
agreement with a priori expectations— of the sign of the coefficients; 
the goodness of "fit;" the size of the standard error of the estimate ; 
the t^test for the significance of the coefficients ; and the Durbin- 
Watson d statistic for the detection of serial correlation among the 
residuals.
In the discussion of the equations that follows, the equations 
are listed and the "^-values" of the coefficients— the coefficients 
divided by their standard error— are immediately below in parentheses.
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Below these are shown the three most often used measures of the goodness
2
of fit of the regression: the coefficient of determination— R ; the
Durbin-Watson d statistic— DW; and the standard error of the regression—  
SE. The equations shown in the discussion are not necessarily all the
best. They are, instead, intended to indicate the direction of the
2
research. Although the differences in the R between the best and the 
worst specifications of a particular equation may not differ by much, the
appropriateness of the chosen equation(s) should be judged on the basis
2
of all the regression criteria, not just R . The level of significance 
of .25 was assumed in determining whether a coefficient is statistically 
significant or insignificant on the basis of the jt-test.
The final selection of the set of equations on the basis of the 
single-equation parameter estimates is accomplished by a relatively 
non-standard method. Each of the possible combinations of the fourteen 
equations could be evaluated on the basis of their convergence charac­
teristics by solving for the characteristic roots (eigenvalues) of the 
system of equations. The details of this method of selection are explored 
in depth in a later part of this chapter. Briefly, however, the largest 
eigenvalue of each of the combinations of l4 equations are compared; that 
set of equations which had the smallest eigenvalue of those compared 
was considered "best."
Monetary Sector
Both sectors of this model parallel (in some cases quite closely) 
those in the model developed by Teigen (1969). The monetary sector con­
tains seven behavioral equations. Five of these seven are demand 
equations relating changes in the numerical values of the components of
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the money supply and closely-related variables to other variables from 
both the monetary and the "real" sectors. These five are: (l) the
demand for demand deposits; (2 ) the demand for coin and currency; (3) the 
demand for time deposits; (U) the demand for free reserves (which may 
also be considered as a type of "supply function" for the loans and/or 
investments which can be hypothecated on them); and (5) the demand for 
commercial bank loans. The remaining two equations attempt to make the 
two most important Federal Reserve policy tools— open market operations 
and the discount rate— endogenous to the system. The more usual econo­
metric assumption is that the former is exogenous and the latter is 
usually so.
This highly aggregated sector does not deal with the non-bank 
financial intermediaries which play an ever increasing role in today's 
financial markets. Nor does it adequately include the process of the 
individual, corporate, or bank portfolio adjustment because of the lim­
ited number of assets assumed, the assumption of an exogenously-deter­
mined interest rate structure, and the restricted size (number of equa­
tions) of the model.
The demand for money cannot generally be empirically broken down 
into the four sources of demand that are hypothesized by the commonly- 
known body of Keynesian theory— transactions, precautionary, speculative, 
and finance motives for holding liquid, or near-liquid assets. Instead, 
the portfolio theory approach is to recognize basically two sources of 
demand— that which is interest-elastic and that which is not.
If one assumes that the demand for money is strictly for trans­
actions purposes, Tobin (195^) and Teigen (1964) have initially specified
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the demand for money of an individual to he a function of income and the 
rate of interest:
= p^(r ^ Y. ).
Aggregating this hy summing, Teigen obtained:
M = 7q r Y .
He approximates this by considering the demand for money to be a product 
of the interest rate and a function of income. By holding income con­
stant and expanding f(r) by a Taylor power series, he obtains a series 
which he truncates after the first-order term. This truncated series 
is assumed to be roughly approximated by 
f(r) = <f^  +
Then holding r constant, he notes that one may expect a relatively- 
proportional relationship between income and money:
M = f^Y.
Multiplying the two parts of the money demand function together yields:
M = (^^ + fgr) (&Y)
= M [(r,Y),f] = M|M^(r,Y), Mg(Y^.
M = p^Y + pg(rY).
Originally the endogenous variables in the financial sectors of 
econometric models were specified in terms of absolute levels. Subse­
quent work has recognized that relatively small changes in these levels 
could hide larger changes or errors in other places. They also could 
underplay the effects of some small but important dollar volume changes. 
Therefore, the endogenous variables in the financial sector of this model 
are expressed in terms of first differences of the dollar volumes. The
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real sector variables continue to be expressed in current dollar level 
terms.
The demand equations for the various components of the money 
supply (add, ACC, ATD) are assumed to reflect the public's demand for 
financial assets. They are all of basically the same form—  functions 
of: interest rates, strictly or in their multiplicative form; other
variables, which primarily are income or a wealth proxy of the type con­
sidered by Friedman (1956) and others; and a lagged stock and/or lagged 
change in the endogenous stock variable. The relation of free reserves—  
net free reserves if the difference is positive, net borrowed reserves if 
it is negative— to the money supply is obvious.
Meigs (1962) has shown the relationship to the short-term inter­
est rates of both excess reserves and member bank borrowing. As was 
mentioned earlier, free reserves has been the primary variable by which 
the Federal Reserve has measured the stabilizing influence of its con­
trol over open market operations, the discount rate, and the reserve 
requirement ratios. Thus, it is fitting that the change in free reserves 
(APR) is a function of the changes in the major components of the money 
supply and in bank loans. It is also a function of changes in the lev­
els of the Federal Reserve's policy tools, the interest rate levels, and 
a lagged stock and lagged change in the stock of free reserves.
Commercial bank loans are the last financial asset included in 
this sector. Since the ability to increase the level of loans depends 
on the availability of free reserves, while this is not strictly the 
case for other earning assets, the change in loans is highly subject to 
credit rationing. Although a variable defining the level of credit
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rationing is not included in the model, the main influence of changes 
in the level of hank loans is on "real" sector variables, especially on 
business inventory investment. Thus, this rationing may be reflected by 
the need for funds as well as by the relative cost to the individual and 
the firm of obtaining these funds. Therefore, loans are analyzed as a 
function of income and interest rates, various real sector variables, and 
the lagged level and lagged change in the previous level of bank loans.
The operation of monetary policy in the United States was, and 
to a large extent still is, generally oriented toward regulating the 
volume of member bank reserves which serve as the base for the money 
supply and bank credit (thus its popular name— monetary base). Open 
market operations are undertaken to accomplish basically two major 
purposes: (l) to offset daily or short-run undesirable money market
developments (the defensive aspect); and, (2) to provide the Federal 
Reserve with an efficient tool which can be used to initiate or alter 
some level or change in the level of a policy objective (the dynamic 
aspect). In its monetary policy operations the Federal Reserve is gen­
erally regarded as being responsive to its policy objectives, such as 
full employment, price stability, some desired level of income growth, 
and a "balance" in international payments. It is also responsive to its 
intermediate policy targets, such as free reserves, the monetary base, 
interest rates, or movements in the money supply.
Interest in open market operations lies basically with those 
actions which are taken to effect some dynamic objective. It is for 
this reason that some measure of net Federal Reserve purchases (and/or 
sales) of securities is not used as a measure of open market operations
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in this model. Wet purchases, or sales, would reflect both the defensive 
and the dynamic operations of the Fed. But research interest relates 
mainly to the dynamic aspect. To measure the extent of the dynamic action 
taken, Teigen (1969) and Goldfeld (1966) have proposed, based on the early 
works of Dewald and Johnson (1963) and Reuber (196U), the use of unbor­
rowed reserves plus the level of coin and currency held outside the 
banks (UBR + CC). This is a measure of the "adjusted monetary base."
It is thought that any overt dynamic action will be reflected in either 
(or both) the level of unborrowed reserves or the level of coin and 
currency outstanding. An alternative, just UBR, has been proposed. The 
former measure is considered to be preferable since the latter does not 
sufficiently measure the problem of currency drains.
A Federal Reserve open market purchase would have the effect of 
increasing either the level of deposits or the level of currency out­
standing, or both. An open market sale would have the reverse effect. 
Therefore, Teigen proposed the rate of change in (UBR+CC) to reflect 
the movements in open market dynamic actions
- -
as the dependent variable in the model. For lack of a better proposal 
and because of the growing acceptance of this measure, it has been 
adopted here.
Thus, it seems appropriate for OMO to be some function of the 
levels, or movements in the levels, of the indicators, targets, and 
policy objectives, the level or changes in the levels of the other 
policy tools, and the lagged adjustment to OMO in the previous period.
OMO is primarily used to supply necessary or absorb excess
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liquidity to compensate for the regular fluctuations in member bank 
reserves. In a period of tight money, when open market policy seeks to 
provide less than the required amount of reserves, banks are forced to 
seek additional reserves by discounting. Through changing the level of 
the discount rate— the cost to the banks of borrowing reserves— the 
Federal Reserve can influence not only the existing level of member bank 
reserves, but also the desire of banks to seek additional reserves. By 
restricting this flow, the Banks are slowing down the growth rate of 
money and bank credit, and eventually the growth rate of income and, 
hopefully, prices. It is also obvious that the discount rate level 
follows changes in the levels of other major interest rates, although 
often with a perceptable time lag. It should be expected, then, that the 
discount rate would be a function of some measure of income— and possibly 
prices— free reserves, bank loans and/or money supply, interest rates, 
and the lagged value of the rate. The lagged rate is extremely important 
because of the relative infrequency with which the rate is changed.
On several occasions in the model, the short- and long-term 
interest rates are assumed to act as proxies for the effects of other 
important variables. Typically, either these variables cannot be 
measured accurately enough or they are not subject to any specific type 
of measure. Generally, the proxy role portrayed by the short-term 
interest rate is one of cost. It may be the cost of holding liquid 
assets, of maintaining a certain level of inventory, or of obtaining 
additional capital or financing. It may also be used as a measure of 
the general level of prices although its capacity in this role is ques­
tionable. This rate may also be a measure of investment return, especially 
from short-term investments.
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The long-term interest rate, on the other hand, is often used as 
a proxy for the expected rate of investment return. The return to expect 
from an investment in monetary assets, in plant and equipment, or in 
other assets. This rate may, however, also represent a cost— the cost 
of obtaining long-term investment funds.
The demand for demand deposits (ADD). Professor Priedman originally pro­
posed that the demand for money was primarily a function of permanent 
income and the interest rate (I956). However, he was not able to find a 
satisfactory statistical relationship which included the interest rate 
(1959)* Therefore, he specified the money supply to be a function of 
permanent income. But he did not seem to rule out a functional rela­
tionship with the interest rate. Laidler (I966) was able to statistically 
support the functional dependence on both permanent income and the inter­
est rate. Although he could not conclusively determine which interest 
rate was more appropriate, he eventually specified the short-term rate.
The initial attempt to derive a regression equation for the demand 
for demand deposits involved these two plus variables representing the cur­
rent level of income (Y), the annual rate of change in prices (CHP), the 
level of commercial bank loans (l ), and the lagged stock and change in 
the stock endogenous variable. Permanent income, the level of loans, 
and the rate of price change are all lagged: permanent income, to
reflect the "normal" income level from the past; the level of loans, 
because when the loan is granted, it is most often reflected as an 
increase in demand deposits; and the annual rate of change in prices, 
to indicate the last rate of change experienced, and used to represent 
expectations for the present period:
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(1) ADD = -3.892 + .008223(Y) + .0223(Yp)_^ + .093U(CHP)_^
(-.672) (.7795) (1.197) (1.178)
-.5985(r^) - .0319(D)_1 - .0U28(dd)_^ + .5454(ADD)_^ 
(-3.690) (-1.266) (-.899) (5.285)
= .6686 DW - 1.949 SE = .5853
This reveals that ADD is responsive to interest rate movements. 
This does not indicate, however, whether it is interest-elastic or 
interest-inelastic. Later evidence in this thesis suggests that it is 
interest-inelastic. The sign of (L) ^ was not as expected, and the 
coefficients of current income and (DD) ^ were insignificant on the 
basis of the t-test at a significance level of 0 .2 5. Thus, income was 
dropped and the current change in loans was substituted for (l)_^.
This new equation, and a similar one which contained the current rate 
of change in prices, were tested. Since there was a negligible difference 
between them, the one containing the current rate of change was chosen:
(2) ADD = .6073 + .01793(Y^)_^ + .1392(CHP) - .6636(r^) + .1184(AL)
(.236) (3.119) (1.558) (-4.289) (1.791)
- .06i4 (dd)_^ + .5i46(add)_^
(-1 .340) (4.912)
r2 = .6744 DW = 1.936 SE - .5754
Lagging the price change one quarter and dropping the constant 
further improved the results :
(3) ADD = .01606(Y )_^ + .1534(CHP) - .68l7(r^) + .1295(AL)
(4.586) ^ (2.013) (-5.833) (2.086)
- .0486(DD)_^ + .4912(ADD)
(-3.888) (5.200)
R^ = .6807 DW = 1.959 SE = .5652
This equation, to explain the movements of the largest component of the 
"narrow" definition of the money supply, seems to support a generalized
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"Friedmonian" hypothesis. If had been calculated with constant 
rather than current-dollar income, the price equation would not have been 
necessary. The addition of the change in loans and the use of a Koyck- 
type lag structure represent the only modifications of the "amended- 
Friedmonian" hypothesis.
The demand for coin and currency (ACC). Essentially the same initial 
regression equation as that assumed for demand deposits (with the excep­
tion of (l ) ,) was used to explain the demand for coin and currency, the
other component of the "narrow" definition of the money supply. The 
rate of price change, however, was insignificant and was therefore 
dropped;
(k) ACC = 1.296 + .00510(y) - .00744(Yp)_^ - .0519(r^) - .0112(CC)_^
(3.97) (4.980) (-4 .400) (-2.599) (-1.067)
+ .5445(acc)_^
(5.989)
= .8709 DW = 2.059 SE = .0984
The sign of (Y^) ^ was unexpectedly negative. As another measure of
income anticipations, Teigen introduced a ratio which closely resembles 
an annual rate of change variable— the annual change of income for the 
current period divided by a "one-year moving total of income:"
He found, however, that "the best results were obtained when the vari­
able was 'led' one quarter," thus becoming a proxy-like measure of an 
expected annual rate of change in income in the forthcoming period:
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WDY
3
The lagged level of permanent income was replaced first by the 
proxy for the expected income change (WDY) and the long-term interest 
rate in its role as a proxy for investment income return. Then, because 
one could question the strength of the impact that a change of investment 
yield or opportunity would have on the demand for coin and currency, it 
was eliminated and (WDY) was replaced with the quarterly rate of income 
change (CHY). Although improving the results, both regressions contained 
statistically insignificant variables:
(5) ACC = .001352(Y) + .o67U(WDY) - .01955(r^) - .0597(r^)
(4.952) (3.393) (-.8695) (-1.405)
- .Ol43(cc)_i + .5084(acc)_^
(-3.408) (5.603)
= .8988 DW = 2.403 SE = .8814
(6) ACC = .0009l(Y) + ,0450(CHY) - .0284(r^ ) - .00797(CC)_^
(2.757) (3.827) (-1.456) (-.772)
+ .6i42(acc)_^
(7.382)
= .9015 DW =2.517 SE = .08693
The final substitution was to replace the other income change 
variables by the current-quarter change in income (AY). It is interest­
ing to note that the final equation coefficients and results are only 
slightly affected whether one uses current or lagged income:
(7) ACC = o000858(y) + .000936(AY) - .00258(r.) - .01l83(CC) ,
(3.450) (4.319) (-1.501) (-6.303)
+ .6022(ACC) ,
(7.993)
R^ = .9048 DW =2.567 SE = .08411
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As expected, the other money supply component also appears to be 
interest-responsive. And, as anticipated, the current level of income is 
important, both as an absolute level and as a quarterly change. The Koyck 
lag structure was again chosen.
The demand for time deposits (ATD). The general movement in monetary 
theory and policy seems increasingly to be to include time deposits as 
another component of the money supply. The April 22, 1971> Federal Reserve 
Statistical Release, Number H .6 includes three money stock measures :
(a) M^-"narrowly defined" = DD + CC; (b) + bank savings and time
deposits and smaller denomination CD's; and (c) + deposits at
mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations. The initial equa­
tion to specify the demand for time deposits was of the same type as that 
assumed for the other money supply factors. It involved income, the multi­
plicative form of the interest rates (to indicate asset substitutability), 
and the lagged stock variable following Teigen's specification. Because 
saving is generally thought to result out of previous period incomes, the 
income variable was lagged one period. Teigen used the lagged stock 
variable to represent the distributed lag of past effects. But this vari­
able was found to have a higher degree of serial correlation with the 
residuals — a smaller Durbin-Watson d— than the lagged change in time 
deposits. Therefore, the latter measure was used:
(8) ATD = -IO.250U + .o4o65(Y)_^ - .2387(r^*Y) + .o666U(r^^»Y)
(-4.949) (5.649) (-3.636) (1.072)
- .2965(r "Y) + .i663(ATD)_^
(-3.009) (1.729)
= .77398 DW = 1.8212 SE = 1.1261
The inclusion of the stock variable and the quarterly change in
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this variable, both lagged one period, made the time deposit yield statis­
tically insignificant. The addition of various price change variables had 
little effect. And the eventual re-exclusion of (TD) ^ resulted in only 
a slight improvement:
(9) ATD = -10.935 + .Oi+288(Y)_^ + .1962(CHP)_^ - .2i+08(r^*Y)
(-5.152) (5.836) (1.327) (-3.689)
+ .0538(r^^*Y) - .3237(r^-Y) + .1733(ATD)_^
(.8593) (-3.235) (1.809)
= .7803 DW = 1.8802 SE = 1.1192
The addition, individually, of changes in the (other) components of the 
money supply and of changes in the level of loans also improved the 
results slightly. The change in coin and currency was not significant 
and, therefore, was dropped. The best of the tested equations in terms 
of the statistical tests applied to these individual equations, was:
(IÔ) ATD = -10.004$ + .0394(y)_^ - .236l(r »Y) + .0$$9(r^^.Y)
(-4 .483) (4 .975) (-2 .933) (0 .7717)
- .2888(r "Y) + .1176(ADD) + .128i(al) + .1393(atd)_^ 
(-2.6461) (0.5181) (1.1380) (1.4215)
R^ = .7825 DW = 1.7515 SE - 1.1228
The statistical insignificance of the time deposit rate and of demand 
deposits are surprising; both should be expected to be quite highly 
related to this demand. The inclusion, once more, of (TD) ^ corrected 
this and improved the equation:
(11) ATD = -12.5629 + .05427(y)_^ + .2756(ADD) + .157^(AL) - .24l9(r^°Y) 
(-4.917) (4 .964) (1.164) (l.4l6) (-3.071)
+ .l692(r^^*Y) - ,2976(r^.Y) - .o848(td)_^ + .226(ATD)_^ 
(1.838) (-2.785) (-1.926) (2.134)
R^ = .7954 DW = 1.8186 SE = 1.0983
9k
The results of the regression estimates of the demand for time 
deposits are interesting. Eliminating for the moment the ADD and AL, the 
theory in this equation is quite similar to that for the (other) compo­
nents of the money supply— function of income, interest rates, and the 
lagged endogenous variable. The addition of changes in demand deposits 
reflects a rather obvious a priori interrelationship between the movements 
of the two variables. Income and economic growth lead to growth in both 
of these, although not necessarily at the same rate. In addition, there 
occasionally has been "cyclic-like" substituting between demand and time 
deposits. Growth in loans is a virtual concomitant of income and economic 
growth; but its relation to the growth of time deposits is much less cer­
tain. Again, the interest-responsiveness is evident though not necessarily 
indicative of either interest-elasticity or inelasticity. The positive 
relationship with the yield on time deposits is generally expected.
The demand for free reserves (AFR). N et free reserves (or net borrowed 
reserves) is the arithmetic difference between the levels of excess 
reserves (ER) and borrowings of member banks from the Federal Reserve 
(MBB). Total reserves (TR) is made up of unborrowed (UBR) plus borrowed 
(MBB) reserves. This is equivalent to excess reserves plus the level of 
required reserves (RR) of member banks :
TR = UBR + MBB = ER + RR.
And net free (borrowed) reserves— hereafter referred to as free reserves 
(FR)— is:
FR = ER - MBB.
Because all member banks are subject to required reserve ratios 
(RRR) against their deposits, it might at first be natural to expect a
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negative relationship between demand or time deposits and free reserves.
A change in these required reserve ratios (ARD and ART) is definitely 
expected to be negatively correlated with free reserves because an 
increase in this rate would increase RR. This would, therefore, lower 
ER. But since I960, vault cash has been counted as a source of reserves. 
This has meant that an addition to vault cash from a deposit of coin and 
currency will increase either, or both, demand or time deposits as well 
as FR. This would indicate a positive relation between these deposits 
and FR as long as the RRR remains fractional (0<RRR<l). However, as a 
result of our increasing "checkless" society, the shift of demand deposits, 
and time deposits to some extent, has made it impossible to know a priori 
what type of relationship (direct or inverse) to expect between these 
deposits and free reserves. Whether there would be a net increase or 
decrease in free reserves as a result of a shift in deposits of the same 
kind between two banks depends on the current "free" reserve position of 
the two banks involved. Disintermediation, of course, would free some 
reserves which were previously subject to the higher RRR on demand 
deposits (RRR^^>RRR^g).
The free reserve situation with respect to interest rates is much 
more certain. Meigs (1962) and others have amply demonstrated a meaning­
ful relation between them. Since excess reserves are non-interest bear­
ing, an increase in the yield on Treasury bills should cause a reduction 
in EE's through investment. On the other hand, there is a general reluc­
tance to sell these highly-liquid interest-bearing substitutes for 
reserves in the bank's portfolio when the rates are high. Therefore, 
banks often tend to borrow from the Fed rather than sell these bills to
96
meet short-term reserve requirements. Because the discount rate is the 
cost of borrowing reserves from the "Fed," one would expect borrowing 
to be negatively related with this rate. Thus, we might expect a priori, 
that free reserves would be positively correlated with the discount rate 
and negatively so with the bill rate. Loans are also related to these 
rates. As the discount rate increases, the willingness of banks to com­
mit some excess reserves as loans decreases. However, as the interest 
rate structure increases, it becomes more monetarily profitable for banks 
to hold loans. Thus, it is apparent that a change in loans should be 
negatively related to changes in free reserves.
The other major factor which one would expect to influence the 
level of PR's is the level of open market operations of the Federal , 
Reserve. As has been mentioned, free reserves have served as one of the 
primary Federal Reserve measures of the stabilizing effects of its open 
market operations (OMO). Since the process of OMO provides reserves to 
member banks, it has a direct effect on the level and on changes in PR's. 
But the direction of causation of a change between the two is difficult 
to determine. So, also, is the appropriate sign of the regression coef­
ficient to expect in regressing free reserves on OMO. The determining 
factor appears to be what type of reserve policy the Federal Reserve is 
attempting to implement. If they are trying to achieve a "tighter mone­
tary position," they will effect a net contraction of reserves whether 
there exists a net free or a net borrowed reserve position. And vice 
versa for an "easy money position."
In the regression, the change in the required reserve ratio on 
demand deposits (ARD) was continually statistically insignificant. The 
decision to keep or exclude the variable ACC appeared fairly trivial.
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Both were dropped. With the exception of these two, however, free reserves 
was established as a function of:
(12) AFR = .1183 - .0U305(ADD) + .01638(ATF) - .036Ui(AL) + .1^59(OMO)
(2.069) (-2.363) (l.Sk?) (-3.396) (4.722)
+ .1375(r^) - .172l(r^) - .3122(ART)
(2.811) (-4.397) (-3.847)
- .3509(FR)_i + .2997(AFR)_^
(-7.555) (3.758)
= .7763 DW = 2.0902 SE = .0974
The demand for commercial bank loans (AL). The change in the demand for 
bank loans and the levels of the various interest rates (short- and long­
term and the discount rate) provide the primary linkages between the 
real and the monetary sectors of this model. As such, therefore, it is 
not too surprising that changes in the level of the demand for loans are, 
at least partially, a function of the levels or changes in the levels of 
several of the real sector variables. It is well-established that the 
magnitude of the supply of loans serves to determine a large part of the 
demand for durable goods. Without such financing, many individuals and 
firms would not be able to make such sizable purchases. Thus, one should 
expect the level of durable goods consumption to be a factor in determin­
ing the amount of loan demand for a particular period. So should changes 
in inventory levels since many firms require sizable amounts of money to 
finance their purchases and holdings of inventory goods, finished or not, 
until they can be processed and/or sold. But the direction of the rela­
tion between business inventory changes and changes in loans is slightly 
uncertain. It depends to some extent on whether inventory purchases and 
accumulations are paid for out of business funds, loans from banks, or
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other types of loans— including sales of securities or credit extensions.
The positive relation of changes in loans to increases in income 
is well established. And with changes in income go changes in demand 
deposits. Why changes in demand deposits should affect changes in the 
demand for loans, however, is less obvious ; one would expect the line of 
causation to flow the other way. Perhaps it does and this is covered-up 
by the aggregation of terms at quarterly intervals rather than monthly 
or weekly (or less).
As discussed in connection with the free reserves equation, the 
supply of loans is inversely related to the discount rate. But it is 
known that, for at least some range, an increase in interest rates gen­
erally results in an increased demand for loans. Whether this is due to 
an expectation of still higher rates or one or a combination of other 
factors, it still holds fairly applicable. Unfortunately, the Treasury 
bill rate (used as a proxy for credit conditions— rationing) was not 
statistically significant. It is doubtful that the discount rate could 
fulfill this role. Therefore, one must explain the relationship of the 
discount rate to the demand for loans along the expectations line;
(13) AL = -9.388 + .0317(Y)_i + .2151(0^ ) + .Ut59(ADD) + .1153(r^) 
(-3.874) (2.346) (3.319) (2.878) (0.3485)
+ .02889(61^) - .i4o8(l)_^ + .3993(al)_^ 
(0.923) (-3.848) (3.829)
= .8511 DW = 2.326 SE = .9003 
The statistical insignificance of the discount rate term was sur­
prising; it was retained, however, and later proved to be the only sig­
nificant interest rate. The positive relation with AI^ was also unex­
pected. The previous level of inventory investment was substituted for
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AI^ with favorable results :
ilk) AL = -6.269 + .03868(y)_^ + .24l3(C^) - .1967(1^)+  .i^ 273(r^ ) 
(-2.673) (3.130) (4.225) (-3.798) (1.389)
+ .4954(add) - .1205(l)_^ + .2231(al) 
(3.322) (-3.595) (2.114)
= .8783 DW = 2.2926 SE = .8l4o8
The attempt to add a price change variable improved the regres­
sion results but the coefficient continually proved statistically insig­
nificant. When both the AI^ and ^ variables were used, the results 
were, again, improved:
(15) AL = -5.313 + .0393l(Y)_i + .2743(0^) - .06002(AI^)
(-2.235) (3.229) (4.610) (-1.697)
- .2643(l^)_i + .5764(r^) + .4771(ADD)
(-4 .084) (1.828) (3.240)
- .1147(L)_^ + .2020(AL)_i
(-3.458) (1.930)
= .8839 DW = 2.2554 SE = .80163
The use of current income yielded poorer results. This led to the con­
clusion that the demand for loans is more closely related to a movement 
in income from the past than with the present income level.
Open market operations (OMO). In an attempt to explain the movements of 
the Federal Reserve's "dynamic" policy activities, it is appropriate to 
relate these to movements in the policy targets and ultimate objectives 
as well as to changes in the indicators. The primary policy objectives 
are full employment, price stability, a balance of international pay­
ments, and an adequate and sustainable rate of economic growth— though 
not necessarily in that order. The targets adopted by the Federal
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Reserve to represent these ideal levels are traditionally thought to 
include the rate of unemployment, the rate of change in income and prices, 
and the magnitude of the change in international liquidity— as measured 
hy the difference between net exports and imports. The primary indicators 
adopted by the Federal Reserve throughout this period have been free 
reserves and the level of certain interest rates.
Teigen defined two additional variables for price changes and 
one for changes in income. The rate of change in income and the ratio 
of a quarterly price change to a normal ("permanent") price level were 
used to recognize the effects of short-run changes in these two variables:
CHÏ = ( ^ )  and PCH = ( ^ ) .
^-1 P
For longer-term changes in income he used the proxy for the expected 
annual rate of change in income (WDY). For prices, he adopted a ratio 
variable using, instead of a quarterly change in prices, the annual change 
in prices :
CHP =
He used the rate of unemployment (u) and its reciprocal (•^) as 
measures of the level of employment. As a proxy for the balance of pay­
ments problem (B-P), he used the Treasury bill rate as an indicator of 
the cost of international liquidity. This was multiplied by a dummy 
variable which assumed the value of zero (o) from 1953 through i960, and 
unity (1) for the years I96I-I96U when the U.S. experienced large balance 
of payments problems. Thus, a fall in this short-term rate would result 
in a tightening of monetary policy (ceteris paribus).
The long-term interest rate (r^) was used to represent the growth 
target. Since the Federal Reserve often used OMO to "cushion" the impact
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of changes in the REE's, he also included the change in the EEE against 
time deposits. The demand deposit multiplier was used to recognize the 
changes in open market operations which are taken to offset a change in 
the velocity of money (Ak).
As an initial attempt to derive a meaningful rela+ion to explain 
the movements in OMO, the current level and rate of change in income, the 
short-term rate of change in prices, the long-term growth rate, the bal­
ance of payments proxy and the two variables representing the Federal 
Reserve's "cushioning" activities were employed;
(16) OMO = .004895 + .00001289(y ) - .02227(c h y ) + .1784(PCH)
(1.091) (0.6941) (-0.4033) (1.538)
- .002477(r^) + .09047(B-P) + .003939(ART)
(-1.121) (0.965) (1.115)
- .02175(Ak) + .3209(OMO)
(-4.533) (3.967)
E^ = .7273 DW = 2.1796 SE = .004699
Surprisingly, both income variables are statistically insignificant; the 
rate of income change even has as incorrect sign. Some question may be 
raised concerning Teigen's assumption that the Federal Reserve closely 
follows the money multiplier, except to the extent that it is significant 
in affecting the level or rate of change in the money supply. If we 
choose to eliminate this variable, substitute WDY for Y, and replace the 
balance of payments proxy with a full complement of interest rate terms, 
the regression yields :
(17) OMO = -.003716 - .1260(CHY) + .3578(WDY) + .4159(PCH)
(-1.499) (-1.418) (2.727) (3.689)
- .0007105(r«Y) + .0004355(r^a'Y) .000398(r^.Y)
(-3.309) (2.309) (1.356)
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+ .01089(art) + .2248(0M0)_
(3.476) (2 .646)
R^ = .7032 DW =2.113 SE = .004782
The results were not as good as before and, again, the rate of change in 
income— and also the AY if it was substituted for CHY— is negative, con­
trary to expectations. It continually had this sign.
For this reason, this income change variable was eliminated in 
favor of keeping only the expectations variable. Adding the indicator 
(AFR), a term to relate the long- and short-term interest rates— the 
term structure, TRM— and the level of member bank borrowings, we signifi­
cantly improved the results, but at the expense of the price change vari­
able:
(18) OMO = .1963(WDY) + .03888(PCH) - .001996(r^"Y) + .0004l02(r^^'Y)
(2.192) (0.2820) (-3.891) (2.447)
+ .001905(r "Y) - .00992(TRM) + .01218(AFR)
(3.892) (-4.219) (4.425)
- .003128(MBB) + .01018(ART) - .1129(0M0)_^
(-1.443) (1.218) (-1.084)
R^ = .7975 DW =1.873 SE = .003516
The relationship between the change in free reserves and the operations 
in the open market are not completely determinant. As was discussed 
earlier, it would depend on the type of monetary policy being effected. 
The insignificance of the price variable coefficient was not expected; 
the annual price change variables (CHP) and (CHP) ^ were both tried but 
with similar results. This led to the eventual elimination of the price 
change variable.
The negative coefficient for member bank borrowings can be 
explained fairly easily. In terms of total reserves as discussed in the
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FR equation:
TR = UBR + MBB = RR + ER 
UBR = RR + ER - MBB.
But, since MBB is one of the determinants of free reserves, it was dropped 
to avoid possible double counting. The other interesting result to 
appear out of this regression was the relation of the signs of the inter­
est rates and the term structure variable.
Given the existence of increasing interest rates: 
as TRM f (Ar^>Ar^), OMO I 
as TRM i (Ar^< Ar^), OMO f 
Given the existence of declining interest rates : 
as TRM f (Ar^< Ar^), OMO Y  
as TRM "jr ( Ar^ > Ar^ ), OMO f 
The conclusion from this is that the Federal Reserve has often practiced 
a reverse form of "operation twist"— acted to maintain the long-term rate 
at some (usually indeterminant) level above the short-term rate. An
obvious exception was the early 1960's when "operation twist" was the
avowed policy position.
The inclusion of the employment proxy (u) or its reciprocal 
proved relatively unsuccessful. It was continually either statistically 
insignificant or had an unexpected (negative) sign. Therefore, the final 
equation for OMO was :
(19) OMO = .1436(WDY) + .01279(AFR) - .01024(TRM) - .002262(r "Y)
(2 .144) (4.987) (-4.907) (-5.607)
+ .0003786(r ^yY) + .002022(r^.Y) + .16i6(B-P)
(2.719) (4.707) (3.0005)
+ .0103 (a r t) - .1831(0M0)_^
(4 .248) (-1.819)
lOU
= .8191 DW = 1.945 SE = .003314 
The conclusion from this equation is that the Federal Reserve reacts pri­
marily to movements in the income change and balance of payments targets, 
and gives less weight to price changes and unemployment. The emphasis 
given to Teigen's assumed growth target is a moot point because its 
proxy was subsumed by (r^«Y).
The discount rate (r^^. This rate represents the cost to a bank of 
obtaining necessary reserves by borrowing (discounting) from the Federal 
Reserve. As may be expected, it is quite closely related to the level 
of market interest rates although it often moves with a perceptible lag 
behind these interest rate movements. There are basically three impor­
tant justifications for the (infrequent) changes in this rate: (l) as
an effort to control the amount of MBB; (2) to reflect a changing policy 
position or to give the psychological appearance of this change; and
(3) to bring this rate more in line with other important interest rates, 
especially the Treasury bill rate.
One should also expect the discount rate to be positively related 
to changes in the level of income and loans. In both cases, these can 
put additional pressure on banks which are already in need of more 
reserves— currently in a net borrowed position. Therefore, it would be 
negatively related to changes in free reserves. An increase in member 
bank borrowings, which might bring on a rate increase, is also reducing 
the level of free reserves. If the level, as well as change in the level, 
of income are both important:
(20) r^ = -.4420 + .0037T4(y)_^ + .00785T(ay) + .304l(r^) + .01143(L)_^ 
(-1 .146) (1.829) (1.905) (7 .246) (1.953)
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- .2612(AFR) + .61+72(r^)_^
(-2 .11+1+) (11.1+1+1)
= .98675 DW - 1.1+326 SE = .13927
One might also include the annual rate of price change (in this case 
lagged one period):
(21) r^ = -.37^7 + .00311+3(Y)_^ + .006l3l+(AY) - .Ol+978(CHP)_^
(-1.026) (1.602) (1.556) (-2.882)
+ .3287(r%) + .009^8(1 ) -  .2i1+9 (AFR)_^
(8.103) (1.701) (-1.850)
+ .66l+6(r^)_^
(12.35)
= .98836 DW = 1.5779 SE = .13161
Interestingly, the sign of the price change coefficient, whether 
one uses an annual or a quarterly rate, indicates an inverse relation­
ship between these changes and discount rate movements. Although this 
seems initially to he incorrect, it might be plausible to the extent 
that discount rate increases will limit the increases in loans which 
would serve to create additional demand pressures on a limited supply of 
goods. Since the amount of available goods is relatively fixed over 
the short-run, an increase in demand through increases in loans or what­
ever can only be reflected immediately by increases in prices. The level 
of goods and services produced generally cannot increase substantially 
until some later period. To the extent that an increase in the discount 
rate can limit the granting of loans, it might serve to hold down price 
changes. It is more likely, however, that these should move in approx­
imately the same direction. Increasing prices justify a rising interest 
rate level.
With the exception of this, however, the other regression results
lo6
are generally expected. One could drop the lagged income level. This 
would make quarterly changes the sole income variable. If one also 
substituted a lagged change in loans for the lagged absolute level of L;
(22) r^ = .01633 + .00531^(AY) - .07007(CHP)_^ + .3%23(r^)
(2.656) (1.636) (-3.747) (8.425)
+ .02915(AL)_^ - .3H 3(AFR)_^ + .6806(r^)
(2.019) (-2.838) (14.68)
= .9885 DW = 1.4452 SE = .1296
Eliminating the income variable and adding, instead, the other major 
interest rate variable, results in:
(23) = -,0749(CHP)_^ + .3242(r^) + .09095(r^) + .02554(AL)_^
(-4.178) (8.023) (3.147) (1.872)
- .3320(AFR)_^ + .6517(r^)_3_ 
(-3.032) (13.43)
R^ = .9882 DW = 1.40l6 SE = .13012
"Real" Sector
The real sector of this model contains five behavioral equations 
and an identity. It also includes a quite crude attempt to explain changes 
in price level along the lines of that done by Teigen with his simplified 
version of the "Phillips curve." The equations in this sector represent 
the major classifications of consumption and investment: (l) consumption
of nondurable goods and services— (2) consumption of durable goods —  
C^; (3) fixed investment in residential structures— I^; (4) fixed invest­
ment in nonresidential structures— I™^; and (5) quarterly change in non­
farm business inventories— AI^. The income identity is the sum of these 
five endogenous variables plus another variable, exogenous expenditures—  
E®. The latter variable includes "all other" factors. Income, then, is:
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(24) Y = C’^'^ + + AI^ + E®.
A more complete elaboration of this sector -would require further 
breaking down these highly aggregated components into more realistic 
levels (e.g., consumption of automobiles, food, housing, furnishings, 
clothing, services, transportation, etc.). The first step would obvi­
ously be to establish the consumption of services as a separate area.
And one should remove the governmental sector from the exogenous expendi- 
t-ures classification. Its vast development over this period of years 
should be accounted for separately. The removal of the net foreign export- 
import position from the exogenous category would also be justified.
Consumption of nondurable goods and services (c’^'^). Teigen suggested 
that "consumption ^ f  both types] is usually related to disposable income, 
among other variables." Because it was not available in a seasonally- 
unadjusted form, however, he did not use it. Instead, he made both types 
of consumption a f-unction of current income, the current-quarter change 
in income, and the current-quarter rate of change in prices. Also 
included were a one period lag of the endogenous variable and seasonal- 
adjustment dummys. Since the present model deals with seasonally- 
adjusted data, disposable income was substituted for either (and both) 
of the income variables. The results suggested that the current level 
and change in the level of income yield much better results.
Loans play a large part in determining the levels of both types 
of consumption, especially consumption of durable goods. Because con­
sumption of non-durables and services are thought to be mainly out of 
current income, both the current level and current change in loans were 
tried— the former yielding generally better results. The change in the
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rate of worker productivity was also included in the initial regression 
attempts. If improved productivity increased the available supply of 
consumption goods and was reflected in the worker's wages and salaries, 
it would have a beneficial effect on the distribution of income. It 
would also increase the purchases of necessities, a major component of
(25) = -22.917 + .Ot615(y) + 38.027(AProd) + .08079(l) + .7734(c"^)_^
total nondurable consumption expenditures:
07  
(-2 .246) (2.430) (2.592) (1.255) (12.954)
=  .9997 DW = 2.2226 SE = 1.5458
With the addition of the quarterly change in income for the current period,
this function becomes :
(26) = -20.843 + .o676(y) + .0183(AY) + 35.76(AProd) + .0878(1)
(-1.787) (1.738) (0.3757) (2.242) (1.301)
+ .787l(c"*)_l
(11.188)
= .9991 DW = 2.2728 SE = 1.5565
The income change coefficient was unexpectedly insignificant.
It was retained, however, in hopes of correcting this. To this equation 
was added a price change variable; this was to reflect the effect that 
expectations of future price increases have on consumption in the current 
period. Both current and lagged (one period) price changes were tried—  
the latter provided better results although it was statistically insig­
nificant:
(27) = -25.669 + .O7243CY) + .02120(AY) + .1657(CHP)_^
(-1.913) (1.829) (0.4319) (0.7368)
+ 43.436(AProd) + .09551(D) + .76l6(
(2.274) (1.39k) (9.689)
=  .9997 DW = 2.2316 SE = 1.5621
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Elimination of the income change variable improved the DW and the SE of
2
this equation without reducing the R . The price change variable, 
though, was still insignificant:
(28) = -27.8289 + .0820U(y) + .1579(CHP)_^ + J+5.679(AProd)
(-2.250) (2.252) (0.7092) (2.502)
+ .08711(1) + .7k70(c"*)_i 
(1 .335) (10.597)
= .9997 DW = 2.1746 SE = 1.5518
And, if the level of bank loans is replaced by the current period change
in these loans, still more improvement is noted:
(29) 0°"^  = -22.8899 + .086i(y) + .2369(CHP)_^ + 31.647(AProd)
(-1.815) (2.924) (1.022) (1.816)
+ .2774(AL) + .8096(0"^ 
(1.59%) (11.025)
R^ = .99971 DW = 2.3034 SE = 1.5429
Consumption of durable goods (C^Q. Starting again from Teigen's equation 
specifications for C^— current level and change in the level of income, 
current annual rate of change in prices, and lagged C^— a variable 
describing the rate of capacity utilization in the manufacturing indus­
tries was included. The lagged form performed better than the current 
one. This variable takes into account the increased capital stock and 
accelerated use of productive facilities which previously were measured 
only by part of an increase in income.
Surprisingly, Teigen did not include a loan variable in his 
demand for durable goods equation. Since a large percentage of durable 
goods purchases are financed this way, it became obvious that some loan 
variable was necessary. With the addition of current changes in the
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(30) = -11.9^6 + .05138(y) + .1319 (AY) + .09272(CHP) + .i+912(AL)
level of bank loans, the regression became:
.9^+ 13
(-3.354) (5.327) (3.856) (0.5796) (3.462)
+ .i436(CAP)_^ + .3844(0^ )^
(3.457) (3.535)
= .99581 DW = 2.1274 SE = 1.1802 
The attempt to introduce other price change variables as well as 
a variable which would account for changes in worker productivity were 
not successful. The coefficients of both became either statistically 
insignificant or maintained negative signs throughout the regressions.
Nor was the addition of one of the employment proxy variables (U or ^ ) 
successful. Dropping the price change variable made only a slight dif­
ference in the results :
(31) = -12.0453 + .05067(7) + .130l(AY) + .1422(C A P ) + .4548(al)
(-3.404) (5.325) (3.839) (3.448) (3.594)
+ .4025(C*)_1
(3.885)
= .9958 DW = 2.1331 SE = 1.1739
Residential fixed investment (l^). Teigen described his elaborate hous­
ing equation in terms of the rate of household formation, income and 
change in income, stock of vacancies, a rent ratio, downpayment require­
ments, credit terms, and mortgage rates. However, the relative infre­
quency with which some of this data is available and the questionable 
accuracy of much of it when it is available, led to the search for a new 
specification. There is a substantial lag between collection and publi­
cation for all of this data except credit terms, mortgage rates and income. 
The new specification sought would be in variables which were more familiar
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and more frequently available.
Since housing starts generally occur in anticipation of the 
actual sale, they can be assumed to depend on expected sales. These 
sales might be simulated by current period income and the rate of change 
in income expected in the next quarter (WDY). Starts would also reflect 
the level of market interest rates and the level of loans outstanding.
One would prefer to use the long-term interest rate because of its 
relevance to the borrower's demand; the short-term rate, however, might 
be acceptable. If we use the government bond rate— as Teigen does— as 
a proxy for the ceiling rate on FHA and VA mortgages and use this in com­
bination with the discount rate to reflect credit conditions and terms, 
a plausable case can be made for specifying this equation as:
(32) = -3.4607 + .02659(y) + .36$0(WDY) - 1.3l57(r^) + .936o(r^)
(-1.265) (1.564) (1.698) (-3.799) (1.678)
+ .06017(1) + .8694(i^)_^ 
(1.349) (14.004)
= .9487 DW = 1.3734 SE = .92007
Although the sign of the discount rate coefficient is unexpected, it is 
not unreasonable in terms of the proxy role it is to play (credit- 
rationing). A one-period lag of loans had no effect. But the replace­
ment of current income by the change in current income led to some 
interesting results:
(33) = .7123 + .05871(AY) + .16i6(WDY) - 1.382l(r^) + 1 .4U 7(r^ )
(0.619) (1.752) (0.594) (-4.113) (3.133)
+ .005568(1) + .8749(l^)_i 
(0.9025) (14.171)
R^ = .94924 DW = 1.3932 SE = .9156 
The expected rate of income change becomes statistically
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insignificant and the influence of the current level of loans becomes 
questionable. If we use the current change in loans, the regression 
becomes :
(3I) = 2.9091 + .06648(AY) - .16145(WDY) - 1.5212(r^ ) + 1.8038(r^)
(2.501) (2.318) (-0.629) (-5.235) (4.983)
+ .3969(41) + .7348(i^ )_^ 
(3.890) (11.08)
= .95878 DW = 1.5197 SE = .82505 
Eventually it was recognized that residential financing involves a 
sizable portion of a person's income and/or wealth. And, if he borrows, 
he faces a lengthy pay-back period. Therefore, it was decided to replace 
WDY with permanent income (Y^^. Various combinations of (Y^ ), r^, and 
loans were tried. The final form was:
(35) = -22.4553 + .07199(ay) + .09509(Yp)_^ - .899l(r^)
(-3.959) (3.312) (4 .681) (-3.341)
+ .178l(r^'Y) + .1588(l)_^ + .8563(f)_i 
(4.o4i) (4.769) (l6.64o)
= .9605 DW = 1.64899 SE = .80728
This meant that in making an investment in housing, the individual takes
into account his last-periods permanent income, the current change in
income, the ceiling interest rate, and credit terms. is a function
also of the level of loans in the previous period and of the lagged I^.
Nonresidential fixed investment (l"^). Teigen based his nonresidential 
investment function on the capital stock multiplier principle. Invest­
ment depends on the level of investment in the previous period, the 
size of the capital stock at the beginning of the period, and the 
expected output of the period. The interest rate enters in the multi­
plicative form to introduce the adjustment to the capital/output ratio.
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In addition to eliminating the seasonal-adjustment dummys which are not 
needed, the only change from his specification was to lag income one 
quarter, thus relating investment and income in the same period:
(36) = -10.73 + .01044(Y)_^ + .1216(AY) + .iUi6(cap)_^
{-3M1) (l.Ull) (5.121) (4.159)
+ .2l32(AL) + .08636(r^-Y) + .8ll7(l^’^ )_^
(2.511) (1.863) (14.551)
= .99815 DW = 1.9546 SE = .88961
It seemed, however, better to use the long-term interest rate to 
represent the cost of capital to the borrower. This would reflect the 
fact that a large portion of the funds borrowed for long-term capital 
investment are secured through the issuance of bonds or some type of 
stocks :
(37) i™^ = -14.1735 + .01018(y)_^ + .1264(AY) + .1542(CAP)_^
(-4.702) (1.434) (5.373) (4.867)
+ .2509(AL) + .9l468(r^) + .8273(l^)_^
(2.618) (2.261) (14.915)
R^ = .99820 DW = 2.009 SE = .8785
Inventory investment (AI^). Teigen again used the accelerator approach 
in the equation to explain changes in the investment in nonfarm business 
inventories. He assumes this investment to be dependent on the level and 
change in the level of current demand, the level and change of past inven­
tories , changes in bank loans and unfilled orders, and the product of the 
short-term interest rate times the level of demand (y ). Although the 
change in unfilled orders did prove significant, the level of demand for 
consumer durables proved to be a better explanatory variable. Inventory 
investment is geared to expected sales and the past performance of sales 
in various areas. Since the inventory stock of durable goods often
Il4
constitutes an expensive and important portion of the items produced 
during a period, production of these goods could he geared to the level 
of sales or consumption— including depreciation— of these items during 
the immediate past period. The short-term interest rate is included to 
represent both the cost of financing the purchases of inventory goods 
and the cost of holding finished but unsold items:
(38) AI^ = 12.5359 + .01927(y) + .l4098(AY) + .3268(C^)_ - .7222(AL)
(4.285) (1.065) (5.973) (2.062) (-2.925)
+ .1733(r^*Y) - .7319(l^)_i + .45095(Al^)_i
(2.434) (-4.491) (5.698)
= .85248 DW = 2.3513 SE = 2.0307
Lagging income one period has no significant effect on the 
results. An unusual facit of this equation is that the change in loans 
has a negative coefficient and the short-term interest rate has a posi­
tive one. This is contrary to normal expectations. It can be inter­
preted in at least two ways. It can first be assumed that these are 
simply the reverse of the a priori expected signs— this would cast doubt 
on the specification of this equation. The other interpretation, however, 
might be that the rising cost of holding large inventories and the reduced 
availability of loans as interest rates— especially the discount rate—  
rise had made industry economize on its investment in inventory. This 
would leave the producers of these items with increases in their stocks 
of finished goods not yet sold.
Further experimenting with this equation did not cause these 
signs to change although it did result in the eventual elimination of 
the current level of income. This substantially improved the size of 
the standard error of the regression and caused slight improvement in
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the other estimation measures :
(39) = 8.4992 + .4431(ay) + .4646(c*)_^ - .7145(al) + 1 .5073(r^)
(5.202) (8.491+) (4.060) (-3.032) (3.325)
- .6213(I^)_^ + .4039(AI^)_1 
(-5.567) (5.244)
= .86274 D¥ = 2.3117 SE = 1.9427
Thus, it appears that changes in current income result in a better esti­
mate of the predicted change in the demand for inventory items than does 
the combination of the current level and the current change in the level 
of income.
The rate of change in prices (CHP). As previously indicated, the equa­
tion estimating the rate of change in prices is the crudest and least 
satisfactory of the equations in the model. Not one completely satis­
factory regression was found. Either one or more of the important 
variables proved to be statistically insignificant or they had signs which 
did not agree with a priori expectations. If both of these were accepta­
ble, there appeared to be too much autocorrelation; the Durbin-Watson d 
statistic was too low— at or below 1 .4 . In this case, also, the standard 
error of the regression tended to be higher than that of other equations.
Teigen introduced another variable for income change in his 
price equation— a one-period lagged form of WDY— (WTY) which was to 
serve as a proxy for wage and profit changes. A factor which Teigen 
did not consider, but which might have a significant impact on price 
change, was the change in worker productivity. An increase in this pro­
ductivity would serve to initially lessen demand pressures because of 
increased output. Until wages reflected this change, its occurrence 
could tend to have a retarding effect on price advances. Also Teigen
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did not consider the discount rate. As a cost (price) factor for bor­
rowing reserves, this rate has a significant impact on the prevailing 
price of loans and, conceivably, on other prices as well. Using these, 
together with current income, the long-term interest rate, and lagged 
price changes, the initial specification was:
(Uo) CHP = .02865 + .QGOOIIB(y) + .02592(WTY) - .03508(AProd)
(1.53k) (0.8509) (0.2861) (-1.483)
+ .00577k(r^) - .003437(1-^) + .68o8(CHP)_^
(4.091) (-1.754) (16.019)
= .95087 DW = 1.6378 SE = .003623 
This regression result contained two unexpected results:
(1) both income variables were not statistically significant, although 
the coefficient of the current income term might be considered by some 
to be in a "grey area" where the line between acceptance and rejection 
is not well defined; and (2) the signs of the interest rates— both 
basically being used as measures of credit availability— conflict with 
each other. This latter conflict reoccurred often because the long­
term interest rate continually had a negative coefficient. But strangely, 
the short-term rate coefficient was generally positive.
In other regressions, the proxies for the employment level (U 
and ^) were either statistically insignificant or of the wrong sign.
So also were measures of the income gap— the difference between current 
and potential income— and expected rate of income change (WDY):
(4l) CHP = .03203 + .00001585(y) - .05808(WDY) - .03937(AProd)
(1.806) (1.118) (-0.7335) (-1.742)
+ .00595l(r^) - .0034l6(r^) + .85597(CHP)_^
(4.816) (-1.742) (16.06)
= .95112 DW = 1.5856 SE = .003618
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Finally, the expected rate of income changes was eliminated. And, in an 
attempt to get the interest rates to agree, the short-term interest rate 
was substituted for the long-term rate. The result was best with the 
discount rate lagged one period to reflect some time span elapsing before 
the effect of a change in the discount rate is reflected in credit terms 
and, therefore, in prices:
(42) CHP = .03433 + .000007086(Y) - .0466l(AProd) + .001746(r )
(1.805) (0 .4844) (-1.940) (1.857)
+ .003452(r.) , + .8103(CHP) 1 
(2 .6014) (16.1288)
= .9483 DW = 1.4809 SE = .003691 
These regression results, as a whole, are not as good as those 
in the previous equations, but at least the signs of the coefficients 
meet a priori expectations and give the equation more economic meaning.
Lag Structure
The Koyck lag structure assumes that a uniformly declining amount
of importance can be assigned to the effects of the previous periods.
This can be proven mathematically by using either the "homogenous solution"
(Y, = pY, , ) or the "homogenous plus the particular solution" (Y, = 
t t-j. "C
pY^ ^ + Constant). The first is a special case of the second and solva- 
-ble in the same manner as the second. The type of equation specification 
adopted supposes that the endogenous variable is a function of exogenous 
variables (constants) plus the absolute value of the endogenous variable 
lagged one quarter and the change in that variable, also lagged one 
quarter :
A?t = Ct + GYt-1 + 9AYt_l '
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In terms of the difference equation, this becomes :
h  - " «t + P (?t-l - ?t-2)
h - 1  - P h - 2
h  - h -1 + P V 2  = = f
Solving for the characteristic equation: 
let: 7 = (l+a+p)
then:
- )' + e \ - 2  '
and let: Y^_g = r^
then:
2
r - 7 r + p = C
The homogenous solution is applicable when the constant term 
(c) is equal to zero. In this case one can solve for the "normalized" 
state by:
Solve: = p Y
for t=l Y^ = p Yq
for t=2 Yg = p Y^ = p^Q
for t=n Y^ = p’^ Q 
Solving for the characteristic function in terms of a homogenous solu­
tion:
2
r - 7r + p = 0
After appropriate manipulations, this characteristic function can be 
solved for'its roots by using the quadratic formula:
, - (-r) t - 1. (1) (p)
2 (1)
If, however, the constant does not equal zero (C ^ O), a
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nonhomogenous solution is sought. The characteristic function is: 
r^ - 7r + p = C 
It this case, one works with the deviation forms:
?t = P?t-i + c
-Ÿ = -pY - C
(Y^-Y) = p(Yt_]-Y)
And solving for the normalized state as before, at the limit (t=n):
(Y^- Ÿ) = p*(YQ- Ÿ)
Y^ = p^{Y^- Ÿ) + Ÿ 
Y^ = p"Yg + (1 - o'") Ÿ 
In essence, this result is much the same as the homogenous solution 
except that the intercept of the slope of the expansion path has been 
shifted. Thus, for the cases when the constant is non-zero or is a 
function of time (C = f(t)), the scale of the results will differ from 
that of the homogenous solution. This does not, however, change the
nature of the convergence or the oscillation conditions.
2
The discriminant (D = 7 - UaP) and the roots of the charac­
teristic equation provide the information necessary to determine the 
distinctive features of the lag assumption. If the discriminant is: 
D < 0 , the lag structure is oscillating 
Dio, the lag structure is not oscillating 
and if the absolute value of
|r| < 1, the series converges
Irj = 1, the series is a straight line (neither converging nor 
diverging)
jr| >1, the series diverges.
3
For a more precise explanation of the non-homogenous solution.
see Goldberg (1961).
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For the demand deposit equation
DD^ + 1.4426 - .4912 (DD)^_2 = constant
we first assume that we can neglect the effect of the non-zero constant. 
The D is greater than zero and the characteristic root is less than one. 
Therefore, the demand deposit series does not oscillate hut it does con­
verge. This is also the case for the coin and currency, time deposit, 
and loan equations :
CC, + 1.5904 (CC), , - .6022 (CC)^ _ = constant0 t—J- t —C
TD^ + 1.1412 (TD)^_^ - .2260 (TD)^_g = constant
+ 1.0873 - .2020 (L)^_2 = constant.
The free reserve and inventory change equations, however, are not of 
this type. For the free reserve equation:
FR^ + .9488 (FR)^_^ - .2997 (FR)^_2 = constant
- .9488 ± V.9002 - 1.1988
2
the discriminant (d ) is less than zero. Thus, the lag structure is 
oscillating. From the characteristic (largest) root:
(r = .7476) (r = .2012) 
since r<l, the series is oscillating hut converging. For the inventory 
change equation :
- .7826 ± V.6125 - 1.^156
2
the discriminant (d ) is less than zero. From the characteristic root:
(r = 1.784) (r = .2188) 
since r>l, the series is oscillating and diverging.
The remainder of the equations were assumed to he affected hy a 
Koyck-type lag distribution for first-order difference equations. This
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series assîmes that a geometrically-declining set of weights, applied 
to successively earlier periods, adequately expresses the distribution 
effect. It also assumes that this series can be measured by a single 
figure— a one-period lag of the endogenous variable.
Selection of the Model Based on Ordinary 
Least-Squares Estimates
The "normal" procedure for selecting the "best" equation to 
explain a particular endogenous variable is to base the decision upon 
theoretical relevance, a priori expectations— concerning which explana­
tory variables to include, and the expected magnitude and sign of the 
coefficients which result— the relative amounts of explained correlation, 
and the size of the standard error (especially important if the function 
is to be used for forecasting). However, if several specifications for 
a particular relationship are judged about equally acceptable on the basis 
of the above criteria, the final choice is quite subjective. It is, 
therefore, often not optimal.
A way to eliminate some of this subjectivity in the final selec­
tion is provided by the use of eigenvalues. An eigenvalue is a charac­
teristic value of an equation which satisfies certain specifications. 
Theil and Boot (I962) have shown that a necessary and sufficient condi­
tion for the convergence of the matrix of lagged endogenous variables, 
and therefore for the system of equations as a whole, is that the largest 
root of this matrix be less than one.
A square matrix is one having as many rows as it does columns.
A matrix of this type can be written as the sum of as many matrices of 
rank one (not a zero matrix) as the rank of the square matrix. Each of
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these separate matrices of rank one is equal to the product of a non­
zero characteristic root of that matrix and the corresponding characteris­
tic column and row.
Since there are fourteen endogenous variables in the system, 
there are fourteen equations. If one were to arrange the coefficients 
of a chosen set of the fourteen equations into matrices according to the 
type of variable they represent (e.g., endogenous), one would have a 
square matrix for the endogenous variables. If all fourteen equations 
are linearly independent, the rank would be fourteen. The same would 
be true for the matrix of lagged endogenous variables.
If r^ is a characteristic root— eigenvalue— of this matrix, and 
w^ and w^* are the corresponding characteristic column and row of this 
matrix A, then:
(A - r.l)w. = 0 1 1
w.* (a - r.l) = 0 1 1
One can then write the A matrix as the sum of the matrices of rank one 
times the corresponding vectors of the characteristic columns and rows :
A = + • • • +
If one raises the matrix A to the nth power the eigenvalues become r^”
while the vectors (w^w^*) remain constant:
„n n j, n ,A = r^w^w^* + rgWgWg* + . . .
Therefore, if is to approach zero as n approaches infinity, it is
necessary— and sufficient— for all the eigenvalues to be less than one
in absolute value (Theil and Boot, l$6l).
The speed of convergence depends on the size of the largest
eigenvalue. For "Klein's Model I," Theil and Boot found this dominant
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root to be .838. The closer the value of this dominant root is to zero, 
the more rapid the rate of convergence. The closer it is to one, the
more unstable the system is. If it is greater than one, the system is
explosive. A second convergence criteria requires that there must be 
at least one pair of conjugate complex roots— one non-zero element for 
both the real and imaginary parts of the set of eigenvalues for the sys­
tem. This requirement assures that the system is subject to a damped 
oscillatory type of convergence rather than uniform convergence.
These criteria were used to determine, on the basis of the ordinary 
least-squares parameter estimates, which subset of equations was finally 
chosen. That set which best met these criteria— the smallest dominant 
root and at least one pair of conjugate complex roots— was considered 
"best." From among the forty equations considered in the last stage 
(7^6,U96 possible combinations), the final set of fourteen equations 
was: 3, 7, U, 12, 15, 19, 21, 2k, 29, 31, 35, 37, 39, k2. The set of
eigenvalues for this system of equations was :
12k
TABLE h-1
EIGENVALUES OF THE SYSTEM OF EQUATIONS
REAL PART OF 
EIGENVALUE 
(RE)
IMAGINARY PART 
OF EIGENVALUE 
(IE)
EIGENVALUE
V re  ^+ lE^
1) 0.60219 0.0 0.60219
2) -0.18323 0.0 0.18323
3) 0.21582 0.0 0.21582
U) 0.19936 0.0 0.19936
5) 0.33411 0.02765 0.33526
6) 0.33411 -0.02765 0.33526
7) 0.55676 0.0 0.55676
8) 0 .50140 0.0 0 .50140
9) 0.91976 0.0 0.91976
10) 0.68804 0.0 0.68804
11) 0.87238 0.0 0.87238
12) -0.00000 0.0 0.00000
13) 0.78277 0.0 0.78277
Ik) 0.80940 0.0 0.80940
Source: author.
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Simultaneous Estimates of the Model Parameters 
Ordinary least-squares estimation procedures are known to give 
biased and inconsistent estimates of a model's parameters if they are 
applied to relationships having current endogenous variables on the right 
hand side. With the assumption of normal and serially-independent dis­
turbances, the two-stage least-squares estimation method yields consis­
tent estimates having the asyptotic properties of normality and efficiency. 
By first regressing each of the jointly-determined variables— those which 
are simultaneously endogenous and exogenous within the system— individually 
on all of the exogenous variables, it is hoped to eliminate the influence 
of the disturbances (stochastic fluctuations) from these jointly deter­
mined variables. Then these "cleansed" variables replace their counter­
parts in the original equations being estimated by the ordinary least- 
squares method.
The two-stage estimates of this model were accomplished by the 
use of these instrumental variables. It is generally expected that, 
because the model as a whole, and each of the equations, is overidenti­
fied, the ordinary least-squares estimates are biased downward. Thus, 
we would commonly expect the two-stage estimates to be more correct, 
though not necessarily more statistically significant, than the ordinary 
least-squares estimates;
(43) add = .06153(Y ) T + .1598(CHP) , - .6l72(r, ) + .1202(AL)
(4.132) P (2.087) " (-4.381)° (2.310)
- .o4819(dd) , + .4787(add) ,
(-3.915) (5.533)
= .6790 SE = .5835
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(UU) ACC = .0008583(7) + .00921+3(AY) - .02U65(r, ) - .01219(CC)  ^
(3.531) (4.307) (-1 .524) (-3.594)
+ .6077(ACC) T
(8.023)
= .9043 SE = .08505
(45) ATD = -13.01 + .05463(7) + .2692(ADD) + .156i(AL)
(-4 .854) (4 .849) (I.162) (1 .464)
- .242l(r,'7 ) + .1712(r,,-7 ) - .2985(r..7)
(-3.148)* (1.895) (-2.836)1
- .08489(TD) + .2259(ATD)
(-1.919) (2.162)
= .791+6 SE = 1.1306
(46) APR = .09425 - .03985(ADD) + .01532(ATD) - .03671(AL)
(1.599) (-2.166) (1.808) (-3.422)
+ .i426(0MO) + .1706(r,) - .1977(r, ) - .3047(ART)
(4.588) (3.235) (-4.690) (-3.732)
- .3537(fr) + .2885(afr) ^
(-7.578) -I (3.598)
R^ = .7745 SE = .09755
(47) AL = -4.528 + .03610(7) , + .3841(0^) - .1244(AI^) - .3430(1^) .
(-1.813) (2.815) " (4 .704) (-2.886) (-4.662)
+ .732l(r,) + .4281(ADD) - .1152(1)  ^+ .106o(AL) ^
(2.096) ^ (2.659) (-3.324) "1 (0.8907)
R^ = .8737 SE = .8351
(48) OMO = .l465(WD7 ) + .01272(AFR) - .009085(TRM) - .002308(r .7)
(2.176) (4.116) (-4.594) (-5.696)
+ .0003739(r,,*7 ) + .00235(r^.7) + .1642(B-P)
(2.535) (4.715) (3.298)
+ .01004(ART) - .1673(OMO) ,
(4 .017) (-1.761)
R^ = .8148 SE = .00338
(49) r, = -.3750 + .003145(7) T + .006134(AY) - .o4978(CHP) t
(-1.027) (1.602) (1.556) (-2.882)
+ .3287(r,) + .009484(1) , - .2149(afr)  ^ + .6646(r,) , 
(8.103) * (1.701) (-1.849) (12.35)
R^ = .9884 SE = .1332
(50) 7 = C^ *^  + c^ + + AI^ + E®
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(51) = -23.02 + .086U8(y) + .2378(chp) + .3l8U(AProd)
(-1.827) (2.937) (1.026) (1.828)
+ .2765(AL) + .8087(0^^) 1
(1.589) (11.01)
= .9997 SE = 1.5^5
(52) = -12.57 + .05103(Y) + .1287(AY) + .1398(CAP) + .46l2(AL)
(-3.452) (5.451) (3.389) (3.210) (3.652)
+ .4189(0 )^
(3.978)
= .9953 SE = 1.180
(53) = -22.07 + .06879(ay) + .09375(Y^)  ^ - 1 .068(r )
(-3.877) (3.152) (4.601) P (-3.858)^
+ .l853(r^-Y) + .1557(L) + .8668(1^) ,
(4.179) (4.660) (16.81)
R^ = .9603 SE = .8099
(54) = -15.09 + .01056(y) , + .1273(AY) + .1529(CAP) , + .9764(rJ
(-4.652) (1.501) ■ (5.171) (4.813) ■ (2.762)
+ .2449(AL) + .8243(1°^) 1 
(2 .210) (1.434)
R^ = .9981 SE = .8789
(55) Al^ = 8.887 + .4711(ay) + .4487(0^) T - .7264(al) + 1.679(r.)
(5.447) (8.832) (3.772) ■ (-3.124) (3.441) P
- .6063(1^) T + .4ooi(ai ) , 
(-5.263) -1 (5.061)
R^ = .8609 SE = 1.939
(56) CHP = .0334 + .0000118(Y) - .04790(AProd) + .001572(r )
(1.710) (0.5233) (-2.093) (1.668)
+ .003499(r.) + .8i83(CHP) ,
(2.685) 4 (1.651)
R^ = .9437 SE = .00369
Interestingly, almost to an equation the coefficient of determi­
nation and the standard error of the regression were poorer for the two- 
stage estimation of the parameters than for the ordinary least-squares 
estimation. The reason probably lies in the first-stage estimation of
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the instruments which replace the appropriate jointly-determined variables 
in the equations of the second-stage. Using the standard errors of the 
estimates as guides, those of the instruments were continually greater 
than the standard errors of the original variable. If they had been 
smaller, it is possible that the two-stage estimates would have been 
better.
Looking at the differences between the two estimates provides us 
with some meaningful comparisons of estimations methods and interpreta­
tions :
Equations (3) and (^3)—“the two-stages (2SLS) estimate gives increased 
weight to permanent income and price changes as determinants of the 
demand for DD. It deemphasizes the importance of changes in loans, the 
short-term interest rate, and the lagged change. The only noteable 
result is the lessened importance assigned to the level of the interest 
rate on assets which are thought to be highly substitutable for the 
holding of demand deposits. Apparently the demand for DD is more stable 
than is generally hypothesized.
Equations (7) and (44)— the 2SLS gives less weight to income changes 
and to the interest rate. Apparently the previous level of coin and 
currency is the most important determinant of the demand for CC in the 
current period.
Equations (ll) and (^5)--the theory that the demand for time deposits 
is basically a function of past income and the interest rate is borne 
out in this comparison. The 2SLS estimate reduces the importance of ADD 
and AL, and increases that of (l) ^ and the yield paid on time deposits. 
The latter is also emphasized by the large coefficient of (ATD) ^ which
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means that there exists a fairly short adjustment lag.
Equations (l2) and jhG)— the 2SLS result, unexpectedly, reduces the 
importance the ordinary least-squares (OLSQ) estimates gave to changes 
in DD, TD, and the RRR^^. OMO is shown to be less important as the 
interest rates gain significantly. One would not a priori expect these 
results since the level of PR's is determined by the levels of DD and 
TD, and by the ERR on DD's and TD's.
Equations (l^ and (4?)— the importance of the real sector variables in 
determining the demand for bank loans is amply illustrated by this com­
parison. Income and the lag adjustment variables are discounted. Those 
of the real sector, especially that for inventory investment, are improved. 
The importance of the discount rate is expected.
Equations (19) and (U8)— the 2SLS estimate more closely approximates a 
priori expectations. OMO is seen to depend more heavily on the market
interest rates and on the balance of payments situation than on the time
deposit variables and the lagged OMO level. The significance of the
expected income change is slightly improved.
Equations (2l) and (Ug)— there is no noticeable difference in this equa­
tion under either estimation procedure. Since there are no jointly- 
dependent variables on the right-hand side of the function, tils result 
should be expected.
Turning briefly to the real sector:
Equations (24) and (90)— income identity.
Equations (29) and (5l)— only slight differences are observed.
Equations (31) and (92)«~the importance of income, loans, and the pre­
vious level of durable goods consumption are obvious and increased by
the 2SLS estimation.
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Equations (35) and ($3)— the increased emphasis on the discount rate 
and the long-term interest rate is understandable ; but the reduced 
importance of income and loans is quite unexpected in light of the 
theory underlying the equation.
Equations (37) and (^4)— the 2SLS estimate places more reliance on income 
and the long-term interest rate and less on the lagged-adjustment. 
Equations (39) and (55)— income, loans, and the short-term interest rate 
are, as expected, increasingly important at the expense of the lagged 
adjustment variables.
Equations (U2) and (^6)— the reduced reliance on the interest rate terms 
is surprising as is the increased emphasis on (AProd).
It appears that, although the statistical measures of the 2SLS 
estimates were not as favorable as those from OLSQ, they did tend to 
place more emphasis (importance) on those variables in the equations 
which theory would lead us to expect should be more important. In the 
multiplier analysis which follows, however, the coefficients which were 
estimated by OLSQ were used. For some reason, the multipliers from the 
2SLS estimation diverged rather than converged. This is evident from the 
fact that the largest eigenvalue was greater than one.
CHAPTER V
ELASTICITY AND MULTIPLIER ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL
The purpose of this chapter is twofold— ‘to briefly look at the 
elasticities and to study in more depth the multipliers that evolve from 
the specification of the model. Both types of analyses employed in this 
chapter reflect, with varying degrees of emphasis, results of the model­
ing and estimation efforts which were rather summarily discussed in the 
previous chapter. The initial part involves analyzing several of the 
interesting demand and income "elasticities" which have resulted from 
the (structural) parameter estimation. The remainder of the chapter 
presents a "multiplier analysis" which describes the time path of the 
response of the endogenous variables to a given unit change in a prede­
termined variable, given a ceteris parabis assumption. The distinction 
between the impact, interim, and total multipliers is emphasized, and the 
response path, as a whole, is considered as still another important part 
of policy considerations.
The Concept of Elasticity Measurement 
The basic concept of an elasticity measure is to indicate the 
degree of responsiveness of an endogenous variable (W) to changes in one 
of the exogenous variables (X) of which it is a function. Thus, the 
elasticity measure depends upon the relative (percentage) changes between
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the two and is independent of their units of measure. Strictly speak­
ing, any movement from one point (which represents a single paired- 
ohservation) on a scatter diagram of the time series data to any other 
point permits the measure of an elasticity. Elasticity is measured
between these two points in time and under a given set of conditions.
However, of more general interest is a summary measure of elasticity which
attempts to describe, on an average, what the reaction of one variable
would be to a given percentage change in the other.
Since this summary figure should, at least theoretically, repre­
sent the elasticity of change between any two points in time, it seems 
appropriate to use the "arc-elasticity" concept as the basis of the 
analysis:
E = #
(X^ + Xg) /2
AX ‘ (W^ + Wg) /2  •
In making an elasticity computation of this type between any two points 
in time, one multiplies the ratio of the changes times the ratio of the 
averages between the two points. To extend this concept to allow for
strictly one summary measure, one simply inserts the average value for
each series over the time horizon in place of the average value of the
variable between any two points :
AX W
There are two basic elasticity concepts: (l) short-run; and
(2) long-run. For the equation:
ït = a +
the short-run elasticity of with respect to changes in X^ is:
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AY X X
E = —  • — = p* — •
AX Ÿ Ÿ
The long-run concept requires two additional assumptions: (l) that the
long-run values in the time series are in equilibrium; and (2) that the 
equilibrium values in the long-run do not change. Given these two 
assumptions, we can solve for Y^:
Since: Y^ = Y^,!
?t = G + pxt + y^t 
(i-7 )y^ = a + px^
Y = — ^  + — L  X . 
t Cu?) (i_?) t
The long-run elasticity then becomes: 
e = - A _ . I .
(1-7) Y
Because of the unrealistic assumptions relating to equilibrium and the 
constancy of the terms, plus the uncertainty surrounding the determina­
tion of how long is the "long-run," the short-run concept was considered 
preferable and potentially more meaningful. This choice, however, elimi­
nates comparisons of the elasticities generated by this model and those 
resulting from other econometric studies since the latter are calculated 
on a long-run basis.
The regressions of the previous chapter provide us with estimates 
of the ratio of the changes. These are measured by the regression coef­
ficients, assuming ceteris parabis. For example, in the functional rela­
tionship describing movement in the discount rate (r^), the coefficient 
of the Treasury bill rate variable (r^) was (.304l). This, then, is the 
figure represented by (AY/AX = p). Completing the elasticity calculation,
13^
the average discount rate level over the sixty-eight quarters was 3*3^8 
percent; that for the hill rate was 3*283 percent. Therefore:
E = .3041 ( | ^ )  = .29819
Table (5-1) contains several of the more interesting demand and income 
elasticities. These measures are based on the parameter estimates 
derived by the OLSQ estimation.
T A B L E  (5-1)
d e m a n d  AND I N C D M F  E L A S T I C I T I E S  W I T H  R E S P E C T  TO C H A N G E S  I N
* * * * * *  * * *  * * * * * *  * * * * * * * * * * * *  * * * *  * * * * * * *  * *  * * * * * * *  * *
B I L L  R D I S C  R D I S  - 1  F P  RES  C M C  OEMD D B LOAN C P L  - 1  I NCOME P E R M Y WTDCHY B A L P A Y
CH DD - 0 . 0 1 E 7
CH CC - 0 . 0 0 2 6
CH TD
+ C H  F R - 1 . 2 9 4 5  1 . 1 5 4 2
- C H  FR 2 . 1 2 6 ?  - 1 . 6 2 J 9
CH C B L  0 . 0 1 4 0
+ OMO 
-  OMO 
D I S C  R 0 . 2 9 8 2  
N J N O  C 
DDR C 
RES  F I 
NONR I
CH I NV 0 . 0  9  3 7
ANCH P 0 . 2 6  7 6
- 0 .  1 2 3 9
0 .  1 4 S 2
0 .3 3 0 6  
2 ,  5 2  9 1  -  1 4 .  6 9 9  - 1 1 . 3 1 1  
- 3 .  0 5 4  4  1 6  . 3  91  1 6 . 9  5  9
0 . 4  14  1
0 .  0 6 4 4
0 . 1 8 1 5
- 0 . 0 0 1 7  
- 0  . 1 3 2 2
0  . 0 4 2 3  
1 . 2 7 2 4
0 . 6 0 7 6  
-  1 . 6 5 9 6
0 . 0 2 4 8  0 . 0 4 8 3
- 0 . 3 8 8 9  - 0 . 0 9 0 2
LO\J1
0 . 5 7 9 9
0 . 4 5 9 5  1 . 3 4 6 6
I . 7 3 6 2  
1 . 9 7 7 4  
0 . 9 0 0 2  1 . 7 0 0 0  1 . 8 7 4 8
1 . 2 7 5 1  
4 . 2 9 8 4  
0 . 2 0 3 9
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Evaluation of the Demand and Income Elasticities
The elasticities of the demand deposit equation (3) are much 
smaller than would normally be expected, although the signs are as 
expected. The elasticities with respect to permanent income (,06k) and 
the bill rate (-.019) indicate that one percent changes in these two 
have very little effect on the level of demand deposits. This does not 
appear to uphold the "Friedmonian" thesis because of the extreme inelas­
ticities. However, this is a short-run elasticity and the quantity theory 
is a long-run theoretical concept. One would also expect a ten percent 
change in loans to boost demand deposits by more than one and one-half 
percent. The other component of the "narrowly-defined" money stock, 
coin and currency, also appears to be extremely interest-inelastic.
Again the income-elasticity figure is quite small (.182); so, also, is 
it for time deposits (.308).
The elasticities of free reserves and of open market operations 
required special considerations because the quarterly averages alternated 
between positive and negative values quite frequently— for FR, thirty- 
five positive and thirty-three negative; for OMO, fifty-seven positive 
and eleven negative. To aggregate these would distort any meaningful 
interpretation of the elasticities. Thus, two elasticities for each 
relationship were calculated— one using the mean of the positive values 
and the other using the mean of the negative values. In order not to 
bias the results, the means of the exogenous variables were also adjusted. 
Taking FR's as an example, the individual values of the exogenous vari­
ables were divided into two groups. One group contained values of the 
exogenous variables which occurred during periods when FR's were positive;
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another held the values for the periods when free reserves were negative.
To illustrate this, we examine the free reserve elasticities 
with respect to a one percent increase in demand deposits:
E = A(-FR) . DD g ^ A(+FR)  ^ DD
ADD (-FR) ADD (+FR)
= -.04305 (123:17) = -.04305 (II5 .56 )
- .3 2 3 5 .33915
=16.39 = -14.67
When the beginning level of free reserves is positive, the elasticity 
measure reflects the fact that a one percent increase in demand deposits 
results in a l4 2/3 percent decline in the existing net free reserve 
position. The other measure shows that a one percent increase in 
demand deposits when free reserves are initially at a negative level 
will result in a 16 I/3 percent increase in net borrowed reserves.
Since loans are usually taken out, at least initially, in the 
form of an increase in demand deposits, we might expect approximately 
the same results for an increase of one percent in loans as we observed 
for the increase in demand deposits. This is in fact the case. The 
positive level of free reserves declines a little less and the negative 
level of free reserves increases a little more than in the demand deposit 
case. If the funds that are lent are withdrawn, this increase in coin 
and currency outstanding reduces reserves, presumably free reserves, by 
the full amount of the loan. The elasticities for a change in time 
deposits are also interesting, especially in terms of what they tell us 
about the effects of disintermediation. An increase in time deposits 
usually comes about as a result of a transfer of funds from either demand
deposits or coin and currency. With a transfer from DD to TD, the amount
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of reserves required to be held against these deposits declines (ERE^^> 
RRR^), thus creating additional free reserves. The deposit of cash
creates almost totally new free reserves. This explains the signs of the
elasticities. A one percent increase in time deposits results in a 4 l/3  
percent increase in net free reserves or a 5 l/Z percent reduction in 
net borrowed reserves (a reduction of the negative level).
In terms of interest rates also, the free reserve elasticities 
are not unexpected. A one percent increase in the percentage level of 
the discount rate should lessen the interest in member bank borrowing 
from the Fed and should make banks less willing to grant new business
loans. This combination of events should serve to increase the amount of
net free— decrease the amount of net borrowed— reserves. This is reflected 
in the elasticity measures. Also, as anticipated, an increase in the 
percentage level of the bill rate should (as discussed in the last chap­
ter) make other investments more attractive than holding demand or time 
deposits. This movement results in a decline in the levels of free— an 
increase in the level of borrowed— reserves.
The final free reserve elasticity of interest reflects the fact 
that an increase in open market operations (purchase by the Fed) pro­
vides reserves to the banks. A one percent increase in the level of 
open market operations in the short-run will increase free reserves by 
21/2 percent. Or it may lower the net borrowed reserve position by 
three percent.
As with the money supply components, the loan elasticities are 
not as large as expected. A ten percent increase in the level of income 
during the previous quarter results in only a one and one-half percent
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increase in loans. And an increase of ten percent in durable goods con­
sumption results in only a one percent increase in loans. Along more 
expected lines, the short-run elasticity of an increase in the discount 
rate has almost no effect {.lOQfo) toward increasing loans although the 
level may initially increase in anticipation of future discount rate 
increases.
Previously it was observed that open market operations, like 
free reserves, frequently experienced quarterly averages which alternated 
between positive and negative values. Therefore, two measures of each OMO 
elasticity were calculated (by the same method used for FR's). For 
example :
A(-OMO) FR A(+OMO) FR
E = ------- • ------ E =
AFR (-0M0) AFR (+OMO)
- . .012795
=  -.1322 =  -.00123
These elasticities reflect the fact that when the level of open market 
operations is increasing, an increase of one, or even ten, percent in the 
level of free reserves has little, if any, effect toward changing the OMO 
trend. Nor does a comparible decline in free reserves have much effect. 
But when the trend in OMO is downward, a ten percent increase in free 
reserves would lead to a 1 I/3 percent decrease in the negative level of 
Federal Reserve operations in the open market. This seems to imply 
that when the Federal Reserve is allowing or forcing the use of more OMO, 
they expect to see a sizable increase in free reserves. Part of this, 
at least, would be due to their provision of additional reserves through 
purchases. But when they are restricting the level of OMO, an increase
i4o
in free reserves will force them to increase their use of this market 
tool. A decrease in free reserves would allow the "Fed" to further 
restrict these operations.
When the rate of income change is expected to rise hy one per­
cent, OMO will not be altered very much if its trend is already increas­
ing. If the trend is downward, however, the increased rate of income 
change will cause a significant reversal of this decline in the trend. 
Surprisingly, the magnitude of the balance of payments problem had very 
little influence on the size or the trend in open market operations.
The discount rate reacts rather as anticipated. A ten percent 
rise in the level of the Treasury bill rate would induce a three percent 
rise in level of the discount rate. An equal rise in income and in 
loans (of the previous period) will induce rate level increases of 13 l/2 
and k 1/2 percent respectively. The sizable elasticity as a result of an 
income rise probably reflects both a rise in income and consumption as 
well as an increase in loans in the same period.
As expected, all the major real sector components of income 
respond significantly to a one percent increase in the level of income. 
This is also true, with the exception of nondurable consumption, for a 
similar rise in the level of bank loans. Nondurable consumption involves 
numerous but generally "inexpensive" purchases, basically of staples and 
necessities. These purchases seldom require the extension of a loan 
except for consumer credit in some cases. Based on the discussion of 
inventory investment in the last chapter, the negative elasticity between 
loans and inventory investment is also expected. Apparently, the 
elasticities with respect to interest rates support the often proposed
lUi
thesis that real sector components are relatively interest-inelastic.
Changes in the price level, however, appear to be highly sus­
ceptible to interest rate changes. A ten percent increase in the level 
of the bill rate or the discount rate will induce increases of almost 3 
and about 5 3/^ percent in the annual rate of price changes. The income 
elasticity of price changes is only 0 .2 . The most interesting factors 
to arise out of the price elasticities are the high degree of responsive­
ness to changes in the discount rate, and the fact that the price 
changes lag the discount rate changes by a perceptible period.
Multiplier Analysis of an Econometric Model 
The structural model of economic relationships which was esti­
mated in the previous chapter proposed that the endogenous variables 
were functions of other current endogenous variables, lagged endogenous 
variables, and the exogenous variables— both current and lagged. The 
coefficients— the "structural parameters"— which were estimated by both 
estimation procedures (OLSQ and 2818) are of the type often used to evalu­
ate both the theoretical basis and the empirical results of the proposed 
relationships. However, these are only tentative specifications because 
many equations involve jointly-determined variables. An improved 
specification would include only exogenous variables on the right-hand 
side of these equations.
This is accomplished by solving for the "reduced-form" equations. 
The coefficients of these reduced-form equations indicate the level of 
influence, both direct and indirect, which results from a given level 
of movement in the exogenous variables (employing a ceteris parabis 
assumption for changes in the other predetermined variables). In matrix
Ih2
notation, the structural equations may be represented, in general terms, 
by:
¥Y = AY T + BX + CX , + p 
- X  -X
where: Y = current endogenous variables ;
Y ^ = endogenous variables, lagged one period;
X = current exogenous variables;
X ^ = exogenous variables, lagged one period; 
p = residuals 
and: W, A, B, C = structural coefficients.
Simplification of the model could have been facilitated by the fact that 
one of the equations (r^) depends solely on predetermined variables. 
Therefore, this recursive system couJLd have been solved by initially 
calculating (r^) and then using the predetermined variables plus the 
discount rate to solve for the remaining unknowns. However, the simul­
taneous solution of these equations for the reduced form equations 
involves dividing each of the structural coefficient matrices by the W- 
matrix. In matrix terminology, this means (pre)multiplying the other 
coefficient matrices by the inverse of the W-matrix:
Y = w “^A(y )_^ + W"^(X) + W'^C(X)_^ + W“\
= A*(y )_^ + B*(X) + C*(X)_^ + (p*)
In the simplified approach to Keynesian theory (as exemplified 
by the basic three equation model in terms of income, consumption and
investment), the (-X-) is said to be the multiplier which measures the 
1-b
amount of change in income that would result from a given level of change
/ ^  \in investments. Each of the reduced-form coefficients in the (B ) matrix 
are multipliers— "impact multipliers"— which express the amount of change
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in the endogenous variables that results from a one-unit change in the 
level of one of the exogenous variables during the same period, ceteris 
parabis ;
■ p ;
Given that the equations in the model are linear, if the esti­
mated coefficients had remained constant over the time span (and for 
sub-periods of this horizon), these impact multipliers should have been 
the same as those timeless multipliers of the Keynesian theory. Since 
this is not the case, there is also considerable interest in the effects 
of lagged variables on the endogenous variables. The implication of 
these lagged values is that their current levels will affect the next 
period levels of the endogenous variables. They may also have a definite 
effect on subsequent values in the future time path of responses of the 
endogenous variables. The "interim (intermediate) multipliers" reflect 
the effects on the future time paths which will result from an initial 
unit change in an exogenous variable during the current period— still 
maintaining the ceteris parabis assumption. Therefore, they are of 
extremely vital importance in a multiplier analysis.
/ ^ \It should not be inferred, however, that the (C ) matrix measures 
the influence of the exogenous variables on the endogenous variables one- 
quarter (or even further) into the future. As Theil and Boot (1962) 
point out, this is because ^ not only affects directly— as is
reflected in the (C ) matrix— but also indirectly through There­
fore, the total effect of ^ on Y^ can be found only by eliminating
^t-r
\  + ® X -1 + = X _2 + * = X  + <^X.l
+ w'^p
= A ^Y._g + B X  + (c + A B )X^_^ + A C X^_g + (residuals).
Taking the limit of A as s—». oo ;
o@
= B*X^ + 2 a*®"^(C* + A*B*)X^_g + 2  A*^ (residuals).
8 = 0  S = 0
The interim multipliers (for time periods s>t) are:H  .
From this can be found the multipliers for the successive time periods 
(neglecting the residuals): 
impact : s=0, B
interim: s=l, (C* + A*B*)
"X-, 4^ -X- "X".
8=2, A (c + A B )
*2, * * *.
8=3, A (C + A B )
It therefore, becomee obviou8 that the "total multiplier" i8:
£  A*=-"(C* . aV)
8=0 à \
Thi8 expre8ses the 8nm of the impact plu8 all the interim multipliere 
under the assumption that the series converges toward some level.
Time Path Response in a Dynamic System 
As was previously discussed, the question relating to convergence 
of the series over time can be answered by determining the eigenvalues 
(roots of a characteristic function) of the system of equations. Addi­
tionally, given the existence of certain other conditions, one can tell 
the type of movement (e.g., damped oscillatory) to be expected from the
lU5
interim multipliers. Convergence is a necessary condition for a meaning­
ful study of the multipliers since divergence would mean not only that 
the economy as a whole is explosively unstable but also that the sum of 
the interim multipliers would be meaningless. The damped oscillatory 
movement in the multipliers is generally expected because of the cyclic- 
like fluctuations generally observed in the economy. The other type of 
convergence is uniform, but this seems incongruous in terms of our a priori 
expectations.
The multipliers in this analysis differ—-significantly in some 
cases— from those of the "Klein Model I" as found by Theil and Boot 
(1962) and those by Goldberger (1959)* They also differ from the multi­
pliers of the Fromm and Taubman (1967) simulation. In the Klein case, 
at least part of the difference can be explained by the difference in 
the eigenvalues and tested convergence of the two models. Another part 
can be attributed to the difference in the number of equations, vari­
ables, time periods, estimation methods, etc. The dissimilarities 
between the present model and the Fromm and Taubman model are not as 
clearly defined, however, because the latter does not appear to have 
been tested for convergence or for the type of movement to be expected 
of the multipliers. The multipliers of both models, however, do converge.
Goldberger (1959) appears to recognize the possibility of these 
differences. He seems to down-play them in favor of analyzing the time 
paths :
It appears that initial conditions can play a critical role in 
the behavior of dynamic systems; and hence that the conventional 
procedure of studying dynamics by mere examination of characteristic 
roots may not be adequate . . .  in analyzing econometric models, 
truncated time paths are at least as important as complete solutions.
Fromm and Taubman (I967) uphold the first contention but appear to reject
ihG
the secondo They seem to say that differences in conclusions from various
models should not concern one unless the differences appear to he quite
serious, leading to markedly differing conclusions:
because of various factors (including the impact of initial condi­
tions), not too much emphasis should be given to the exact time path 
of increase of the various multipliers. A complex, dynamic, dif­
ference equation system is likely to have roots that produce fluctu­
ation responses to any stepped changes in its forcing functions 
(exogenous inputs). Such a model is also likely to be influenced 
by specification choices and the techniques used to estimate para­
meters. Consequently, the dynamic multipliers fluctuate.
Tables (5-2) through (5-8) contain the structural and reduced 
form coefficients for the model specified in Chapter IV. The ordinary 
least-squares parameter estimates were used. The two-stage estimates 
would have been preferable, but the multipliers diverged instead of 
exhibiting the convergence which is generally expected a priori. These 
expectations reflect the theoretical implications that, although the 
economy more or less constantly verges on the "knife's edge," the cycle 
experiences implosive rather than explosive fluctuations as a result of 
exogenous "shocks."
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TE I S IS TEE-
CE CEE C CE CCIEC
c cr 1 .CCOCC C .C
c cr C .C I .CCCCC
C 1C - C . 2 7 5 6 C C.C
C FR C.C43C5 C .C
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GNF G .C c.c
c C .C c .c
C [ C .C c .c
RES C .C c .c
^C^F C .C c .c
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CE F c .c c .c
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C CC c.c C.C
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C FR C.C c.c
CE L C.C c . c  '
CEC C.C c .c
C I S C.C c .c
GEF 1.CCOCC - 1 .CCCCC
C EC -C.C82C3 1.CCCCC
C [ -C.C5C67 c .c
PES C.C c .c
ECER C.C c .c
CE I C.C c.c
CE F -C.CCOCl c . c
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1 .CCCCC C.C C.C c .[ C .C
C.C 1.C C C C C C.C c .c C.C
C.C c .c 1 . C C C C C c . c C.C
C.C C.C c.c 1 .CCCCC c .c
C.C C.C c.c c . c 1.C C C C C
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Impact Multipliers
*
The impact multipliers of this system of equations— B -matrix—  
reflect the magnitude of the current-quarter change of an endogenous 
variable which results from a unit change in one of the current exogen­
ous (or contemporary endogenous) variables. In terms of the B -matrix, 
an element, bUj, would indicate the magnitude of the change in the i—  
endogenous variable given a unit change during the current period in the 
j—  exogenous variable. For example, from Table (5-6), a one percent 
increase in the rate of worker productivity would immediately result in 
an increase of more than $525 million in income. Most of this increase, 
apparently, would be spent to purchase nondurable goods and services.
A one billion dollar increase in government expenditures (accounted for 
by a rise in exogenous expenditures) would apparently result in a $20 
million addition to the level of loans. These two would combine to raise 
income by $1.15 billion— the initial increase in government spending 
plus about $95 million in new nondurable and service consumption and $68 
million in durable goods consumption.
Several of the entries in this Table do not agree with the results 
which, a priori, are more generally expected. These multipliers tend to 
be larger than those normally expected. At least part of the reason for 
this is that the effects of lagged endogenous and exogenous variables 
have not yet had an effect on the magnitude of this reaction. Also, as 
pointed out before, the multipliers are quite subject to differences 
resulting from other dissimilarities in specification and estimation. 
Fromm and Taubman (196%) also explain why these impact multipliers may 
differ from model to model:
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The impact multipliers reported here are somewhat greater than 
those customarily estimated. However, most of the other information 
we have on such multipliers is derived from models which are highly 
recursive, rather than simultaneous. This high degree of recursion 
tends to dampen the reaction of the multipliers. . . .
It should also be emphasized that these are one-quarter impact 
multipliers; in a system with lags, longer-term multipliers tend to 
be different.
Interim and Total Multipliers 
As Goldberger (l959) points out, the procedure that has usually 
been employed to trace the effects of a unit change in the exogenous 
variable on the various endogenous variables during periods subsequent 
to the occurrence of the impact effect has been: . .to first esti­
mate a value of the marginal propensity to consume and specify a one- 
period lag in the consumption-income relationship. The time path of 
response is then easily traced out in terms of unit periods." However, 
the preferable method recognizes that the impact multipliers do not 
include lagged effects of either the exogenous or endogenous variables. 
The time path of changes in the endogenous variables when a unit increase 
in one of the exogenous variables is sustained in successive periods is 
better explained by also including the effects of the lagged endogenous 
(a -matrix) and lagged exogenous (C -matrix) variables. This means that 
the impact multipliers— the B -matrix— will differ substantially from 
the interim multipliers which are obtained by (pre-) multiplying the
. # # -K-
product matrix (C + A B ) by an appropriate power of the A -matrix.
The appropriate power is one less than the number of the future period
in which one is interested— e.g., for the fourth quarter in the future,
*3
one would use A ,
Also following Goldberger (1959) ^se was made of the "truncated
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time paths" although it was recognized that:
. . . They are quite particularized, in that they refer to the 
response to a particular sequence of exogenous stimuli beginning 
from a particular initial situation. The particular response 
path, then, may be regarded as being determined by these two 
particular factors, superimposed upon the inherent response char­
acteristics of the system.
The "total multiplier" is a concept which measures the aggre­
gated effects of a sustained increase of one unit in the exogenous 
variable. Table (5-9) contains the "total multipliers" for the dynamic 
effects of a unit change in each of the exogenous variables on all of the 
endogenous variables. As previously noted, this multiplier represents 
the arithmetic sum of the impact multiplier and all (summed theoretically 
to infinity) the interim multipliers. Since in this analysis, a trun­
cated time path covering a ten year future time span— forty quarters—  
was employed, the sum of the impact plus all the interim multipliers 
shown does not total to the figure shown as the "total multipliers."
Tables (5-IO) through (5-25) present all the multiplier measures: 
(1) the total multiplier; (2) the impact multiplier (for a zero time lag); 
and, (3) the forty interim multipliers for the ten year (forty-quarter) 
truncated time path. The length of this time path was arbitrarily 
chosen to be forty-quarters because it seemed that, for almost all the 
endogenous variables, the rate of convergence had "settled-down" into 
a slightly damped, monotonie convergence path. It was, therefore, felt 
that most of the economically relevant developments had already taken 
place.
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TABLE (5-9)
DYNAMIC TOTAL MULTIPLIERS 
** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
CB LCANS C CH GNP WTD V+l CHPRQOUC TERM STR
CH OEM D 0.06249 0.31040 0.00281 0.09810 -0.00020
CH GOING 0 .00688 0.04021 0.00045 0.01013 -0.00003
CH TIMED 0.29559 0.89981 0.01776 0,50122 -0.00127
CH FR RS 0.00158 -0.03873 0.02254 -0.01211 -0.00161
CH LCANS 0.24404 I .21624 0.01128 0.67410 -0.00081
OPEN M 0 0.00002 -0.00042 0.12158 -0.00013 -0.00868
OISC'T R 0.05699 0.11521 -0.01248 0.08798 0.00089
GNP 3.19092 7.73043 0.20637 4.69571 -0.01473
C NONDUR 1.37995 2.50854 0.06679 3.17636 -0.00477
C OUR G 0.45639 I .79920 0.02609 0.91136 -0.00186
RESID FI 0.74871 -0.21995 0.07812 -0.55066 -0.00557
NONRES I 0.54267 2.95476 0.02856 1.25628 -0.00204
CH INVEN 0.C6320 0.68788 0.00681 -0.09765 -0 .00049
ANN CH P 0.00116 0.00239 -0.00022 -0.24397 0.00002
T BILL R GOVT B R BILL R*Y T IMEDR*Y BOND R*Y
CH OEM D -2.03279 0 .69096 -0.00086 0.00058 0.16075
CH GOING -0.09578 0.03822 -0.00014 0.00009 0.00879
CH TIMED -2.28730 2.03899 -0.31803 0.22230 0.08665
CH FR RS 0.11921 -0.09176 -0.00688 0.00462 -0.02918
CH LOANS -2.74857 2.70808 -0.00344 0.00231 0.62995
OPEN M 0 0.00129 -0.00099 -0.00199 C.00037 0.00139
DISC* T R 0.76617 0.22418 0.00381 -0.00256 0.05673
GNP -14.32898 17.71928 -0.06295 0.04230 4.07657
C NONDUR -4.63291 5.74950 -0.02037 0.01369 1.32281
C DUR G -3.30744 3.56416 -0.00796 0.00535 0.82525
RESID FI -4.79527 -1.40309 -0.02383 0.01601 0.88471
NONRES I -4.83847 10.27671 -0.00871 0.00585 1.15565
CH INVEN 3.24509 -0.46796 -0.00208 0.00140 -0.11185
ANN CH P 0.02261 0.00474 0.00007 -0.00004 0.00118
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TABLE (5-9) 
CONTINUED
DYNAMIC TOTAL MULTIPLIERS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
BAL-PAYM CHRRR-TD EXOG EXP PERM Y-1 INVENT-1
CH DEM D 0.00316 -0.04929 0. 13044 0.13370 -0.34998
CH COINC 0.00050 -0.00782 0.00721 0.00511 -0.01245
CH TIMED 0.02000 -0.31194 0.38491 0.29524 -0.80827
CH FR RS 0.02538 -0.39590 -0.01732 -0.01582 0.05641
CH LCANS 0.01270 -0.19816 0.51122 0.40032 -1. 37233
OPEN M 0 0. 13688 0.00442 -0.00019 -0.00017 0.00061
DISC'T R -0.01405 0.21919 0.04232 0.03226 -0.08997
GNP 0.23234 -3.62410 3.34500 2.37102 -5.77113
C NONDUR 0.C7519 - I . 17292 1.08537 C.76937 -1.87279
C DUR G 0.02937 -0.45821 0.67283 0.50580 -1 .53406
RESID FI 0.08795 -1.37184 -0.26487 0.46000 0.56311
NONRES I 0.03215 -0.50154 0.94001 0.72144 -2.33420
CH INVEN C.00767 -0.11960 -0.08834 -0.08559 -0.59311
ANN CH P -0.00025 0.00385 0.00090 0.00068 -0.00185
CAPAC -1 DEMD D-1 COIN C-1 TIME D-1 FR RES-1
CH OEM 0 0.22919 - C . 14319 0.0 -0.00028 -0.05563
CH CCINC 0.01082 -0.00102 -0.02974 -0.00005 -0.00882
CH TIMED 0,61603 -0. 12231 0.0 -0.11136 -0.35200
CH FR RS -0.03310 0.01318 0.0 -0.00229 -0.44675
CH LOANS 0.89843 -0.18723 0.0 -0.00114 -0.22361
OPEN M 0 -0.00036 0.00014 0.0 -0.00002 -0.00483
DISC'T R 0.06803 -0.01286 0.0 0.00127 0.24734
GNP 5.017C5 -0.47431 0.0 -0.02092 -4.08958
C NONDUR 1.62797 -0.15398 0.0 -0.00677 -1.32357
C DUR G 1.34745 -0.18274 0.0 -0.00265 -0.51706
RESID FI -0.42577 0,08046 0.0 -0.00792 -1 .54803
NONRES I 2.49405 -0.30002 0.0 -0.00290 -0.56595
CH INVEN -0.02664 0.08198 0.0 -0.00069 -0.13496
ANN CH P 0.00143 -0.00025 0.0 0.00002 0.00435
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l/SELE (5-lC)
INTERIM MLLTIPLIEPS FCR TEE E>CGENCL< V/SRI/iPLE ce LC/S
CE [EM C CE CCINC CE TINEC CE FR PS CE LC/!NS CFE M C C s c ' 7  R
T/iL C.C624S C.CC6EE C.2S55S C.CC156 C . 244C^ CCC 2 .C56SS
L/G
C C.CCC23 C.CCCCS C.CCC35 -C.CCCC? C .CC 16 1 CCCC . c
1 -C.C 167S C.CCC2E -C.C1S6 3 C.CC64S -C .13C46 C. CCC6 .CCS6 1
2 -C.C 1156 C .CCC34 C.CC265 C.CC424 -C.C255E C . CCC4 .CC5S5
3 -C.CC53E C .CCC34 C.C1C12 C.CC2CS C .CC227 C . CCC 2 .CC 366
4 - C . CCI 1C C.CCC33 C.CI27C C.CCC7S C.Cl 167 C. CCC I .CC24S
c C.CC155 C .CCC32 C.C13S2 C.CCCCE C.C 1EC5 CCCC .CC 1S5
E C.CC31 1 C .CCC3 1 C .C14 S3 -C.CCC2S C.C 1EC3 CCCC .CC 172
? C.CC3SE C .CCC3C C.C 1473 -C.CCC4E C. C 1666 C C C l .CC163
8 C.CC443 C . C C C 2 S C .C M 6 2  -C.CCC57 C .C 1SC4 CCC 1 .CC 16C
S C.CC462 C .CCC27 C.C142S -C.CCCEC C.C l e e c CCCl .CC 157
1C C.CC464 C .CCC26 C.C13EC -C.CCCEI c . c  1E2S CCCl .CC 154
11 C.CC457 C .CCC25 C.C 1 323 -C.CCCEC c . c  1 7 6  2 CCCl .CC 15 1
12 C.CC443 C.CCC2^ C . C 1261 -C.CCC5E c . c 1665 CCC 1 .CC146
13 0.CC426 C.CCC22 C . C 1156 -C.CCC55 C.C IfC4 CCCl .CC 14 1
14 C.CC4C 1 C .CCC2 1 C.Cl 131 -C.CCC52 c.c 152C C C C l . CC135
15 C.CC366 C.CCC2C C.C1C66 -C.CCC5C C.C 1436 CCCl .CC 126
16 C.CC366 C .CCCIS C.C1CC3 -C.CCC47 c . c  1353 CCCl .CC 122
17 C.CC345 C.CCC17 C.CCS42 -C.CCC44 C.C 1272 CCCC .CC 1 15
IE C.CC324 C .CCC 16 C.CCEE3 -C.CCC41 C .C11S3 CCCC . .CC ICS
IS C.CC3C5 C .CCC 15 C.CCE27 -C.CCC3S C . C 1116 .CC iC2
2C C.CC2EC C .CCC 14 C.CC773 -C.CCC3E C.C1C46 CCCC .CCCS6
21 C.CC267 C .CCC 13 C.CC722 -C.CCC34 C.CCS76 CCCC .CCCSC
2 2 C.CC25C C .CCC 12 C.CC674 -C.CCC32 C.CCS 13 CCCC .CCC64
23 C.CC233 C.CCC12 C . C C 6 2 E  -C.CCC25 C.CC651 CCCC .CCC7S
24 C.CC21E C .CCC 1 1 C.CC5E5 -C.CCC27 C.CC7S2 CCCC .CCC73
25 C.CC2C3 C.CCCIC C.CC54A -C.CCC26 C.CC73S CCCC .CCC6S
26 c . c c i e s C.CCCCS C.CC5C6 -C.CCC24 C.CC667 CCCC .CCC64
27 C.CC176 C .CCCCS C.CC47C -C.GCC22 C.CC63S CCCC .CCC5S
26 C.CC16^ c . c c c c e C.CC437 -C.CCC21 C.CC5S4 CCCC .CCC55
29 C.CC152 C .CCCC7 C.CC4C6 -C.CCCIS C.CC551 CCCC .CCC5 1
3C C.CC141 C.CCCC7 C.CC376 -C.CCC16 C .CC5 1 1 CCCC .CCC4E
3 1 C.CC13 1 C.CCCC6 C.CC345 -C.CCC16 C.CC474 CCCC .CCC44
32 C.CC122 C .CCCC6 C.CC324 -C.CCC15 C.CC44C CCCC .CCC4 1
33 C.CC113 C.CCCC5 C.CC3CC -C .CCC 14 C.CC4C6 CCCC .CCC36
34 C.CC1C4 f .CCCC5 C.CC27E -C.CCC 13 C.CC37E CCCC .CCC35
■3 5 C.CCCS7 C .CCCC5 C.CC257 - C .CCC12 C .CC35C CCCC .CCC33
36 C.CCCSC C .CCCCi C.GC236 -C.CCC11 C.CC324 CCCC .CCC3C
37 C .CC083 C .CCCC4 C.CC22C -C.CCCIC C.CC2SS CCCC .CCC26
36 C.CCC77 C.CCCC4 C.CC2C3 -C.CCCIC C.CC277 CCCC .CCC26
3S C.CCC71 C .CCCC3 C.CC1E6 -C.CCCCS C.CC256 CCCC .CCC24
40 C .CC066 C .CCCC3 C.CC174 - c . c c c c e C.CC23 7 CCCC .CCC22
l6o
T ^ EL t ( 5 -l f )
C C M  I M E C
I M E K  IN M L T I F L I E F S FOR IFE EXCGENCIS V / F W E L E  CE LCf 5
GNP 0 NCNCIP C CLP 0 FESIC FI NONFES I CF INV N N OF F
TC7/ÏL
t^G
3 . 1909 2 1.37995 0.45639 0.7487 1 0.54267 0.063 a .00 116
C C. 1CC42 0.09535 0.0059 1 C.C 0.00045 -0.001 Ç .00000
1 C .2633C 0.09283 -0.04361 0.14998 -0.03134 0.0 95 •3 .00000
t C. 196 I 7 0.08544 - C . C 1924 0.12306 -0.02966 0.036 4 .00004
3 C . 163 I 1 0 .0 7 7 22 0.00155 (.10211 -0.02197 0.(04 ( .00(05
4 C.1491C 0.06992 0.0 1358 0.08520 -0.0 13 54 -0.006 6 .00006
c C .1^ 1 76 0.06387 0.0 1995 0.07120 -0.00566 -0.007 1 .00005
f , C .136C4 0.05889 0.023 13 0.05943 0.00 129 -0.0(6 c .00005
? C .13C35 0.05469 0.02450 0.04942 0.007 19 -0,005 4 .00005
8 C. 1244 1 0.05 107 0.02483 0.04089 0.01205 -0.004 2 .00005
9 C . 11827 0.04786 0.02454 0.03360 0.01595 -0.0(3 8 .00(04
IC C . 1 12C« 0.04495 0.02387 0.02738 0.0 1899 -0.003 c .00004
11 C. 1C5E5 0.04227 0.02299 0.022 10 C.C2127 -0.002 7 .00004
12 C.C9977 0.03977 0.02197 C .0 176 1 0.02290 -0.002 8 .00004
13 C.C9366 0.03742 0.02089 0.0 138 1 0.02399 -0,002 c .00004
14 C .088 15 0 .035 19 C.C 1979 0.01062 0.02461 -0.002 6 .00004
15 C.C6267 0.03307 0.0 1868 0.00794 0.02486 -0.00 1 0 .00003
16 C.0 7742 0.031(6 0.01759 0.00570 0.0248 1 -0.00 1 c .00003
17 C.07242 0.029 15 0.01654 0.00385 0.(2450 -0.00 1 2 .00003
18 C. 06 76 7 0.02734 0.01551 0.00232 0 . 02400 -C .001 0 .00003
19 0.06317 0.02561 0.0 1453 0.00 107 0.02335 -0.00 1 9 .00003
2C 0.05891 0.02397 0.01359 0 .0000 5 0.02259 -0.00 1 8 .00(03
2 1 0.05490 0.0224 1 0.01270 -0.C0076 0.02 174 -0.001 Ç .00003
2 2 0.05112 0.02094 0.0 1185 -0.00 14 1 0.02084 -0.(01 0 .00(02
23 0.04756 0.01955 C.Cl 105 - C .00 192 0.01989 -0.00 1 2 .00002
24 0.04422 0.0 1824 0.01030 -0.00230 0.01893 -0.000 4 .00002
25 0.04109 0.01700 0.00959 -0 .00 259 0.0 179 7 -0.00 0 7 .00002
26 0.03816 0.0 1583 0.00892 -0.00279 0.01701 -0.000 1 .00002
27 0.03542 0.01473 0.00829 -0.00292 0.01606 -0.000 c .00002
26 0.03285 0.01371 0.00770 -0 .00300 0.01514 -0.(00 c .00002
29 0.03046 0.01274 0.00715 -0.00303 0 .0 1424 -0 .000 4 .00002
3C 0.02823 0.0 1184 0.00663 -0.00303 0.0 1338 -0.000 c .00001
31 0.02615 C.C1C99 0.006 15 -0 .00299 0.0 1254 -C.CCC c .0000 1
32 0.02422 0.01020 0.00570 -0.00293 0.01175 -0.000 0 .0000 1
33 0.02241 0 .00946 0.00529 -0.00285 0.0 1099 -0.000 7 .(000 1
34 0.02074 0.00877 0.00490 -0.00276 C.C 1027 -0 .000 2 .COCCI
35 0.0 1919 0.00813 0.00453 -0.00266 0.00958 -0.000 0 .00001
36 0.01774 0 .00 753 0.00419 -0 .002 55 0.00893 -0.000 7 .0000 1
37 0.0 1640 0.00697 0.00388 -0.C0244 0.00832 -C.CCO 4 .0000 1
38 0.01516 0.00645 0.00359 -0.00232 0.007 7 5 -0.000 1 .00001
39 0.01400 0.00597 0 .00332 -0.00220 0.00721 -0.(00 Ç .00(0 1
4C C . C 129^ 0.00552 0.00307 -C .00209 0.00670 -C.OCC 7 .CCCC 1
l6l
T / i B L E  ( 5 - 1 1 )
INTEP IV M E T  IFL I EPS CP U E  E>CCENCLS V/SPI/iELE C CE G
CE CEr' c CE CC INC C TINEC CE FP RS CE LCANS LPEN C C s c  1 P
TCT/iL
L/C
C.31C4C C .C4C2 1 .699 61 -C.C3673 1.21624 -C.CC 42 .1152 1
C C.CC419 C . C 1C 12 .CC624 -C .CCC4 1 C.C3231 -C.CC C 1 .CC6 13
1 C . C 1225 C.CC665 .C65C6 -C.CC15C C.C7667 -C.CC C2 .CC694
2 C . C 1649 C .CC444 .C66 9 1 -C .CC2C5 C.CEC62 -C.CC C2 . C C 6 9 6
3 C . C 1766 C .CC3C5 .C596C -C .CC224 C.C7544 -C.CC C2 .CC666
4 C . C 17 7 9 C.CC217 .C5 3 2 C -C .CC223 C.C6947 -C.CC C 2 .CC63CC C.C17C5 C.CC 162 .C46C6 -C .CC2 14 C .C64C7 -C.CC C2 . C C 5 6 9
6 C.C 16C7 C .CC126 .C44C3 -C.CC2C2 C.C5926 -C.CC C2 .CC55C
7 C .C 15C3 C.CC1C2 .C4C64 -C .CC 169 C.C5499 -C.CC C2 .CC5 12
e C.CI4C2 C.CCC66 .C3769 - C . C C 176 C .C5 1C9 -C.CC C2 .CC476
9 C.C 13C6 C.CCC74 .C35C2 - C . C C 164 C.C4752 -C.CC C2 .CC443
1C C.C 1216 C.CCC66 .C3 2 5 7 - C . C C 15 3 C.C4«22 -C.CC C2 .CC4 12
11 C.C1132 C.CCC59 .C3C3C - C . C C 142 C .C4 1 1 5 -C.CC C2 .CC364
12 C.C 1C53 C.CCC54 .C2619 -C.CC13 2 C.C3626 -C.CC C 1 .CC357
13 C.CC98C C.0CC49 .C262 1 -C .CC 123 C .C 3 5 6 C -C.CC C 1 .CC332
14 C.CC91 1 C.CCC46 .C2436 - C . C C 114 C .C33C9 -C.CC C 1 .CC3C9
15 C.CC647 C.CCC42 .C2263 -C.CC1C6 C.C3C75 -C.CC C 1 .CC267
16 C.CC767 C.GCC39 .C21C1 -C.CCC99 C .C 2 6 5 5 -C.CC C 1 .CC267
17 C.CC73 1 C.CCC36 .C195C -C.CCC92 C.C265C -C.CC C 1 .CC246
If C.CC679 C.CCC33 .C16C9 -C.CCC65 C.C2459 -C.CC C 1 .CC23C
19 C.CC63C C.CCC3 1 .C1677 -C.CCC79 C.C226C -C.CC C 1 .CC213
2C C.CC564 C.CCC29 .C1554 -C.CCC73 C.C2113 -C.CC C 1 .CC 196
21 C.CC54 1 C.CCC26 . c M 3 9  - c . c c c c e C .C 19 5 6 -C.CC C 1 .CC 164
22 C.CC5C2 C.CCC24 .C 1333 -C.CCC63 C .C 16 13 -C.CC C 1 .CC 17C
23 C.CC465 C.CCC23 . C 1233 -C.CCC56 C.C1676 -C.CC C I .CC 156
24 C.CC43C C.CCC2 1 .C1141 -C.0CC54 C.C1553 -C.CC C 1 .CC 1^6
25 C.CC39E C.CCC 19 .C1C55 -C.CCC5C C.C 14 36 -C.CC C 1 .CC 135
26 C.CC366 C.CCC 16 .CC976 -C.CCC46 C.Cl 3 26 -C.CC CC .CC 125
27 C.CC34 1 C.CCC17 .CC9C2 -C.CCC43 C .C 1 2 2 6 -C.CC CC .CC I 16
26 C.CC3 1 5 C.CCC 15 .CC633 -C.CCC39 C.C1134 -C.CC CC .CCIC7
29 C.CC29 1 C.OCC 14 .CC77C -C.CCC36 C.C1C46 -C.CC CC .CCC99
3C C.CC269 C.CCC 13 .CC711 -C.CCC34 C.CC966 -C.CC CC .CCC9 1
3 1 C.CC24E C.CCC12 .CC656 -C.CCC31 C.CC694 -C.CC CC .CCC64
32 C.CC229 C.CCC 1 1 .CCCCC -C .CCC29 C.CCE25 -C.CC CC .CCC76
33 C.CC212 C.CCCIC .CC559 -C.CCC26 0.CC762 -C.CC CC .CCC72
34 C.CC195 C.CCCC9 .CC516 -C.CCC24 C.CC7C3 -C.CC CC .CCC66
3 5 c . c c i e c C.0CCC9 .CC4 7 6 -C.CCC22 C.CC649 -C.CC CC .CCC6 1
36 C.CC166 c . c c c c e .CC439 -C.CCC21 C.CC599 -C.CC CC .CCC57
37 C.CC154 C .CCCC7 .CC4C5 - C . C C C 19 C.CC552 -C.CC CC .CCC52
36 C.CC142 C.CCCC7 .CC374 - c . c c c i e C.CC5C9 -C.CC CC .CCC46
39 C.CC13 1 C .CCCCC .CC3 44 -C.CCCIC C.CC469 -C.CC CC .CCC44
4C C.CC12C C .CCCCC .CC3 16 - C . C C C 15 C.CC4 33 -C .CC CC .CCC4 1
162
T / E L  E ( 5 - 1 1 )
C C M  I M E C
I M E R I N  M L T I P L I E P S  F C P  T h E  E > C C E ^ C L £  V / P l / E L E C C E  C h f
GNP C NCNCLF C CLP C FESIC FI NCNFES 1 CE INVEN / N CE F
TCT/L
L/C
7.73C43 2 .5C854 .79920 -0.21995 2.95^76 0.68788 .00239
C C.88299 C .C7244 .18956 0.06648 0.13447 0.420(5 .0000 1
1 C.6438C C.1C693 . 14470 C.05069 0.13998 0.20151 .00003
2 C.51372 C . 122(3 .12104 0.03715 0.14264 0.09087 .00005
I C .439 54 C .12722 .10530 0.02581 0.14216 0.03903 .00007
4 C .392 CE C. 12722 .09385 0.01644 0.13952 0.01505 .00008
c C.3576C C. 1 24 39 .08503 0,0(878 0.13549 0.0039 1 .00009
6 C .32982 C.l 19 99 .07790 0.00258 0.1306 1 -0.00 127 .000 10
7 C.3C56 1 C . 1 1 4 7 4 .07186 -0.00240 C. 1 : 5 2 1 -0 . 0 03 6 1 .000 10
e C .2 8423 C .1C9C5 .06657 -0.00633 0.11952 -0.00458 .00010
9 C .26439 C .103 17 .06 180 -0.0094 1 C .11370 -0.00488 .000 10
1C C.24596 C .0972 7 .0 5745 -0 .Cl 177 0.10 7 85 -C.C0485 .000 10
11 C.22874 0.09144 .05343 -0.0 1353 0.10206 -0.00466 .00009
12 C.21262 C .08577 .04969 -0.01479 0.0963 7 -0.00441 .00009
12 C . 19753 C.C8C29 .(4620 -0.01565 0 .0 9 0 8 2 - C .004 13 .00009
14 C. 1 834 1 0.07504 .C4294 -0.01616 0.08545 -0.00385 .00008
15 C . 17C2C 0.070(4 .03969 -0.01644 0.08028 -0.00357 .00008
16 C . 15786 0.06528 .03704 -0.01648 0.07531 -0.00331 .00008
17 C . 14633 C .06079 . 034 38 -0 .0 16 34 0.07(57 -0.003(6 .00(07
IF C. 1 3559 0 .05654 .03189 -0.01606 0 .06604 -0 .00283 .00007
19 C . 1 2557 C .0525 5 .0 29 57 -0.0 156 7 0.06174 -0.00262 .00006
2C C . 11625 C .0488 1 .02740 -0.01520 0.05766 -0.00242 .00006
21 C. 1C75E ( .04529 .02538 -0.01467 0.05380 -0.00223 .00006
22 C.C9952 0.042(1 .02350 -0.01409 0.05015 -0.002(6 .00005
23 C.C92C3 0.03894 .02176 -0.01348 0 .0467 1 -0 .00 1 90 .00005
24 C.C85CE C.036(8 .02012 -0.01286 0.04348 -0.00175 .00005
25 C.C7863 C .0334 1 ,01862 -0.01222 0.04044 -0.00162 ,00004
26 C.C7265 C .03092 .01722 -0.(1159 0 .0 3 759 -0 .00 1 49 .00004
27 C.C671 1 0 .0286 1 .01591 -0.01(97 0.03492 -0.0(138 .00004
28 C.C6I97 0 .02647 .0 147 1 -0.01035 0.03242 -0,00 127 .00003
29 C.C5722 0.02447 .01359 -0.00975 0.03008 -0.00117 .00003
3C C.C5282 0 .02262 .01255 -0.00917 0.02790 -0.001(8 .00003
31 C . C4874 0.02090 .0 1 159 -0 .0086 1 0.02586 -0.00099 .00003
32 C.C4498 0.0 1931 .01070 -0.0CE08 0.02396 -0.00092 .00003
3 3 C.C4149 0.01783 .00987 -0.00756 0.02220 -0.00084 .00002
34 C.C3827 C.C 1646 .0091 1 -0.0C707 0.02055 -0.00078 .00002
3 5 C .C353C 0.01520 .008^1 - C .CC661 0.0 1902 -0.00072 .00002
36 C.C3255 0.0 1403 .00776 -0.006 17 0.01760 -0.00066 .00002
37 C.C3CC 1 0.01294 .00715 -0.00575 0.01627 -0.00061 .00002
38 C.C2767 C .01 194 .00660 -0.00536 0.01505 -0.0(056 .00002
39 C.C255C C .01102 .00608 -0.00499 0.0 139 1 -C .C0C52 .0000 I
4C C .C235 1 C.01016 .0056 1 -0.00464 0.01285 -0.00047 .0000 1
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l / E L E  ( 5 - 1 2 )
Ih EP IM M I T  IFL lEFS FCP TEE EXCGENCLS V/)P W E I E  kTC i*
c CEM [ CH CCINC CE TIEEC CE FP RS CE LC/SNS CFEN N C c s c  M  P
TCl/iL .CC2E 1 C.CCC45 C . C 1116 C.C2254 C.C112E C.1215E .C 124E
IfC
C .C C.C C.C C.G2C99 C.C C . 1< 3E2 . c
1 - .CCC43 C .CCCCC -C.CCC64 C . C C 196 - C . C C 32 9 -C.C26 3C - .CC451
2 - .CCC65 C.CCCCl -C.CCC6C C.CCC97 -C.CC33E C.C 4E3 - .CC 34C
3 - .CCC6 7 C.CCCCl -C.CCC36 -C.CCCC6 -C.CC26E -C.C CEE - .CC245
4 - .CCC56 C .CCCC 1 -C.CCCCE -C .CCC 12 -C.CClll C.C C 16 - .CC 159
5 - .CC04C C .CCCC2 C.CCCIE - C . C C C 12 -C.CCC96 -C.C C C I - .CC ICC
6  — .CCC24 C.CCCC2 C.CCC3E -C.CCCC9 -C.CCC31 C.C CCC - .CCC6 1
7 - ,CC01C C .CCCC2 C.CCC56 -C.CCCC? C.CCC 16 -C.C CCC - .CCC36
E .COCCI C .CCCC2 C.CCC66 -C.CCCC6 C.CCC5C -C.C CCC - .CCC2C
9 . c c c i c C .CCCC2 C.CCC14 -C.CCCC5 C.CCC73 -C.C CCC - .CCCC9
IC .CCC16 C .CCCC2 C .CCC79 -C .CCCC4 C.CCCEE -C.C CCC - .CCCC2
11 .CCC2C C.CCCC2 C.CCC82 -C.CCCC4 C.CCC9E -C.C CCC .CCCC2
12 .CCC23 C .CCCC2 C.CCCE3 -C.CCCC4 C.CC1C3 -C.C CCC .CCCC5
13 .CCC25 C .CCCC2 C.CCCE2 -C.CCCC4 C.CC1C5 -C.C CCC .CCCCC
14 .CCC26 C .CCCC2 C.CCCEI -C.CCCC4 C.CC1C5 -C.C CCC . C C C C l
15 •CC026 C .CCCC 1 C.CCC 19 -C.CCCC4 C.CC1C3 -C.C CCC .CCCCE
16 .CCC26 C.CCCCl C.CCC16 -C.CCCC3 C .CC ICC -C.C CCC .CCCCE
17 .CC025 C .CCCC 1 C.CCC13 -C.CCCC3 C.CCC97 -C.C CCC .CCCCE
IS .CC024 C .CCCC 1 C.CCC69 - C . C C C C l C.CCC93 -C.C CCC .CCCCE
19 .CC023 C.CCCCl C.CCC66 -C.CCCC3 c . c c c e e  - c . c CCC .CCCCE
2C .CCC22 C.CCCCl C.CCC62 -C.CCCC3 C.CCCE4 - c . c CCC .CCCC7
21 .CCC2 1 C .OCCC 1 C.CCC59 -C.CCCC3 C.CCC79 -C.C CCC .CCCC7
2 2 .CCC2C C.CCCCl C.CCC56 -C.CCCC3 C.CCC15 -C.C CCC .CCCCl
23 .CCC19 C.CCCCl C.CCC52 -C.CCCC2 C.CCC7C -C.C CCC .CCCC6
24 .CCCIE C .CCCC 1 C.CCC49 -C.CCCC2 C.CCC66 -C.C CCC .CCCC6
25 .CCCll C .CCCC 1 C.CCC46 -C.CCCC2 C.CCC62 -C.C CCC .CCCC6
26 .CCC16 C.CCCCl C.CCC43 -C.CCCC2 C .CCC5E -C.C CCC .CCCC5
27 .CCC15 C.CCCCl C.CCC4C -C.CCCC2 C.CCC54 -C.C CCC .CCCC5
2E .CCC 14 C .CCCCl C.CCC3E -C.CCCC2 C .CCC5 1 -C.C CCC .CCCC5
29 .CCC13 C.CCCCl C.CCC35 -C.CCCC2 C.CCC41 -C.C CCC .CCCC4
3C .CCC12 C.CCC C 1 C.CCC33 -C.CCCC2 C.CCC44 -C.C CCC .CCCC4
3 1 .CCClI C.CCCCl C.CCCIC -C.CCCCl C.CCC41 -C.C CCC .CCCC4
32 .CCCll C .CCCCl C.CCC26 -C.CCCC I C.CCC3E -C.C CCC .CCCC<
33 .CCCIC C .CCCCC C.CCC26 -C.CCCCl C.CCC36 -C.C CCC .CCCC3
34 .CC0C9 C.CCCCC C.CCC24 -C.CCCCl C.CCC33 -C.C CCC .CCCC3
3 5 .CCCCE C.CCCCC C.CCC23 -C.CCCCl C .CCC3 1 -C.C CCC .CCCC3
36 .CCCCE C.CCCCC C.CCC21 -C.CCCCl C.CCC29 -C.C CCC .CCCC3
37 .CC0C7 C.CCCCC C .CCC19 -C .CCCC 1 C .CCC26 -C.C CCC .CCCC2
3P .CCCC7 C.CCCCC C.CCCIE -C.CCCCl 0.CCC25 -C.C CCC .CCCC2
3 9 .CCCC6 C.CCCCC C.CCCll -C.CCCCl C.CCC23 -C.C CCC .CCCC2
4C .CCCC6 C.CCCCC C.CCC16 -C.CCCCl C.CCC21 -C.C CCC .CCCC2
l6k
7 / S E L E  ( 5 - 1 2 )
C C M  I M E C
I M E M I M  M L T I P L I F P S FCP 7FE E > C C- E N CL 5 V/!FI/!EIE M E W  1
G^P C N CNCLF C CLP C PE S IC FI NCNFES I CH INVEN a N CH F
TCIAL
LAG
C.2 C6 37 C.C667S C .C26CS C.C78 12 C.C 2 6 S 6  C.CC6E1 - .CCC22
C C .C c .c C.C C.C C.C C.C .C
1 f.CC47I C.C CC3S -C.CC 126 C .CC4C6 - C . C C C 8 3  C .C C2 3S .CCCCC
2 C .CC7C1 C .C CC66 - C . C C 1 6 F C .CC6S3 - C . C C 146 C .C C2 76 - .CCCC2
3 C.C CR C3 C . C C 1 3 C - C. CC 14 S C.CC78C - C . C C 18 3 C .CC225 - .CCCC2
4 C .CC83S C .C C166 - C . C C C S f C .CC6 1C - C . C C 187 C . C C 146 - .CCCC 3c C .CC84S C .CC1S3 -C .CCC4C C .CC7E4 - C . C C 1 7 C  C.CCCE3 - .CCCC3
6 C .CC84S C ,CC2 13 C .C CC 13 C .CC726 - C . C C 1 4 C  C.CCC37 - .CCCC3
7 C .C C844 C.C C22E C.CCC55 C.CC654 - C . C C 1 C 3  C.CCCCS - .CCCC2
8 C .CC833 C .CC23E C .CCCE7 C .CC576 - C . C C C 6 4  - C . C C C C E - .CCCC2
S C.CC817 C .CC245 C.CC 1 1C C .CC5C3 - C . C C C 2 6  -C .CCC 14 - .CCCC2
1C C .CC7S6 C .C C 2 4 8 C.CC 125 C .CC433 C .C CC CS  - C . C C C I E - .CCCCl
11 C .C C7 7  1 C .CC246 C.CC 134 C .CC36S C .C C C 4 C  - C . C C C  IS - .CCCCl
12 C .CC744 C.CC246 C.CC 138 C .CC3 12 C . C C C 6 7  - C . C C C  IS - . C C C C 1
13 C.CC7 14 C .CC242 C.CC 14C C .CC26 1 C . C C C 8 S  - C . C C C I E - .CCCCl
14 C .CC6.82 C .CC237 C.CC 136 C . C C 2 17 C . C C 1 C 7  - C . C C C 17 - .CCCCl
IS C .C C 6 4 Ç C .C C2 3C C . C C 135 C.CC17S C.CC 12 1 - C . C C C  16 - .CCCCC
16 C.CC6 17 C . G C 2 2 2 C.CC 13 I C.CC 146 C.CC 132 - C . C C C  IS - .CCCCC
17 C .CC584 C.CC2 14 C .CC 126 c .c ciie C . C C 1 4 C  - C . C C C  14 - .CCCCC
18 C.CC551 C .C C 2 C 5 C.CC121 C.CCCS4 C . C C 1 4 S  - C . C C C  13 - .CCCCC
IS C.C C5 2C C . C C 1 S 6 C.CC 1 15 C.CCC73 C .CC 146 - C . C C C 12 - .CCCCC
2C C.CC48S C . C C 166 C.C C  ICS C.CCC56 C .CC 146 - C . C C C  1 1 - . C C C C C
21 C .CC45S C .C C1 77 C.CC 1C3 C.CCC42 C .C C1 4E  - C . C C C  1C - . C C C C C
22 C .CC43C C .CC 167 C.C CC S7 C.C CC3C C . C C 146 - C . C C C I C . C C C C C
23 C .C C4 C3 C .C C I S E C.C CCS2 C .C CC2C C . C C 1 4 3  - C . C C C C S . C C C C C
24 C .C C377 C . C C I 4 S C.CCCEE C.CCC 1 1 C .C C1 3S  - C . C C C C E . C C C C C
25 C .C C3 52 C .C C 1 4 C C . C C C 8  I C.CCCCS C .CC 134 - C . C C C C E .CCCCC
26 C .C C3 26 C .CC 132 C.C CC76 - C . C C C C l C.CC 12S -C .CCCC7 .CCCCC
27 C .C C3 C6 C .CC 124 C.CCC71 - C . C C C C S C . C C 1 2 4  - C . C C C C 7 .CCCCC
26 c.cczes C . C C 1 1 6 C .C CC 66 - C. CC CC S C .CC 1 16 - C . C C C C E .CCCCC
2S C . C C 2 6 5 C . C C 1 C 6 C.CCC62 - C . C C C l l C . CCI 13 - C . C C C C E .CCCCC
3C C .C C247 C . C C  IC 1 C .C CC 57 -C .CCC 13 C . C C 1 C 7  - C . C C C C S . C CCCC
3 1 C .C C2 2S C . C C C S 4 C.CCC53 - C . C C C  15 C . C C 1C 1 - C . C C C C S .CCCCC
32 C .C C2 13 C . C C C E E C.CCCSC - C . C C C I E C .C CC S6  - C . C C C C S .CCCCC
33 c .c cise C . C C C E 2 C .C CC46 - C. CC C1 7 C . C C C S C  - C . C C C C 4 .CCCCC
34 C .C C 1 8 4 C.C CC76 C .C CC43 - C . C C C  17 c .c cc es  - C . C C C C 4 .CCCCC
35 C . C C 1 7 C C.CCC7 1 C .C CC4C - C . C C C  17 C . CCCEC - C . C C C C 4 .CCCCC
36 C . C C I S E C . C C C 6 6 C.C CC 37 -C. CC C1 7 C . C C C 7 5  - C . C C C C 3 .CCCCC
37 C . C C 1 4 6 C .C CC 6  1 C .C CC34 - C . C C C 1 7 C .C CC 7C  - C . C C C C 3 . C C C C C
38 C . C C I 3 5 C . C C C 5 7 C.CCC32 - C . C C C 17 C .C CC EE  - C . C C C C 3 .CCCCC
3S C .C C1 2S C .C CC 53 C .C CC3C - C.CCC 16 C . C C C 6 2  - C. CC CC 3 .CCCCC
4C C . CCI 16 C .C CC 4Ç C.CCC27 - C . C C C I E C . C C C S E  - C . C C C C 2 . C C C C C
165
T f E L E  ( 5 - 13 )
I M E P I P  N L L T I F L I E F S  FCP TEE E X C C E N C L S  V / F I ^ E L E C E F R C C L C
CE CEE [ CE CCIEC CE TIEEC CE FF PS CE LCfNS [PEh E c CI5C' 1 F
TCT4L C.C98 1C C.C1C13 C.5C122 -C.C12 11 c.6 74 1C -C .CCC 12 C.CE796
l/SG
C C.CC123 C.CCC45 C.CC1E3 -C.CCC37 C.CC9 5C -C.CCCCC C.C
1 -C.CC135 C .CCC66 C.C3492 -C.CCC36 C.C4CC5 -C.CCCCC C.CC4C5
2 -C.CCC2E C.CCC74 C.C3995 -C.CCC3 5 C.C4 767 -C.CCCCC C.CC6CE
2 C.CC147 C.CCC75 C.C3E67 -C.CCC36 C.C4E59 -C.CCCCC C.CC6E9
4 C.CC3CC C.CCC72 C.C36C1 -C.CCC39 C.C46 9 4 -C.CCCCC C.CC699
c C.CC4 12 C.CCC67 C.C3 3C5 -C.CCC44 C.C4413 -C.CCCCC C.CC67C
6 C.CC482 C.CCC6 1 C.C3CC9 -C.CCC4E C.C4C91 -C.CCCCl C.CC622
7 C.CC52C C.CCC55 C.C2725 -C.CCC5C C.C3735 -C.CCCCl C.CC56 5
e C.CC532 C.CCC49 C.C246C -C.CCC52 C.C 3394 -C.CCCC 1 C.CC5C6
9 C.CC52E C .CCC44 C.C2215 -C.CCC52 C.C3C7C -C.CCCCl C.CC45C
1C C.CC512 C.CCC4C C.C1993 -C.CCC5 1 C.C277C -C.CCCCl C.CC39E
11 C.CC4E9 C.CCC35 C.C1793 -C.CCC5C C.C2496 -C.CCCCl C .CC25C
12 C.CC462 C .CCC32 C.C1É13 -C.CCC46 C.C2247 -C.CCCCl C.CC2CE
13 C.CC433 C.CCC2G C.C1453 -C.CCC46 C.C2C23 -C.CCCCC C.CC27 1
14 C.CC4C4 C.CCC25 C.C13C9 -C.CCC43 C.C1E22 -C.CCCCC C .CC23E
15 C.CC375 C.CCC23 C.CIIEI -C.CCC41 C.C1643 -C.CCCCC C.CC2 1C
16 C.CC341 C.CCC2C C.CIC66 -C.CCC38 C .C 1482 -C.CCCCC C.CC1E5
17 C.CC32C C.CCClf C.CC964 -C.CCC36 C.C123E -C.CCCCC C.CC 163
19 C.CC295 C .CCC 17 C.CCE73 -C.CCC33 C.C121C -C.CCCCC C.CC14 5
19 C.CC271 C.CCC15 C.CC791 -C.CCC3 1 C.C1C95 -C.CCCCC C.CG12E
2C C.CC249 C.CCC13 C.CC717 -C.CCC29 C.CC992 -C.CCCCC C.CC 114
21 C.CC229 C.CCC12 C.CC65 1 -C.CCC2 7 C.CC9CC -C.CCCCC C.CC 1C2
2 2 C.CC21C C.CCCII C.CC592 -C.CCC25 C.CCE17 -C.CCCCC C .CCC9 I
23 C.CC193 C.CCC 1C C.CC53E -C.CCC2 3 C.CC742 -C.CCCCC C.CCC8 1
24 C.CC17 1 c .CCCC9 C.CC49C -C.CCC21 C.CC675 -C.CCCCC C .CCC73
25 C.CC162 C.CCCCE C.CC446 -C.CCC19 C.CC614 -C.CCCCC C.CCC66
26 C.CC149 C .cccce C.CC4C7 -C.CCC le C.CC56C -C.CCCCC C.CCC59
27 C.CCL37 C.CCCC7 C.CC371 -C.CCC16 G.CC51C -C.CCCCC C.CCC53
2E C.CC125 C .CCCC6 C.CC339 -C.CCC15 C.CC46 5 -C.CCCCC C.CCC46
29 C.CCI 15 C .G0CC6 C.CC2C9 -C.CCC14 C.CC424 -C.CCCCC C .CCC44
3C C.CC1C5 C.CCCC5 C.CC2E2 -C.CCC13 C.CC26E -C.CCCCC C .CCC29
31 C.CCC97 C.CCCC5 C.CC25E -C.CCC12 C.CC254 -C.CCCCC C.CCC36
32 C.CCC89 C .CCCC4 C.CC236 -C .CCC 1 1 C.CC324 -C.CCCCC C.CCC22
33 c.ccca 1 C.CCCC4 C.CC216 -C.CCC1C C.CC296 -C.CCCCC C.CCC2C
34 C.CCC74 C.CCCC4 C.CCI9 9 -C.GCCC9 C.CC271 -C.CCCCC C.CCC27
3 5 C.CCC6E C .CCCC3 c.cciei -c.cccce C.CC24E -C.CCCCC C .CCC25
36 C.CCC63 C .CCCC3 C.CC166 -c.cccce C.CC22 7 -C.CCCCC C .CCC22
37 C.CCC57 C .0CGC3 C.CC152 -C.CCCC7 C.CC2C7 -C.CCCCC C.CCC2C
39 C.CCC53 C.CCCC3 C.CC129 -C.cccce C.CC19C -C.CCCCC C.CCC19
39 C.CC04E C.CCCC2 C.CC127 -c.cccce C.CC174 -C.CCCCC C.CCC17
4C C.CCC44 C .CCCC2 C.CC117 -C.CCCC5 C.CC159 -C.CCCCC C.CCC16
l66
TABLE (5-13)
C C M  I M E C
IhTFPlM NLLT IPL lEFS FCP TFE EXCGENCLS API ABLE CHFPCC 0
GNP C NCNCIR 0 OCR G RESIC FI N NPES 1 OH 1^VE^ A N OH F
TC TAL
LAG
4.6957 1 3.17636 0.91136 -0.55066 .25626 -0.0 9 7 6 5 - .24397
C C. 5 2659 0 .49999 0.03100 0.0 .00236 -0.0 679 - .0466 1
1 0.45387 0.40339 0.05369 -0.00365 .01738 -0.0 695 - .03776
2 0.35769 0.32603 0.06345 -0.00659 .03096 -0.0 596 - .03056
3 C .35107 0.26902 0.06543 -0.0 13 55 .04 16 5 -0.0 166 - .02476
4 0.3 1013 0.22250 0.(6340 -0.01769 .04996 -0.0 766 - .02004
5 C.2 7396 0 . 18 553 0.05947 -0.0 2135 .05557 -0.0 525 - .0 162 1
6 0.24216 0.15590 0.05477 -0.02387 .0590 1 -0.0 365 - .01311
7 0.21426 0.13196 0.04969 -0.02552 .06065 -0.0 271 - .01060
6 0.16994 0.11250 0.04514 -0.02641 .06066 -0.0 2 16 - .00657
9 0.1687 1 0.09653 0.04068 -0.02666 .06000 -0.0 164 - .00693
1C 0.15019 0.06334 0.03656 -0.0264 1 .0563 1 -0.0 163 - .00560
1 I 0.13400 0.07237 0.03267 -0.02577 .05603 -0.0 149 - .00452
12 0.11963 0.063 16 0.02952 -0.02464 .05336 -0.0 139 - .00365
13 0 . 10739 0.05543 0.02652 -0.02371 .05044 -0.0 130 - .00295
14 0.09643 0.04865 0.02365 -0.02244 .04739 -0.0 122 - .00236
15 0.06677 0.04324 0.0214 7 -0.02111 .04431 -0.0 115 - .00192
16 0.07820 0.03841 0.01934 -0.0 19 74 .04126 -0.0 106 - .00 155
17 0.07060 0.03424 0.01745 -0.0 1637 .03629 -0.0 10 1 - .00 125
IP 0.06364 0.03062 0.01576 -0.01703 .035 43 -0.0 095 - .00 100
19 0.05780 0.02746 0.01425 -0.01574 .03271 -0.0 066 - .00 06 1
2C 0.05240 0.02466 0. 0 1290 -0 .0 145 1 .030 14 -0.0 062 - .00065
21 0.04756 0.02224 0.01170 -0.01334 .02773 -0.0 077 - .00052
22 0.0432 1 0.02006 0.0 106 1 -0.01224 .02547 -0.0 07 1 - .00042
23 0.03930 0.0 16 16 0. 00964 -0 .0 I 12 I .02336 -0.0 066 - .00034
24 0.03577 0.01644 0 .0 0 6 76 -0 .0 10 26 .02143 -0.0 06 1 - .00027
25 0.03259 0.01492 0.0079? -0.00937 .01964 -0.0 056 - .00022
26 0.0297 1 0.01355 0.00726 -0.00656 .01796 -C.C 052 - .00017
27 0.02710 0,01231 0.0066 1 -0.0076 1 .01646 -0.0 04E - .000 14
28 0.02473 0.01121 0.00603 -0.007 12 .01506 -0.0 045 - .00011
29 0.02259 0.01021 C.CC550 -0.0 06 49 .01376 -0.0 041 - .00009
3C 0.02064 0.00931 0.00502 -0.00591 .01260 -0.0 036 - .00007
31 0.01887 0 ,00649 0.00459 -0.00536 .01152 -0.0 035 - .00005
32 0.0 1725 0 .007 75 0.00419 -0.00490 .01054 -0.0 032 - .00004
33 0.01576 0.00706 0.00363 -0.00446 .00964 -C.C 030 - .00003
34 0.01445 0.00647 0.00351 -0.00407 .00661 -C.O 027 - .00003
35 0.01323 0 .0059 1 0.00321 -0.00370 .00606 -0.0 025 - .00002
36 0.01211 0.00541 0.00294 -0.00337 .00737 -0.0 023 - .00002
37 0.0 1109 C .00495 0.00269 -0.00307 .00674 -0.0 021 - .00001
38 0.01016 0.00453 0.00246 -0.00260 .00617 -0.0 0 19 - .0000 1
39 0.00932 0.004 15 0.00225 -0.0025 5 .00564 -0.0 0 16 - .00001
40 0.00854 0.00360 0.00207 -0.00232 .00516 -0.0 0 16 - .00000
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TfeiE (5-14)
I M E P  I N  E L I T  I P L  I E P S  F C P  I F E E X C G E E C L S  V z / P I / E L E T E F E S T P
C h C E N  [  C E  C C I E C  CE  TIE EC C E  F F  P S  CE L C f E S C F E E  E c C I S C !  P
TCTfL - C . C C C 2 C  - C . C C C C 2  - C . C C  1 2 7 - C . C C  l E  1 - C . C C C E I - C . C C E E E C . C C C E 9
L/ ! G
C C C C . C  C . C - C . C C 1 5 C  C . C - C . C I C 2 E C . C
I C C C 0 C 2  - C . C C C C C  C . C C C C 5 - C . G C C 1 4  C . C C C 2 2 C . C C I E E C . C C C 2 2
2 C C C 0 C 5  - C . C C C C C  C . C C C C 4 - C . 0 C C C 7  C . C C C 2 4 - C . C C C 2 4 C . C C C 2 4
3 C C C C C 5 - C . C C C C C  C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C  C . C C C 1 9 C . C C C C E c . C C C 1 1
4 C C C C C 4  - C . C C C C C  C . C C C C l C . C C C C l  C . C C C 1 2 - C . C C C C l c  . C C C  1 1
c C C C C C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C l C . C C C C l  C . C C C C l C . C C C C C c . C C C C l
6 C C C 0 C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C l  C . C C C C 2 - C . C C C C C C . C C C C 4
7 C C C C C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 4 C.CCCCC -C.CCCCl C.CCCCC C . C C C C 2
E C C O C C  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 5 C.CCCCC - C . C C C C 4 C.CCCCC C . C C C C l
5 C C C C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 5 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 5 C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
IC CCCCI -C.CCCCC -C.CCCCE C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C E C . C C C C C c . C C C C C
1 1 C C C C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C E C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 7 C . C C C C C -C.CCCCC
1 2 C C C C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C E C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 7 C . C C C C C - C . C C C C C
1 2 C C C C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C E C . C C C C C  - C . C G C C 7 C . C C C C C - C . C C C C C
1 4 C C C C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C E C.CCCCC -C.CCCCl C . C C C C C - C . C C C C l
1 5 C C C C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C E C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C l C . C C C C C - C . C C C C  1
1 6 C C C C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 5 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C l C.CCCCC -c .CCCC I
1 7 - c C C 0 C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 5 c  . C C C C C  - C . C C C C l C . C C C C C - C . C C C C  I
I E C C 0 C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 5 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C l C.CCCCC - C . C C C C l
1 9 C C 0 C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 5 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C E C.CCCCC - C . C C C C  l
2 C C C 0 C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C E C . C C C C C - C . C C C C l
2 I C C C C 2  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C E C . C C C C C - C . C C C C  1
2 2 C C O C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 5 C.CCCCC -C.CCCCC
2 3 C C C C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 5 C.CCCCC - C . C C C C C
2 4 C C C C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 5 C . C C C C C - C . C C C C C
2 5 -  c C C O C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C.CCCCC - C . C C C C 4 C.CCCCC -C.CCCCC
2 6 C C O C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C  - C . C 0 C C 4 C.CCCCC -C.CCCCC
2 7 C C O C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 4 C.CCCCC - C . C C C C C
26 C C O C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C.CCCCC - C . C C C C 4 C.CCCCC -C.CCCCC
29 C C O C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C .CCCCC -C.CCCCC
3 C C C C C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C - C . C C C C C
2 1 C C C C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C.CCCCC - C . C C C C C
2 2 C C C C I  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C - C . C C C C C
23 C C O C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C - C . C C C C C
24 C C C C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C - C . C C C C C
1 c C C C C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C.CCCCC - C . C C C C C
26 - c C C C C 1 - C  . C C C C C  - C . C C C C l c  . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C.CCCCC - C . C C C C C
2 7 C C O C l  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C l C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C.CCCCC - C . C C C C C
26 C C O C C  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C l C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C - C . C C C C C
29 C C O C C  - C . C C C C C  - C . C O C C I C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C.CCCCC - C . C C C C C
4 C C C O C C  - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C l C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C - C . C C C C C
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TfElE (5-14) 
C C M  INLEC
I NT E R  IN M L T I F L I E R S  FCR TEE E X C G E N C L S  V f R l f E L E TERN 5 p
G NP  C N C N C L R  C CLR C R E S I C  El N C N R E S  1 CH I N V E N A N CE F
T C T 4 1  - C . C 1472 - C . C C 4 T 7  - C . C C I E E - C . C C 5 5  7 - C . C C 2 C 4 - C . C C C 4 S . C C C C 2
LfC
C C.C C .C  C.C C .C C.C C . C .c
I - C . C C C 3 4  - C . C C C C 3  C . C C C C 9 - C . C C C 2 S  C.C CC6 - C . C C C 17 - . C C C C C
2 - C . C C 0 5 C  - C . C C C C C  C . C C C 12 - C . C C C 4 7  C.C Cl 1 - C . C C C 2 C . C C C C C
3 - C . C C C E I  - C . C C C C C  C . C C C  1 1 - C . C C C E 6  C.C C 1 3 - C . C C C  16 . C C C C C
4 - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C 12 C . C C C C 7 - C . C C C E E  C.C C13 - C . C C C 11 . C C C C C
5 - C . C C C C l  - C . C C C 14 C . C C C C 3 - C . C C C 5 6  C.C C 12 - C . C C C C E . C C C C C
C - C . C C C C l  - C . C C C 15 - C . C C C C l - C . C C C 5 2  C.C C 1C - C . C C C C 3 . C C C C C
7 - C . C C C C C  - C . C C C 1C - C . C C C C 4 - C . C C C 4 7  C.C CCI - C . C C C C l . C C C C C
e - C . C C C 5 5  - C . C C C 17 - C . C C C C C - C . C C C 4 1  C.C CC5 C . C C C C C . C C C C C
9 - C . C C C 5 E  - C . C C C 1 7 - C . C C C C E - C . C C C 3 6  C.C CC2 C . C C C C l . C C C C C
1C - C . C C C 5 7  - C . C C C I E  - C . C C C C C - C . C C C 3 1  - C . C CCI C . C C C C l . C C C C C
11 - C . C C C 5 5  - C . C C C I E  - C . C C C 1C - C . C C C 2 6  - C . C C CS C . C C C C l . C C C C C
12 - C . C C 0 5 3  - C . C C C I E  - C . C C C 1C - C . C C C 2 2  - C . C CC5 C . C C C C l . C C C C C
13 - C . C C 0 5 1  - C . C C C 17 - C . C C C 1C - C . C C C I S  - C . C CC6 C . C C C C l . C C C C C
14 - C . C C 0 4 9  - C . C C C 17 - C . C C C 1C - C . C C C 15 - C . C C C E C . C C C C l . C C C C C
15 - C . C C C 4 6  - C . C C C 16 - C . C C C 1C - C . C C C 13 - C . C CCS C . C C C C l . C C C C C
16 - C . C C 0 4 4  - C . C C C 16 - C . C C C C 9 - C . C C C 1C - C . C CCS C . C C C C l . C C C C C
17 - C . C C C 4 2  - C . C C C 15 - C . C C C C 9 - C . C C C C E  - C . C CIC C . C C C C l . C C C C C
IE - C . C C 0 3 9  - C . C C C I E  - C . C C C C 9 - C . C C C C 7  - C . C C 1C C . C C C C l . C C C C C
IS - C . C C C 3 7  - C . C C C 14 - C . C C C C E - C . C C C C E  - C . C C 1 1 C . C C C C l . C C C C C
2C - C . C C C 3 E  - C . C C C 13 - C . C C C C E - C . C C C C 4  - C . C C 1 1 C . C C C C l . C C C C C
21 - C . C C C 3 3  - C . C C C 13 - C . C C C C 7 - C . C C C C S  - C . C C 1 1 C . C C C C l . C C C C C
22 - C . C C C 3 1  - C . C C C 12 - C . C C C C 7 - C . C C C C 2  - C . C CIC C . C C C C l - . C C C C C
23 - C . C C C 2 S  - C . C C C 11 - C . C C C C 7 - C . C C C C l  - C . C CIC C . C C C C l - . C C C C C
24 - C . C C C 2 7  - C . C C C 11 - C . C C C C E - C . C C C C l  - C . C CIC C . C C C C ] - . C C C C C
25 - C . C C C 2 5  - C . C C C 1C - C . C C C C 6 - C . C C C C C  - C . C C IC C . C C C C l - . C C C C C
26 - C . C C C 2 3  - C . C C C C S  - C . C C C C E C . C C C C C  - C . C CCS C . C C C C l - . C C C C C
27 - C . C C C 2 2  - C . C C C C S  - C . C C C C S C . C C C C C  - C . C CCS C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
2E - C . C C C 2 C  - C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C E C . C C C C l  - C . C CCE C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
2S - C . C C C I S  - C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C l  - C . C CCE C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
3C - C . C C C I E  - C . C C C C 7  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C l  - C . C CCE C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
31 - C . C C C 16 - C . C C C C 7  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C l  - C . C CC7 C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
32 - C . C C C 15 - C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C l  - C . C CC7 C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
33 - C . C C C 14 - C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C C l  - C . C C C6 C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
34 - C . C C C 13 - C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C C l  - C . C CC6 C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
35 - C . C C C 12 - C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C C l  - C . C CC6 C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
36 - C . C C C 11 - C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C S C . C C C C l  - C . C C CE C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
37 - C . C C C 1C - C . G C C C 4  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C l  - C . C C CE C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
3E - C . C C C 1C - C . C C C C 4  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C l  - C . C C C C E C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
3S - C . C C C C S  - C . C C C C 4  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C l  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
4C - C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C S  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C 1 - C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C C - . C C C C C
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7 / E L E  ( 5 - 1 5 )
INTER lY M L T I P L I F F S  FCP THE EXCGENCLS V/FI/ELE 1 E ILL F
CH [EM [ CH CCINC CH TIHEC CH FP PS CH LCANS CFFh c [ SC'T P
TCT4L -2.C221S - C , C F 5 7 E  -2.2E73C 
L/iG
C . 115 2 1 -2.74 85 7 C.CC 25 .766 17
C -C. 7 164 2 - C . C 2 4 6 1  - C . 23566 -C. C5C42 -C. 26 828 -C.CC 16 .32874
I -C.3632E - C . C 146 1 -C.CS246 C.C236 7 -C.C85E5 C.CC 5 1 .24224
2 -C.1E251 - C . C C Ç C 6  -C.C6366 C.C3687 - C . C 3 745 C.CC 38 .1565 7
3 -C.C53EE - C . C C 5 5 3  -C.C6216 C.C2E44 -C.C3461 C.CC 25 .C55C4
4 -C.C5186 - C . C C 4 1 6  -C.C663? C.C15C2 -C.C4775 C.CC 15 .C55 15
5 -C.C333C - C . C C 3 1 3  -C.C7C57 C . C 1247 -C.C6354 C.CC 12 .C3C3C
6 -C.C26CC - C . C C 2 5 2  -C.C74 7S C.CC852 -C.C7721 C.CC C5 .C15C6
7 -C.C237Ç - C . C C 2 1 5  -C.C7743 C.CC625 -C.C8744 C .CC C6 .CC575
e -C.C2364 - C . C C 15 1 -C.C7EE3 C.CC5C6 - C.C5424 C . C C C5 .CCCC7
9 -C.C2411 - C . C C 175 -C.C7SC5 C .0C43 7 -C.C5 8 12 C.CC (5 - .CC33 8
1C -C.C2455 - C . CCI 64 -C.C7E37 C.CC35? - C . C5 5 6  5 C . C C C4 — . C C 5 4 4
11 -C.C24E2 - C . C C 154 -C.C76E6 C.CC371 -C.C5 5 38 C.CC C4 - .CC664
12 -C.C2475 - C . C C 146 -C.C7474 C.CC352 - C . C 5777 C.C C C4 - . C C 7 2 8
13 -C.C2441 - C . C C 1 3 E  -C.C7216 C.CC335 -C.C5515 C . C C C4 - .CG757
14 -C.C2384 - C . C C 1 3 1  -C.C6525 C.CC32C - C. C5152 C.CC C3 — .CC762
15 -C.C23C5 - C . C C 124 -C.C66I5 C.CC3C5 -C.C6815 C . C C C3 - .CC752
16 -C.C2221 - C . C C 117 -C.C6252 C.CC25C -C.C8418 C . C C C3 - .CC732
17 -C.C2126 - C . CCI 11 -C.C5564 C.CC275 - c.cecci C . C C C3 - .CC7C6
18 -C.C2C25 - C . C C 1 C 4  -C.C5637 C.GC261 -C.C7578 C .CC C3 — .CC676
15 - C . C 192 1 - C . C C C 5 E  -C.C5314 C.CC246 - C.C7156 C.C C C3 - .CC643
20 -C.C1817 - C . C C C 5 2  -C.C4555 C.CC232 -C.C6741 C . C C (2 - .CC6 1C
21 - C . C 1714 - C . C C C E 7  -C.C4653 C.CC210 - G.C6337 C .CC C2 - .CG577
22 -C.C1613 - C . C C C E I  -C.C4355 C.CC2C5 -C.C5545 C . C C C2 - .CC543
23 -C.C1514 - C . C C C 7 6  -C.C4117 C . C C 152 -C.C5565 C .CC C2 — .CC5 1 1
24 -C.C142C - C . C C C ? 1 -C.C3E4E C.CC18C -C.C52C5 C .CC C2 - .CC475
25 - C . C 1325 - 0 . C C C 6 6  -C.C3552 C . C C 168 -C. C4 8 66 C.C C C2 - .CC445
26 - C . C 1242 - C . C C C 6 2  -C.C335C C . C C 157 -C.C4541 C .CC C2 - .CC42C
27 -C.C116C - C . C C C 5 7  -C.C3121 C . C C 146 -C.C4232 C . C C C2 - .CC352
28 -C.C1C81 - C . C C C 5 3  -C.C25C5 C .CC 136 -C.C354 2 C.C C C 1 — .CC366
25 -C.CICCE - C . C C C 5 C  -C.C27C2 C . C C 127 -C.C3668 C . C C C 1 - .CC341
3C -C.CC53E - C . C C C 4 6  -C.C2512 C.CC 1 18 -C.C34 1C C.C C C 1 - .CC318
31 -C.CC872 - C . C C C 4 3  -C.C2333 C.CClie -C.C3 16 8 C.C C C 1 - .CC255
32 -C.CC811 - C . C C C 4 C  -C.C2165 C.CC1C2 -C.C2542 C.CC C I - .CC275
33 -C.CC753 - C . C C C 3 7  -C.C2CC5 C.CCC54 - C. C273C C.CC C 1 - .CC255
34 -C.CC655 - C . C C C 3 4  -C.C1E63 C.CCC88 -C.C2532 C.CC C 1 - .CC237
35 -C.CC64E - C . C C C 3 2  -C.Cl 726 C.CCCEI -C.C234 7 C.CC Cl - .CC22C
36 -C.CC6C1 - C . C C C 25 - C . 01555 C . C C C 75 -C.C2 175 C.CC ( 1 - .CC2C4
37 - C.CC557 - C . C C C 2 7  - C . C 148 1 C.CCC7C - C. C2C14 C.CC C 1 - .CC185
38 -C.CC516 - C . C C C 2 5 - C . C 1371 C.CCC65 - C . C 1864 C . C C C 1 - .CC175
35 -C.CC478 - C . C G C 2 3  -C.C1268 C.CCC6C - C . C 172 5 C . C C C 1 — .CC 162
4C -C.CC442 - C . C C C 2 1  - C . C 1173 C.CCC55 -C.C1556 C . C C C 1 - .CC15C
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T/SELE (5- 15)
C C M  I M E C
I N T E R I M  M L T I F L I E F S  FCP TFE E X C G E N C C S  V f P l f E L E 1 E ILL P
GNP C N C N C I F C CLP G P ES IC FI N C N P E S  1 CH IN V EN /SNN CH F
T C T 4 L - I 4 . 2 2 E S E  - 4 . 6 2 2 9 ]  
IfC
_ 3 .20 744 - 4 . 7 9 5 2 7  - 4 . 6 2 6 4 7 2 . 2 4 5 0 9 0 . 0 2 2 6 1
C 1.2 9*3 6 5 C . I I 4 E 4 -0 .05 106 - 0 . 2 9 5 5 7  - 0 . 0 6 7 2  1 1 . 6 9 6 9 7 0 . 0 0 1 7 6
1 C . 2 4 9 5  1 C . 1 C 6 5 2 -0 .04 6 76 - 0 . 4 7 0  91 - 0 . 0 6 2 9 9 0 . 7 2 6 6 5 0 . 0 0 2 5 6
2 -C . 2 C 3 1 C  C .055 12 - 0 . 0 5 2 0 5 - 0 . 5 4 4 0 2  - 0 . 0 5 9 6  1 0 . 2 9 7 6  1 0 . 0 0 29 1
2 - C . 5 6 1 2 E  - C . C C 4 4 2 -0 . 0 6 5 1 4 - 0 . 5 5  132 - 0 . 0 6 1 2 5 0 . 1 2 0 7 5 0 . 0 0 2 6 9
4 - C . 6 7 8 2 ^  - C . C 5 6 4 F -0 . 0 6 2 2 0 - 0 . 5 2 1 7 1  - 0 . 0 6 6 2 7 0 . 0 5 2 6 2 0 . 0 0 2 6 7
5 - C .  7 2 6 7 2  -0 . 10268 -0 . 0 9 6 6 5 - 0 . 4 7 4 0 0  - 0 . 0 7 9 4  1 0 . 0 2 6 4  1 0 .002 2 5
6 - C .  7 40 9  2 - C .  1 2 72 7 -0 . 1 1 2 4 5 - 0 . 4  19 45 - 0 . 0 9 2 4  7 0 . 0 2 0 7 2 0 . 00 20 0
7 - C . 7 2 6 7 E  - C . 16267 -0 . 1 2 2 2 6 - 0 . 2 6 4 2  6 - 0 . 1 0 5 9 6 0 . 0  1659 0 . 0 0 1 6 7
6 - 0 . 7 2 2 1 1  - C . 1 6 0 5 C -0 .12 6 7 1 - 0 . 3  1206 - 0 . 1 1 6 6 2 0 .0 1600 0 . 0 0 1 2  7
9 - C .  7 0 0 9 9  - C . 19212 -0 .12 195 -0 . 2 64 2  1 - 0 . 1202 7 0 . 0 1 7 5 6 0 .0 0  lie
10 - 0 . 6 7 5 7 5  - 0 . 1 9 6 7 9 -0 . 1 3 2 6 6 -0  .2 2 1 2 5 -0  . 12992 0.0  1699 0 . 0 0 0 6 6
11 - C . 6 4 7 6 E  - C . 2 C 1 5 2 -0 . 1 3 1 4 4 -0  . 1 6 3 5 9  -0  . 14757 0 . 0  1622 0 . 0 0 0 6 9
12 - C . 6 1 6 4  1 - 0 . 2 0  116 - 0 .120 71 - 0 . 1 5 0 6 7  - 0 . 1 5 2 2  1 0.0 1525 0 . 0 0 0 5 2
13 - C . 5 6 8 0 6  - 0 . 1 9 6 4 4 -0 . 1 2 4 9 0 - 0 . 1 2 2 2 2  - 0 . 1 5 6 9 2 0 . 0  144 1 0 . 0 0 0 4 0
14 - C . 5 5 7 4 7  - 0 . 1 9 2 9 1 - 0 . 1 2 0 3 2 - 0 . 0 9 7 6 1  - 0 . 1 5 6 6  6 0 . 0 1 3 4 7 0 . 0 0 0 2 9
15 - C .  5 2 7 0 0  -0 . 16605 -0 . 1 1 5 2 5 - 0 . 0  7 700 - 0 . 1 5 9 2 5 0 . 0 1 2 5 5 0 . 0 0 0 2 1
16 - C . 4 9 7 C I  - 0 . 1 8  122 -0 . IC986 - 0 . 0 5 9 2 6  - 0 . 1 5 6 2 4 0.0  1167 0 .000 14
17 - 0 . 4 6 7 7 2  - 0 . 1 7 2 7 2 - 0 . 1 0 4 2  1 - 0 , 0 4 4 4 9  - 0 . 1 5 6 0 5 0 . 0 1 0 6 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 6
18 - 0 . 4 2 9 3 7  - 0 . 1 6 5 6 1 -0 . 0 9 6 7 2 - 0 , 0 2 2 0 2  - 0 . 1 5 2 6 6 0.0 1006 0 . 0 0 0 0 4
19 - C . 4  12C< - 0 . 1 5 7 6 7 -0 . 09 2 16 -0 .02 162 -0 . 1469 I 0 . 0 0 9 2 2 0 .00 00 1
20 - 0 . 2 6 5 6 4  - 0 . 1 4 9 4 2 -0 . 0 6 7 7 1 - 0 . 0 1 2 0 4  - 0 . 1 4 4 3 0 0 . 0 0 6 6 5 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 2
21 - 0 . 2 6 0 6  2 - 0 . 1 4  124 -0 .08 24  1 - 0  .0 059 6 -0  . 1 29 2 1 0 . 0 0 6 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 4
22 - 0 . 2 2 7 0 3  - 0 . 1 2 2 1 6 -0 . 0 7 7 2 9 -0 . 0 0 0 2 4  -0  . 12276 0 . 0 0 7 4 2 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 5
23 - C . 2 1446 - 0 . 1 2 5 2 9 -0 . 0 7 2 2 7 0 . 0 ( 4 2 9  - 0 . 1 2 6 0  7 0 . 0 0 6 6 6 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 6
24 - 0 . 2 9 3 1 1  - 0 , 1 1 7 6 5 -0 . 0 6 7 6 7 0 . 0 0 6 0 7  - 0 . 1 2 2 2 2 0 . 0 0 6  27 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 7
25 - 0 . 2 7 2 9 6  - 0 . 1 1 0  29 -0 . 0 6 2 2 0 0 .0 1095 - 0 . 1 1 6 3  1 0 . 0 0 5 9 0 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 6
26 - C . 2 5 4 C C  - 0 . 1 0 2 2 4 - 0 . 0 5 6 9 6 0 . 0 1 2 1 5  - 0 . 1  1040 0 . 0 0 5 4 6 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 8
27 - 0 . 2 2 6  17 - 0 . 0 9 6 5 1 -0 .0 5 4 9 5 0 .0 1479 -0 . 10454 0 . 0 0 5 0 5 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 6
26 - 0 . 2 1 9 4 4  - 0 . 0 9 0 1 1 -0 .05 1 16 0 . 0 1 5 9 5  - 0 . 0 9 6 7 6 0 . 0 0 4 6 7 - 0  . c c o c e
29 - 0 , 2 0 3 7 6  - 0 . 0 6 4 0 5 -0 . 0 4 7 6 0 0 . 0 1 6 7 2  - 0 . 0 9 2 1 6 0 . 0 0 4 2 2 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 6
20 - 0 . 1 6 9  10 - 0 . 0 7 6 2  1 - 0 . 0 4 4 2 5 0.0  17 18 - 0 . 0 6 7 7 0 0 . 0 0 2 9 9 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 6
31 - 0 . 1 7 5 2 9  - 0 . 0 7 2 9 0 -0 . 0 4 1 1 1 0 . 0 1 7 3 7  - 0 . 0 6 2 4 2 0 . 0 0 2 6 9 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 7
22 - 0 . 1 6 2 5 9  - 0 . 0 6 7 6 1 -0 .026 17 0 . 0 1 7 2 4  - 0 . 0 7 7 2 7 0 . 0 0 2 4 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 7
22 - 0 .  1 5066 - 0  . 0 6 2 0 2 -0 . 0 2 5 4 1 0 . 0 1 7 1 4  - 0 . 0 7 2 5 1 0 . 0 0 3  15 - C . C C C C 7
24 -0 . 129 54 -0 . 05 854 -0 . 0 2 2 6 4 0 . 0 1 6 6 1  - 0 . 0 6 7 6 6 0 . 0 0 2 9  1 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 7
35 - 0 . 1 2 9 1 9  - 0 . 0 5 4 3 4 -0 . 0 2 0 4 4 0 . 0 1 6 2 7  - 0 . 0 6 2 4 6 C .0 0 2 6 9 - 0  . 0 0 0 0 6
26 -0 . 1 1956 -0 .0504 I - 0 . 0 2 6 2 0 0 . 0 1 5 6 5  - 0 . 0 5 9 2 6 0 . 0 0 2 4 6 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 6
37 -0 . 1 106 I -0 . 04 67 5 -0 . 02 61 2 0 . 0  1526 - 0 . 0 5 5 2  1 0 . 0 0 2 2 9 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 6
26 - 0 .  10229 -0 . 04 22 2 - 0 .0 24 16 0 . 0 1 4 6 6  - 0 . 0 5  156 0 .002 1 1 -0 .0000  5
39 - 0 . 0 9 4 5 7  - 0 . 0 4 0 1 2 -0 . 0 2 2 2 7 0 . 0 1 4 0 1  - 0 . 0 4 6 0 2 0 . 0 0 1 9 5 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 5
40 - 0 . 0 6 7 4 1  - 0 . 0 2 7 1 6 -0 . 0 2 0 6 9 0 . 0 1 2 2 4  - 0 . 0 4 4  7 0 0 . 0 0  160 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 5
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l / S E L E  ( 5 - 1 6 )
I M ERIN NL17IPLIEF5 FCR 7FE EXOGENCLS V^RI/!ELE 0C\7 E R
Ch CEN C CE CCINC CH 7INEC CF FR PS CH LC/>NS CFEE N C [ ISC'T P
TCT/SL .69096 0.03822 2 .03699 - C.09176 2.70606 -0.00099 0.22416
L/SG
C .CC246 0.00090 0.00367 -0.00074 0.0 1902 -0.000(1 0 .0
I .C1255 C.GC142 C.07528 -0.00224 0.0675 1 -0.00003 0.00347
2 .C2C99 0.00 170 0.095 9 0 -0.00335 0.11444 -0.00004 0 .00596
3 .0 2675 0 .00 164 0.10236 -0.00^03 0.12663 -0.00004 (.00779
4 .03026 0.00189 0.10365 -0.00438 0 . 1 32 0 8 -0 .0000 5 0.00903
5 .0 32 1 1 0.00169 0.1026 1 -0.00451 0.13304 -0.00005 0.00981
6 .0 32 79 0 .00 185 0 . 1002 2 -0 .00450 0.13123 -0.00(05 (.0 1022
7 .03265 0.00 176 0.09662 -0.00440 0.12759 -0.00005 0.01036
e .03197 0.00170 0.0 9 240 -0.00424 0.12277 -0.000(5 0.0 1026
g .03091 C.00162 0.0876 1 -0.00406 C. I 1 722 -0 .000 (4 0.01005
1C .02962 0.00153 0.06304 -0.00365 0.11127 -0.00004 0.009 72
11 .02820 0.00144 0.07623 -0.00364 0.10512 -0.000(4 0 .0093 1
12 .02670 0.00135 0.07347 -0.00343 C.09696 - C .000 04 0 .0068 7
13 .02517 0.00127 0.06663 -0.00321 0.09266 -0.00003 0.00640
14 .02366 0.00116 0.06434 -0.00301 0.06696 -0.00003 0.CC792
15 .02217 0.001 10 0.06005 -C.0028 1 0.08 125 -0.00003 0.00744
16 .02074 0.00103 0.05596 -0.00262 0.0 75 79 -0.00 0(3 0.00696
17 . 0 1936 0 .00096 0.05208 -0.00244 0.07059 -0.00003 0.00652
le .0 180^ 0.00069 0.04841 -0.00227 0.06566 -0.00002 0 .00609
19 .0 1679 0 .0006 3 0.04497 -0.00211 0.06104 -0.00002 0.00567
2C .0 156 I 0 .00077 0.04173 -0.00196 0.05667 -0.00002 0.00526
21 .0 1450 0.0007 1 0.03670 -0.00162 0.05256 -C.CCC02 0 .CC49 1
2 2 .01346 0 .00066 0.03566 -0.00169 0.046 7 4 -0.00002 0.(0456
23 .0 124 6 0 .0006 1 0.03322 -0.00 156 0.04516 -0.00002 0.00423
24 .0 1157 0 .00056 0.03075 -0.00145 0.04182 -0.000(2 0.00392
25 .01071 0 .00052 0.02645 -0.00134 0.036 7 1 -0.00001 0.00363
26 .00992 0.00048 0.02622 -0.00124 0 .0358 1 -0 .COCO 1 0.00337
27 .00916 0 ,00045 0 .0243 3 -0 .00 1 1 5 0.03312 -0.000(1 0.003 11
26 .00849 0 .0004 1 0.02249 -0.00106 0 .0306 1 -0 .0000 1 0.00266
29 .00785 0.00036 0.02076 -0.00096 0.02629 -0.00001 0.00266
3C .00725 0 .00035 0.01919 -0.00091 0.02614 -0.00001 0.00246
31 .00670 0.00032 0.01773 -0.00084 C.C2414 -0.CCCCl C.CC226
32 .00619 0.00030 0.0 1636 -0.00077 C.02229 -C.CCCCl C.0C21C
33 .00572 0 .00028 0.0 15 10 -0.0007 1 C.C2C57 -0.000(1 C .OC 19^
34 .00526 0.00026 0.01394 -0.00066 C.0 1899 -O.CCCOl C .00 179
3 .00467 0.00024 0.01266 -0.0006 1 0.01752 -0.000(1 C .00 166
36 .00450 0 .00022 C.C1166 -0.00056 0 .0 16 16 -0 .000(1 C.CC 153
37 .00415 0.00020 0.0 10 94 -0.00052 0.01491 -0.0000 1 0.00141
38 C .00383 0 .000 16 0.0 1009 -0.00048 0.01375 -0.0000 1 0.00 130
39 C.00353 0.000 17 0.00930 -0.00044 0.0 1268 -0.000(0 0 .00 120
4C C .00325 0.00016 0.00656 -0.0 0 041 0.01169 -0.00000 C .00 111
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l/'BLE ( 5- 1 6 )
C C M  IMJEC
I M E R I N '  M L T I F L I E F S  FCP IFE E X C G E N C L S  V/!PI/!ELE G C V T  E F
GNP C NCNCIF 0 CLP C FES IC F I NCNFES I OF INVEN N CF F
I/SL 17.7 192E 5 . 7495C 3.56416 -I.4C3C9 10.27671 -0.46796 .00474
L/*G
C I.C5444 C .C865 C (.06208 C.C 0 .9 1945 -0 .0 1359 .0000 1
1 I.C1522 0.1479 1 (.11623 -0.00312 0.7 9 338 -0.03917 .0000 1
2 C.9E366 C . 19119 0.14868 -0.00805 0.69543 -0.0435 8 .00003
C.95C66 C.22CE2 0.16570 -0.01390 0.61718 -C. 0 39 14 .00005
4 C.91313 C.2398E 0 . 17304 -0 .0 2(0 2 0.55343 -0.(3319 .00008
C C.E7154 C .2507 I 0.17432 -0.02596 0.50054 -0.02807 .000 10
6 C.E2733 C.2551E 0.I7I77 -0.03142 0 .4559 1 - C . 024 1 1 .00012
1 C.78189 C .25479 (.16679 -0.03622 0.41762 -0.0210 9 .000 14
P. C . 7 363 1 C .Z5C77 0.16028 -0.04(26 0.38427 -0.0 18 75 .000 15
<5 C .69139 C .244CE 0.15287 -0.04 351 0.35482 -0.01686 .00016
IC C .64767 C .23549 0.14 49 5 - C.04600 0.32851 -0.01528 .000 17
II C.6C552 C .22563 0. 13684 -0.04 77 7 0.30475 -0.0 1394 .00018
12 C .565 16 C .2 1494 0 . 12 87 2 -0 .04 8 8 8 0.28312 -0.01276 .00018
13 C.52674 C.2C38 I 0. 12074 -0 .0494 I 0.26329 -0.0 1170 .000 18
14 C.49C33 C . 192 5 I 0. I 13(0 -0 .04943 0 . 2450 1 -0 .0 10 76 .000 18
15 C.45595 0.18125 0.10554 -0.04902 0.22806 -0.00990 .00(18
16 C.4235E C.17CI7 0.09841 -0.04825 0 . 2 1235 -0 .009 1 1 .000 17
17 C.3931E C. 1594 I 0.09 164 -0.04718 0.19771 -0.00840 .00017
le C.3647C C .149(3 0.08524 -0.04568 0.18405 -0.00774 .00(16
19 C. 3 38C 7 C .139(9 0.07920 -0.04439 0. 17 129 -0 .007 1 3 .00015
2C C.31319 C . 1 296 2 0.07352 -0.042 7 6 0 . 1 59 3 8 -0 .( 06 5 8 .00015
21 C.29CCC C .12065 0 . 06820 -0 .04 103 0.14824 -0.006(6 .00(14
2 2 C.2 683 9 C .I 12 17 (.06322 -0.03923 (.13782 -0.00559 .000 13
23 C .24829 0.104 IE 0.(5857 -0.03740 0.1280 9 -0.(0515 .00(12
24 C.2296C C .09669 0.05423 -0.03555 0 . 1 1899 -0 .00475 .000 12
25 C.2 1225 ( .08966 0.05(19 -0.03371 0.11049 -0.00438 .00011
26 C . 19614 0.083(9 0.04643 -0.03190 0.10256 -0.0(404 .(((10
27 C.1812C 0,(7695 0.04293 -0.03011 0.09516 -0.00372 .00010
28 C. 16736 C .07 123 0.(3968 - C . 02838 0.08825 -0.00343 .00009
29 C . 15453 C .06590 0.03667 -0.02670 0.0818 I -0.(03 16 .00(08
3C C . 14265 (.06(95 0.(3388 -0.02508 0.07582 -0 .0029 1 .00008
31 C. 13166 0 .05634 0.(3 129 -0.02352 0.(7023 -0.(0268 .00007
32 C.12149 0.05207 0.02889 -0.02203 0 .06504 - C.00247 .00007
■a 2 C.112CE 0 .048 10 0.02666 -0.02061 0 .0602 1 -C .00228 .00006
34 C. 1C338 0.04443 0.0246 1 -0.019 27 0.05572 -0.002 10 .00006
35 C.C9535 (.04 102 (.0227 1 -0.01799 0.05 154 -0 .00 19 3 .00(05
36 C.CE792 0.03787 0,(2095 -(.01678 0.04767 - C . 00178 .00005
37 C.Ce1C6 0.03495 0.01932 -0.01563 0.0440 7 -0.00 164 .0(005
38 C.C7473 0.03224 0.0 I 782 -0 .0 1456 0.04074 -0.00 15 1 .00004
39 C.C688E 0 .029 75 0.0 1643 -0.01355 0.03765 -0.00139 .000(4
4C C.C6349 0.02744 0.01515 -0.01259 0.03478 -0.00128 .000(4
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1/>eLF (5-17)
I N T F R I N  M L T I P L I E P S  FCR THE E X C G E N C L S  V/SPI/SELE E ILL P«V
7C14L
L/>G
C
1
2
3
4
c
6
7
e
c
CE- CEN r. CE- CCINC CE- M  NEC CE FF PS CE LC/SNS CFEN N C C 
-C.CCC86 -C.CCClf -C.31EC3 -C.CCEEE -C.CC24^ -C.CCISS
1C
11 -  
12 -
13 -
14 -
15 -
16 -  
17 - 
lE - 
19 - 
2C - 
21  -  
22  -
23 -
24 -
25 -
26 -
27 -
28 - 
29 - 
3C -
31 -
32 - 
3 3 - 
2 4 —
35 -
36 -
37
38
39 
4C
C.C
C.CCCCS 
C.CC017 
C.CCC19 
C.CCCIE 
C . C C C M  
CCGCS 
CCCC5 
CCOCl 
CC0C2 
CC0C4 
C.CC0C6 
C.CC0C7 
C.CCCC7 
C.CCCCE 
C.CCCCE 
C.CCCCE 
C.CCCCE 
C . C C C C 7 
C.CCCC 7 
C.CCCC7 
C.CCCC/ 
C .CC0C6 
C.CCCCE 
C.CCCCE 
C.CCCC5 
C.CCCCE 
C.CCCC5 
C.CCCC4 
C.CC0C4 
C.CCCC4 
C.CCCC4 
C.CCCC3 
C.CCCC3 
C.CCCC3 
C .CCCC3 
C.CCCC2 
CCCC2 
CC0C2 
CCCC2 
CC0C2
C ,C
•C.CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
•C.CCCCC 
•C.CCCCC 
•C.CCCCC 
•c .CCCCl 
•C.CCCC 1 
•C.CCCCl 
•C.CCCC 1 
•C.CCCC 1 
•c .CCCC 1 
•C.CCCCl 
-C.CCCCC 
•C.CCCCC 
•C.CCCCC 
-C .CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
•C.CCCCC 
•C.CCCCC 
•C.CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
•c .CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
•C .CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
•C.CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
-C .CCCCC 
■C.CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
•C.CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
•C.CCCCC 
■C.CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
-C .CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC 
-C.CCCCC
C.24 1S6 
C.C5455 
C . C 1219 
•C.CC2E6 
■C.CCC57 
C.CCCIE 
■C.CCC 12 
■C.CCC 15 
C.CCC19 
■C.CCC22 
C.CCC23 
C.CCC25 
C.CCC25 
C.CCC25 
■C.CCC25 
C.CCC24 
■C.CCC23 
■C.CCC23 
■C.CCC22 
C.CCC2 1 
■C .CCC 19 
-C.CCCIE 
•C.CCC17 
•C.CCCIE 
■C .CCC 1 5 
■C.CCC 14 
■C.CCC 14 
•C .CCC 1 3 
-C .CCC 1 2 
-C.CCC 11 
•C.CCCIC 
•C.CCC 1 C 
•C.CCCCS 
•C.CCCCE 
-C.CCCCE 
•C.CCCC7 
•C.CCCC? 
•C.CCCCE 
•C.CCCCE 
•C.CCCC5 
•C .CCCC5
C .CC43C 
■C .CC2C3 
■C.CCC72 
C.CCCIE 
■C.CCCCl 
C .CCCC3 
C .CCCC3 
C.CCCC2 
C.CCCC2 
C.CCCC2 
C.CCCC 
C.CCCC 
C.CCCC 
C.CCCC 
C.CCCC 
C.CCCC 
c .CCCC 
C.CCCC 
c .CCCC 
c .CCCC 
C.CCCC 
C.CCCC 
C.CCCC 
C.CCCC 
C.CCCC 
c .CCCC 
C.CCCC 
C.CCCC 
c .CCCC 
C.CCCC 
c .CCCC 
c .CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC
C.C
c .CCCE7 
C.CCCS5 
c .CCCE7 
c .CCCE4 
C.CCC4C 
C.CCCIE 
C.CCCC2 
CCC 1C 
CCC 19 
CCC25 
CCC2E 
■C .CCC3 1 
•C.CCC32 
•C .CCC32 
•C.CCC32 
•C.CCC31 
•C.CCC3C 
•C .CCC2S 
•C.CCC27 
•C.CCC2E 
•C.CCC25 
•C .CCC23 
■C .CCC22 
•C.CCC2 1 
•C .CCC 19 
■C.CCCIE 
C.CCC17 
•C.CCCIE 
•C.CCC15 
•C.CCCM 
•C.CCC 13 
•C.CCC12 
•C.CCC 1 1 
•C.CCCIC 
•C.CCCIC 
•C.CCCCS 
•C.CCCCE 
•C.CCCCE 
•C.CCCC? 
•C.CCCC?
•C.CC232 
C .CCC4C 
•C.CCCCE 
C.CCCC 1 
•C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
c .CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
c .CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
,CCCCC 
.CCCCC 
,CCCCC 
,CCCCC 
,CCCCC 
,CCCCC 
C.CCCCC 
C.CCCCC
SC'T p 
.CC 38 I
.c
.CCC92 
.CC 1C5 
.CCCE^ 
.CCC59 
.CCC39 
.CCC24 
.CCC15 
.CCCCE 
.CCCC4 
.CCCC2 
.CCCCC 
.CCCCl 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC2 
.CCCC I 
.CCCCl 
.CCCC 1 
.CCCCl 
.CCCC 1 
.CCCCl 
.CCCC 1 
.CCCC 1 
.CCCC 1 
.CCCC 1 
.CCCCl 
.CCCC 1 
.CCCCl
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l/teiE (5-17)
C C M  I M E C
I M E R I N  M L I I F L I E P S  FCP TFE E X C G E N C L S  V ^ P I / E L E E III R
GNP C NCNCLP C CLP C P ESIC FI NCNFES I CF INVEN A
TCT/SL - C . C 6 2 S 5  - C . C 2 C 7 7  - C . C C 7 Ç 6 - C  . C 2 3 E 2 - C . C C E 7  1 - C . C C 2 C E . CC CC 7
L/SG
C C .C C.C C.C C.C C.C C .C .c
1 - C . C C 0 G 7  - C . C C C C E  C . C C C 2 6 - C  . CC CE 3 C . C C C 1 7 -C . C C C 4 6 - .C C C C C
2 - C . C C I E C  - C . C C C 2 1  C . C C C 4 4 -C .CC 165 C . C C C 3 7 -C .CCC 75 .C C C C C
3 - C . C C 2 2 7  - C . G C C 3 4  C . C C C C E - C . C C 2 1 E C . C C C 5 C - C . C C C 7 2 . C C C C l
4 - C . C C 2 4 E  - C . C C C 4 6  C . C C C 2 5 - C  . C C 2 4 C C . C C C 5 5 -f .CCC 54 . C C C C l
5 - C . C C 2 5 E  - C . C C C 5 5  C . C C C I G - C . C C 2 4 C C . C C C 5 3 - C . C C C 3 4 . C C C C l
e. - C . C C 2 5 E  - C . C C C E 2  C . C C C C 3 - C  . C C 2 2 E C . C C C 4 6 - C . C C C I E . CC CC l
7 - C . C C 2 5 E  - C . C C C 6 7  - C . C C C I I - C  . C C 2 C 8 C . C C C 3 6 - C . C C C C 7 .C C CC  1
E - C . C C 2 5 5  - C . C C C I I  - C . C C C 2 2 - C . C C 1 E 6 C . C C C 2 5 - C . C C C C l .C C C C l
9 - C . C C 2 5 1  - C . 0 C C 7 4  - C . C C C 3 C - C . C C  163 C . C C C 1 3 C . C C C C 3 . C C C C l
IC - C . C C 2 4 5  - C . C C C 7 5  - C . C C C 3 6 -C  .CC 14 1 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C 5 . CC CC C
11 - C . C C 2 3 6  - C . C C C I E  - C . C C C 3 9 - C . C C 1 2 1 - C . C C C C E C . C C C C 6 . C C C C C
12 - C . C C 2 3 C  - C . C C C 7 5  - C . C C C 4 1 - C  .CC 1C3 - C . C C C 1 7 C . C C C C E . C C C C C
13 - C . C C 2 2 I  - C . C C C 7 4  - C . C C C 4 2 - C . C C C 8 6 - C . C C C 2 4 C . C C C C E . C C C C C
14 - C . C C 2 1 2  - C . C C C 1 3  - C . C C C 4 2 - C . C C C 7 2 - C . C C C 3 C C . C C C C S . C C C C C
15 - C . C C 2 C 2  - C . 0 C C 7 1  - C . C C C 4 2 - C . C C C 6 C - C . C C C 3 5 C . C C C C S . C C C C C
16 - C . C C 1 9 2  - C . C C C 6 9  - C . C C C 4 1 - C  . C C C 4 9 -C . C C C 3 9 C . C C C C S . C C C C C
17 - C . C C 1 8 2  - C . 0 C C 6 6  - C . C C C 3 9 - C  . C C C 4 C -C . C C C 4 2 C . C C C C 4 . C C C C C
IE - C . C C I 7 2  - C . C C C 6 4  - C . C C C 3 E - C . C C C 3 2 -C . C C C 4 3 C . C C C C 4 . C C C C C
19 - C . C C I 6 3  - C . C C C 6 1  - C . C C C 3 6 - C . C C C 2 5 - C . C C C 4 5 C . C C C C 4 . C C C C C
20 - C . C C 1 5 3  - C . C C C 5 E  - C . C C C 3 4 -C  .CCC 19 - C . C C C 4 5 C . C C C C 4 . C C C C C
21 - C . C C 1 4 <  - C . C C C 5 5  - C . C C C 3 2 -C  .CCC 15 - C . C C C 4 5 C . C C C C 3 . C C C C C
22 - C . C C 1 3 5  - C . C C C 5 2  - C . C C C 3 C - C  .CCC 1 1 - C . C C C 4 5 C . C C C C 3 - . C C C C C
23 - C . C C 1 2 6  - C . C C C 4 9  - C . C C C 2 9 -C  . C C C C 7 - C . C C C 4 4 C . C C C C 3 — . C C C C C
24 - C . C C I I E  - C . C C C 4 7  - C . C C C 2 7 - C . C C C C 5 - C . C C C 4 3 C . C C C C 3 - . C C C C C
25 - C . C C l I l  - C . C C C 4 4  - C . C C C 2 5 - C . C C C C 2 - C . C C C 4 1 C . C C C C 2 — . C C C C C
26 - C . C C I C 3  - C . C C C 4 I  - C . C C C 2 4 -C  . C C C C 1 - C . C C C 4 C C . C C C C 2 — . CC CC C
27 - C . C C C 9 6  - C . C C C 3 9  - C . C C C 2 2 C . C C C C l - C . C C C 3 E C . C C C C 2 - . CC CC C
28 - C . C C 0 9 C  - C . C C C 3 6  - C . C C C 2 1 C . CC CC2 - C . C C C 3 7 C . C C C C 2 - . C C C C C
29 - C . C C 0 8 4  - C . C C C 3 4  - C . C C C 19 C . CC CC 3 - C . C C C 3 5 C . C C L C 2 - . C C C C C
3C - C . C C 0 7 6  - C . C C C 3 2  - C . C C C I E C . C C C C 4 - C . C C C 3 3 C . C C C C 2 - . C C C C C
31 - C . C C 0 7 2  - C . C C C 3 C  - C . C C C 17 C . CC CC 4 -C  . CC C3 2 C . C C C C 2 - . C C C C C
32 - C . C C C 6 7  - C . C C C 2 E  - C . C C C 16 C . C C C C 5 - C . C C C 3 C C . C C C C l - . C C C C C
33 - C . C C C 6 2  - C . C C C 2 6  - C . C C C 15 C . C C C C 5 - C . C C C 2 E C . C C C C l - . CC CC C
34 - C . C C C 5 E  - C . C C C 2 4  - C . C C C 14 C . C C C C 5 - C . C C C 2 7 C . C C C C  1 - . C C C C C
35 - C . C C C 5 4  - C . C C C 2 2  - C . C C C 13 C . C C C C 5 - C . C C C 2 5 C . C C C C l - . C C C C C
36 - C . C C 0 5 C  - C . C C C 2 1  - C . C C C 12 C . C C C C 5 - C . C C C 2 4 C . C C C C  1 - . C C C C C
37 - C . C C C 4 6  - C . C C C 19 - C . C C C I I C . CC CC 5 - C . C C C 2 2 C . C C C C  1 - . CC CC C
36 - C . C C C 4 3  - C . C C C I E  - C . C C C I C C . C C C C 5 - C . C C C 2 1 C . C C C C l - . C C C C C
39 - C . C C 0 4 C  - C . C C C 17 - C . C C C C 9 C . C C C C 5 - C . C C C 19 C . C C C C  1 - . C C C C C
4C - C . C C C 3 7  - C . C C C 1 5  - C . C C C C 9 C . C C C C 5 - C . C C C I E C . CC C C  1 - . C C C C C
N CF F
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T/5ELE ( 5 - 1 6 )
I M E P I N  M L T I P L I E P S  FCP TEE E X C G E ^ C L S  V/SPI/!ELE TIEECP=«V
CE CE V  [
T/»L C . C C C E E C . C C C C P
LfC
C C.C C .C
1 - C . C C C C 6 C . C C C C C
? - C . C C O l 1 C . C C C C C
3 - C . C C C 1 3 C . C C C C C
4 - C . C C C 12 C . C C C C C
5 - C . C C C I C C . C C C C C
6 - C . C C C C E C . C C C C C
1 -C .C C O C E C . C C C C C
e - C . C C C C l C . C C C C C
p C . C C C C  I C . C C C C C
1C C . C C 0 C 3 C . C C C C C
11 C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C C
12 C . C C 0 C 4 C . C C C C C
13 C . C C C C E C .CC CC C
14 C . C C C C E C . C C C C C
IE C . C C C C E C . C C C C C
16 C . C C O C E C . C C C C C
17 C . C C C C E C . C C C C C
IE C . C C C C E C . C C C C C
IP C . C C C C E C . C C C C C
2C C . C C C C E C . C C C C C
21 C . C C 0 C 4 C . C C C C C
22 C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C C
23 C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C C
24 C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C C
2E C . C C C C 4 C . C C C C C
26 C . C C C C 3 C . C C C C C
27 C . C C C C 3 C . C C C C C
26 C . C C C C 3 C . C C C C C
29 C . C C G C 3 C . C C C C C
3C C . C C C C 3 C . C C C C C
31 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C
32 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C
3 3 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C
34 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C
3 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C
36 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C C C
37 C . C C 0 C 2 C . C C C C C
36 C . C C C C  I C . C C C C C
39 C . C C C C  1 C . C C C C C
4C C . C C C C 1 C . C C C C C
C . 2 2 2 2 C
C . 1 6P 25  
C . C 2 E  16 
C . C C E 5 3  
C . C C  186 
C . C C C 4 C  
C . C C C 11
c . c c c c e  
C . C C C I C  
C . C C C  13 
C . C C C 14 
C . C C C  16 
C . C C C  1? 
C . C C C  1 7 
C . C C C  1? 
C .CCC I 7 
C . C C C  16 
C . C C C  16 
C . C C C  1 5 
C . C C C I E  
C . C C C  14 
C . C C C  1 3 
C . C C C  12 
C .CCC 12 
C . C C C I I  
C . C C C I C  
C . C C C I C  
C . C C C C P
c  . c c c c e
C . C C C C E  
C . C C C C l  
C . C C C C 7  
C . C C C C 6  
C . C C C C 6  
C . C C C C 6  
C . C C C C E  
C . C C C C E  
C . C C C C 4  
C . C C C C 4  
C . C C C C 4  
C . C C C C 4  
C . C C C C 3
CE FR RS CE L C A N S  C R E E  N C C I S C ' !  P
C . C C 4 6 2  C . C C 2 3 1  C . C C C 3 7 - C . C C 2 E 6
C .CC 26 3 C.C C . C C C 4 1 C.C
C.CC 1 C - C . C C C 4 4  - C . C C C C 6 -C.CCCC- 1
C.CCC 9 - C . C C C 6 3  C . C C C C 2 - C . C C C I C
C .C CC 3 - C . C C C E 9  - C . C C C C C - C . C C C E I
C.CCC 1 - C . C C C 4 3  C . C C C C C - C . C C C 4 C
- C . C C C 2 - C . C C C 2 7  - C . C C C C C - C . C C C 2 6
- C . C C C 2 - C . C C C 1 3  - C . C C C C C - C . C C C I I
- C . C C C 2 - C . C C C C  1 - C . C C C C C - C . C C C I C
- C . C C C 1 C . C C C C 7 - C . C C C C C - C . C C C C E
- C . C C C 1 C . C C C 13 - C . C C C C C -C . C C C C 3
- C . C C C 1 C . C C C  1 7 - C . C C C C C - C . C C C C l
-C .CCC 1 C . C C C  19 - C . C C C C C - C . C C C C C
- C . C C C 1 C . C C C 2 1  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C  1
- C . C C C 1 C . C C C 2 1  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
- C . C C C 1 C . C C C 2 I  - C . C C C C C C . CCC C I
- C . C C C 1 C . C C C 2 1  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C 2
- C . C C C 1 C . C C C 2 1  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C 2
- C . C C C 1 C . C C C 2 C  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C 2
-C .CCC 1 C . C C C  19 - C . C C C C C C . C C C C 2
-C .CCC 1 C . C C C I E  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C 2
- C . C C C 1 C . C C C I E  - C . C C C C C C . CC C C 2
-C .CCC 1 C . C C C I I  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
-C .CCC 1 C . C C C  16 -C .CC CCC C . CC C C l
-C .CCC 1 C . C C C I E  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
-C .CCC C C . C C C  M  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
- C . C C C C C . C C C  13 - C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
-C .CCC C C . C C C  12 - C . C C C C C C . CC C C l
-C .CCC C C . C C C  1 1 - C . C C C C C C . CC CC  1
- C . C C C C C . C C C I I  - C . C C C C C C .CCCC 1
-C .CCC C C . C C C I C  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C  1
-C .CCC C C . C C C C 9  - C . C C C C C C . CC CC  1
- C . C C C C C . C C C C 9  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
-C .CCC C C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
- C . C C C C C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
- C . C C C C C . C C C C l  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
-C .CCC C C . C C C C 7  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
- C . C C C C C . C C C C 6  - C . C C C C C C .CC CCl
- C . C C C C C . C C C C C  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C l
- C . C C C C C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C C
- L . C C C C C . C C C C E  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C C
- C . C C C C C . C C C C 4  - C . C C C C C C . C C C C C
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T fELE ( 5 - l£ )
C C M  I M E C
INTERIM M L T I P L I E P S  FCP TFE FXCCENCLS V^PI/ELE T IFECP=ev
GNP C N CNCLP C CLP C PESIE FI N CNFES 1 CF INVEN n N CF F
TCI/SL C.C423C C . C 1369 C .CCE3E C.C 16C 1 C . C C E E E  C .CC M C .CC CC*
L/5G
C C.C c .C C.C C.C C.C C.C .c
I C.C CC 64 c .CCCCE - C . C C C 1 7 C.CCCEE - C . C C C I I  C . C C C 3 2 .CCCCC
2 C .C C1 2C c .CCC 14 - C . C C C 3 C C.CCllC - C . C C C 2 4  C .C CCEC - .CCCCC
3 C .C C 1 5 2 c .CCC23 - C . C C C 3 I C .CC 146 - C . C C C 3 4  C . C C C 4 E - .CCCCC
4 C.C C1 67 c .CCC3 1 - C . C C C 2 4 C .CC 16 1 - C . C C C 3 7  C .C CC 36 - .CCCCl
c C .C C1 72 c .CCC37 - C . C C C 1 3 C .CC 16 1 - C . C C C 3 6  C . C C C 2 3 - .CCCCl
6 C . CCI 74 c .CCC42 - C . C C C C 2 C .CC 1E3 - C . C C C 3 1  C . C C C 12 - .CCCCl
7 C . CCI 73 c .CCC4E C.CCCC7 C .CC 14C - C . C C C 2 4  C .C C C C E - .CCCCl
E C . CCI 7 1 c .CCC4E C.CCCIE C .CC 12E - C . C C C I I  C .C CC CC - .CCCCC
g C . C C 1 6 9 c .CCC49 C.CCC2C C.C CllC - C . C C C C 9  - C . C C C C 2 - .CCCCC
IC C.C C I E E c .CCCEC C.CCC24 C .CCC9E - C . C C C C l  - C . C C C C 3 - .CCCCC
1 1 C . C C I 6 C c .CCC5 1 C .CCC26 C .C CCE2 C.C C C C E  - C . C C C C 4 - .CCCCC
12 C.C C I E E c . C C C E 1 C .CCC2E C.C CC69 C .CCC 1 1 -C .CCCC4 - .CCCCC
13 C .C C 1 4 9 c .CCCEC C.CCC26 C .C CCEE C . C C C 16 - C . C C C C 4 - .CCCCC
14 C . C C L 4 3 c .CCC49 C .CCC2E C .C CC49 C . C C C 2 C  - C . C C C C 4 - .CCCCC
IE C . C C 1 3 6 c .CCC4E C .CCC2E C.CCC4C C .CCC23 -C .CCCC3 - .CCCCC
16 C .C C L 2 9 c .CCC46 C.CCC27 C.CCC33 C.C C C 2 6  - C . C C C C 3 - .CCCCC
17 C . C C 1 2 3 c .CCC4E C.CCC26 C.CCC27 C . C C C 2 E  - C . C C C C 3 - .CCCCC
IE C . CCI 16 c .CCC43 C.CCC2E C.CCC21 C . C C C 2 9  - C . C C C C 3 - .CCCCC
IS C .CC1C9 c .CCC4 1 C.CCC24 C.CCCII C.C CC 3C  - C . C C C C 3 - .CCCCC
2C C.C Cl C3 c .GCC39 C-CGC23 C .CCC 13 C .C C C 3 C  - C . C C C C 2 - .CCCCC
21 C .C C0 97 c .CCC37 C.CCC22 C.CCCIC C.C C C 3 C  - C . C C C C 2 - .CCCCC
22 C . C C C 9 1 c .CCC3E C.CCC2C C .CCCC7 C .C C C 3 C  - C . C C C C 2 .CCCCC
23 C.CCCEE c .CCC33 C.CCC19 C.CCCCE C.C C C 2 9  - C . C C C C 2 .CCCCC
24 C .C CC EC c .CCC3 1 C.CCCIE C.CCCC3 C.C C C 2 9  - C . C C C C 2 . C C C C C
2E C .C C0 74 c .CCC3C C.CCC 17 C .CCCC2 C.C C C 2 E  - C . C C C C 2 . C C C C C
26 C .C CC 69 c .CCC2E C . C C C 16 C . C C C C C C . C C C 2 7  - C . C C C C 2 . C C C C C
27 C .C CC6E c .CCC26 C.CCCIE - C . C C C C  1 C.C CC 26  - C . C C C C l . C C C C C
2E C.C CC6C c .CCC24 C.CCC14 - C . C C C C l C .CCC2 E - C . C C C C l . C C C C C
29 C.C CCEE c .CCC23 C.CCC13 -C .CCCC2 C . C C C 2 4  - C . C C C C l .CCCCC
30 C . C C C 5 2 c .CCC2 1 C.CCC12 -C .CCCC3 C . C C C 2 2  - C . C C C C l .CCCCC
31 C.CCC49 c .CCC2C C.CCCII -C .CCCC3 C .CCC2 1 - C . C C C C l .CCCCC
32 C .C CC 4E c .CCC19 C.CCCII - C . C C C C 3 C.C C C 2 C  - C . C C C C l .CCCCC
3 3 C . C C 0 4 2 c .CCC17 C.CCCIC - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C 19 - C . C C C C l .CCCCC
34 C.C CC 39 c .CCC16 C.CCCC9 - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C I E  - C . C C C C l .CCCCC
•a c C .CCC36 c .CCC IE C.CCCCE - C . C C C C 4 C.C C C I I  - C . C C C C l .CCCCC
36 C .C CC 33 c .CCC 14 C.CCCCE - C . C C C C 4 C.CCC 16 -C .CCCC 1 .CCCCC
37 C.CCC3 1 c .CCC13 C.CCCC7 - C . C C C C 3 C .C CC IE  - C . C C C C l .CCCCC
38 C .C C0 29 c .CCC 12 C.CCCC7 - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C M  - C . C C C C l .CCCCC
3 9 C.C CC27 c .CCCl 1 C.CCCC6 - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C 1 3  -C .CCCCl .CCCCC
4C C .C C0 2E c .CCCIC C.CCCCE - C . C C C C 3 C.C C C 1 2  - C . C C C C l .CCCCC
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l / E L E  {5-JC)
IMEPTI^ M L T I F L I E F S FCP TFE E XC GE NC LS V/5RI/S6LF eCNC P * \
Cl- [EM [ CH CCINC CF T IN EC CF FR PS CF LC/^NS CPEN N C CISC'T P
ICIfiL
LfiO
C. 16C75 C .C C6 79 C .C 6E E5  - C . C 2 9 1 6 C .62995 C.CC139 C .C 5E 73
C C. CCC4E C .C CC IE - C . 2 9 E E 6  - C . C C 4 7 3 C . C C 3 7 C  C . C C 196 C.C
I C .C C 2 5 5 C.CCC26 - C . C 5 2 4 4  - C . C C 2 6 7 C . C 1 7 8 7  - C . C C C 4 C C.CC 166
2 C .CC435 C .CCC34 C .CC4 1 1 -C .CC 152 C . C 2 3 9 2  C .C CCC5 C.CC236
3 C . C C 5 6  1 C.CCC37 C .C 1Î 57  - C . C C 1 C 4 C . C 2 E 6 2  - C . C C C C 2 C.C C 2 5 2
A C . C C 6 4  1 C .CCC39 C .C 2C E6  - C . C C C 9 3 C . C 2 6 1 5  - C . C C C C l C .CC252
c C.CC685 C.CCC4C C . C 2 1 5 E  - C . C C C 9 2 C . C 2 E 5 6  - C. CC CC l C .C C246
6 C .CC7C5 C .CCC39 C.C2 146 -C .CCC93 C . C 2 E 4 1  - C. CC CC l C .CC243
7 C . C C 7 C 6 C.CCC39 C . C 2 1 C C  - C . C C C 9 3 C . C 2 7 6 7  - C . C C C C l C .C C2 36
e C .C C699 C.CCC37 C . C 2 C 3 4  - C . C C C 9 1 C . C 2 7 C 9  - C . C C C C  1 C .CC233
9 C .CC663 C.GCC36 C . C 1 9 5 7  - C . C C C 6 9 C . C 2 E 1 3  - C . C C C C l C.C C2 2E
1C C .CC66 1 C .CCC35 C . C 1673 - C . C C C E E C .C25CE - C . C C C C l C . C C 2 19
1 I C .C C6 35 C .CCC33 C . C 1764 - C . C C C 8 2 C . C 2 3 9 2  -C. CC CC l C .CC21C
12 C .CC6C7 C .CCC3 ] C . C 1 E 9 4  - C . C C C 7 6 C . C 2 2 7 5  - C . C C C C l C .CC2C2
13 C . C C 5 7 E C .CCC3C C . C 1 E C 3  - C . C C C 7 4 C . C 2 1 5 E  - C . C C C C l C.CC 19 2
lA C . C C 5 4 9 C .C CC26 C . C 1513 - C . C C C 7 C C . C 2 C 3 B  - C. CC CC l C . C C 1 6 3
15 C .C C5 19 C .CCC26 C . C 1 4 2 5  - C . C C C E E C . C 1922 - C . C C C C l C.C C 1 7 3
16 C . C C 4 9 C C .OCC25 C . C 1339 - C . 0 C C E 2 C .C I6C6 - C . C C C C l C.CC 164
17 C .C C4 6  1 C .C CC23 C . C 1 2 5 7  - C . C C C 5 9 C . C 1696 - C . C C C C l C .CC 155
IB C . C C 4 3 3 C.CCC22 C.C 1 176 -C .CCC55 C.C 1 592 - C . C C C C  1 C.CC 145
19 C .C C4 C7 C .CCC2C C. C 1 1 C 2  - C . C C C 5 2 C . C 149 1 - C . C C C C l C .CC 137
2C C .C C3 6  1 C .GCC 19 C. C 1 C 2 9  - C . C C C 4 6 C . C 1 3 9 4  - C . C C C C l C .CC 126
21 C . C C 3 5 6 C . C C C I E C.C C 9 E 1  - C . C C C 4 5 C.C 13C2 - C . C C C C C C.CC 12C
22 C . C C 3 3 3 C .C CC IE C.C C 6 9 E  - C . C C C 4 2 C.C 12 15 - C . C C C C C C .CC112
23 C .CC3 1 1 C .CCC 15 C . C C 6 3 5  - C . C C C 3 9 C . C 1 132 - C . C C C C C C .C CI C5
24 C .C C2 9C C.COG 14 C . C C 7 7 7  - C . C C C 3 E C .C1C54 - C . C C C C C C .CCC96
25 C .C C2 7C C.CCC 13 C . C C 7 23 - C . C C C 3 4 C . C C 9 6 1  - C . C C C C C C .CCC9 1
26 C . C C 2 5 1 C.CCC 12 C . C C E 7 2  - C . C C C 3 2 C . C C 9 12 - C . C C C C C C .C CC65
27 C .C C233 C . C C C 11 C . C C E 2 4  - C . C C C 2 9 C . C C E 4  7 - C . C C C C C C .CCC79
26 C ,CC2 17 C.CCC 1 1 C . C C 5 7 9  - C . C C C 2 7 C . C C 7 6 E  - C . C C C C C C .CCC73
29 C .C C2 C1 C.CCCIC C . C C 5 3 7  - C . C C C 2 5 C . C C 7 3 C  - C . C C C C C C.C CCEE
3C C .C C 1 6 7 C.CCCC9 C . C C 4 9 6  - C. CC C2 3 O . C C E 7 7  - C . C C C C C C.C CC63
31 C.C C 1 7 3 c.cccce C.CC4É 1 - C . C C C 2 2 C . C C E 2 7  - C . C C C C C C.CCC59
32 C.CC16I c .cccce C . C C 4 2 7  - C . C C C 2 C C . C C 5 6  1 - C . C C C C C C.CCC54
2 3 C .C C 1 4 9 c .C CCC7 C .C C 3 9 6  - C . C C C 1 9 C . C C 5 3 6  - C . C C C C C C .C GC5C
34 C .C C I 3 E C .CCCC7 C . C C 3 E E  - C . C C C 17 C . C C 4 9 E  - C . C C C C C C.CCC47
3 ' C .C C1 2E C .CCCCE C . C C 3 3 9  - C . C C C I E C . C C 4 E 1  - C . C C C C C C .CCC43
36 C . C C I I E C.CCCCE C . C C 3 1 4  - C . C C C 15 C . C C 4 2 7  - C . C C C C C C .CCC4C
37 C .C CI C9 C.CCCC5 C. C C 2 9 C  - C . C C C 14 C . C C 3 9 5  - C . C C C C C C.CCC37
36 C . C C I C 1 C.CCCC5 C . C C 2 E 6  - C . C C C 13 C . C C 3 E 5  - C . C C C C C C .CCC3^
39 C .C CC 94 C.CCCC5 C . C C 2 4 E  - C . C C C 12 C . C C 3 3 7  - C . C C C C C C .CCC32
4C C .CC066 C.CCCC4 C . C G 2 2 9  - C . C C C I I C . C C3  12 - C . C C C C C C .CCC29
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T / Ë L E  ( 5 - ( S )
C C M  I M E C
INTERIM M L T I P L I E P S FCR TEE E>CGENCLS V7FI/SELE EONC F
GNP C NCNCIR 0 CLP G FFSIC FI NCNRES 1 OF INVEN N OF F
7CT/L
L/»C
4.C7657 1 . 3226 1 0.62525 0.66^71 1.15565 -0.11165 .00 116
C C .2053 2 0.0 1664 0.0 1209 0.17610 0.00093 -0.00265 .00000
1 C . 2 C 2 6 1 C.02920 0.02326 0.15102 0.00734 -0.00622 .00000
2 C.20039 0.03826 0.03040 0.12721 C .01414 -G .00961 .0000 1
3 C .19742 0.04416 0.03444 0.10666 0.0204 7 -0.00892 .00(02
4 C. 1931 1 0.04929 0.03645 0.08908 C .02600 -0.00772 .00002
c C. 1E74E 0.05221 0.03716 0.07405 0.0 3 065 -0.00659 .00003
É C. 18080 0.05384 0.03704 0.06 122 0.03439 -0.00569 .00003
7 0 . 1 7 3 3 E 0.054^5 0.03637 0.05028 0.03728 -0.00500 .00004
e C. 16550 0.05426 0.03534 0.04097 0.03941 -0.00446 .00004
c 0.15737 0.05345 C.03406 0.03305 0.04064 -0.00405 .00004
1C 0. 1^916 0.052 17 0.03266 0.02624 0.04166 -0.00371 .00004
11 C. 1409E 0.05055 0.03 116 0.02066 0 .(4200 -0 . 0 034 1 .00004
12 C. 1 329 3 0.C4E67 0.02963 0.0 1566 0.04 189 -0.003 15 .00(04
13 C. 1250E 0.04663 0.02607 0.01167 0.04142 -0.00291 .00004
14 0 . 1 174E 0.04448 0.02652 0 ,0 06 5 2 0.04066 -0,00269 .000(4
15 0. I 1016 0.04227 0.02500 0.00574 0.03965 -0.00250 .00004
16 0.103 15 0.04005 0.0235 1 0.00344 0.03647 -0.0023 1 .00004
17 0.09646 C .037 84 0.02206 0 .00 156 0.03 7 13 -0.00214 .00004
lE 0.09009 0.03566 0.02069 0.00002 0.03570 -0.00199 .00004
1^ C .06406 0.03354 0.01937 -0.00 12 1 0.034 19 -0.0(164 .00004
2C 0.07835 0.03149 0.01611 -0.002 19 0.03264 -0.00170 .00003
21 0.07296 0.02952 0.01691 -0.00295 0.03107 -0.00156 .00003
22 0.06789 0.02762 0.01577 -0.00354 0.02949 -0.00 146 .00003
23 0.06313 C .02562 0.0 1469 -0.00397 0.02793 -0.00135 .00003
24 0.05665 0 .024 1 1 0.01366 -0.00426 0.02640 -0.00125 .00003
25 0.05446 0.02248 0.01273 -0.00448 0 . 02490 -0 .00 1 16 .00003
26 0.0505^ 0.02094 0.01163 -0.00460 0.02344 -0.00107 .00002
27 C .04686 0.01950 0.01099 -0.00465 0.02203 -0.0009 9 .00002
2E 0.04346 0.01813 0.01020 -0.00464 0.02068 -0.00091 .00002
29 0.04027 0.01665 0.00947 -0.00459 0 .0 1938 - C.00084 .00002
30 0.03730 0.01565 0.00678 -0.00450 0.01614 -0.00078 .00002
3 1 0.03453 0.01453 0.006 14 -0.00436 0.0 1696 -0.00072 .00002
32 0.03196 0.01346 0.00754 -0.00424 0.0 1584 -0.00066 .00002
2 3 0.02957 0.01250 0.00698 -0.00409 0.01476 -0.0006 1 .00002
34 0.02734 0.01156 0.00646 -0.00392 0.01376 -0.00056 .CCCC 1
35 0.0252E C .01073 0.00598 -0.00375 0.0 1264 -0.00052 .00001
36 0.02337 0 .00993 0.00553 -0.00357 0.0 1195 -0.00046 .0000 1
37 0.02159 0.009 19 0.00512 -0.00339 0.01111 -0.00044 .0000 1
38 0.0 1995 0 .0065 1 0.00473 -0.00321 0.0 1033 -0.00041 .0000 1
39 C.C 1842 0.00767 0.00437 -0.00304 C.00960 -0 .00036 .0000 1
40 0.0 170 1 0 .00 727 0.00404 -0.00266 0 .0 069 1 -C.00035 .00001
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T^E LE  ( 5 - 2 0
I M f P I E '  M L T I F L I E F S  FCP TEE E X C G E N C L S  V / I P W E L E
CE CE V  C CE C C I N C CE T IEEE CE FP RS CE L C A N S  C F E N C [ SC'T R
T/»L
L/!G
C .CC3 16 C . C C C E C C . C 2 C C C C .C  2 5 3 E C . C 1 2 7 C  C . 1 3 6 6 - .C 1 4C E
C C.C C . C C.C C . C 2 3 6 3 C.C C .16 92 .c
1 -C . C C C 4 6 C . C C C C C - C . C C C 1 2  C . C C 2 2 1 - C . C C 3 7 C  - C . C 2 •CC EC E
2 - C . C C C 7 3 C . C C C C l - C . C C C 6 7  C . C C 1 C 9 - C . C C 3 6 I  C . C C . C C 3 £ 3
1 - C . C C C 7 5 C . C C C C l - C . C C C 4 1  - C . C C C C 6 - C . C C 3 C 2  - C . C C .CC 27 6
4 - C . C C 0 6 3 C . C C C C 2 - C . C C C C 9  - C . C C C  14 - C . C C 199 C . C C . C C 1 7 9
5 - C . C C C 4 5 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C 2 C  - C . C C C 1 4 -C .CC ICE - C . C C .CC 1 13
6 - C . C C C 2 7 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C 4 3  - C . C C C I C - C . C C C 3 E  C . C C . C C C 6 9
7 - C . C C 0 1 2 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C 6  1 - C . C C C C E C . C C C I E  - C . C C . C C C 4 C
E C . C C C C l C . C C C C 2 C . C C C I E  - C . C C C C 6 C . C C C E E  - C . C C . C C C 2 2
9 C . C C O l  I C . C C C C 2 C . C C C E 4  - C . C C C C E C . C C C 6 2  - C . C C . C C C I C
IC C . C C C I E C . C C C C 2 C . C C C 6 9  - C . C C C C E C .CC ICC - C . C C . C C C C 3
1 1 C . C C 0 2 3 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C 9 2  - C . C C C C E C . C C l l C  - C . C C CC . C C C C 2
12 C . C C 0 2 6 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C 9 3  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C I I E  - C . C C CC . C C C C E
I 3 C . C C C 2 6 C . 0 C C C 2 C . C C C 9 3  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C I I E  - C . C C CC . C C C C 7
14 C . C C C 2 9 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C 9 1  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C I I E  - C . C C CC .CC CC E
15 C . C C 0 2 9 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C E 9  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C I I E  - C . C C CC . C C C C 9
16 C . C C 0 2 9 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C E E  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C 1 1 3  - C . C C CC .C C CC 9
17 C . C C C 2 6 C . C C C C 2 C . C C C E 2  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C 1 C 9  - C . C C CC . C C C C 9
IP C . C C G 2 7 C . C C C C l C . C C C I E  - C . C C C C 4 C . C C 1 C 4  - C . C C CC . C C C C 9
19 C . C C C 2 6 C . C C C C l C . C C C 7 4  - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C 9 9  - C . C C CC . C C C C 9
2C C . C C C 25 C . C C C C l C . C C C I C  - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C 9 4  - C . C C CC . C C C C E
21 C . C C C 2 4 C . C C C C l C . C C C 6 6  - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C 8  9 - C . C C CC .C C C C E
2 2 C . C C C 2 3 C . C C C C l C . C C C 6 3  - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C 6 4  - C . C C CC . C C C C E
23 C . C C 0 2  1 C . C C C C l C . C C C E 9  - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C 79 - C . C C CC . C C C C 7
24 C. C C C 2 C C . C C C C l C . C C C E E  - C . C C C C 3 C . C C C 7 E  - C . C C CC . C C C C 7
25 C . C C C 19 C . C C C C l C . C C C E 2  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C 7 C  - C . C C CC . C C C C E
26 C . C C G 1 6 C . C C C C l C . C C C 4 6  - C  . C C C C 2 C . C C C E E  - C . C C CC . C C C C E
27 C . C C O  11 C . C C C C l C . C C C 4 E  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C E I  - C . C C CC . C C C C E
26 C . C C C  16 C . C C C C  1 C . C C C 4 2  - C  . C C C C 2 C . C C C E 7  - C . C C CC . C C C C E
29 C . C C C I E C . C C C C l C . C C C 3 9  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C E 3  - C . C C CC . C C C C E
3C C . C C C  14 C . C C C C l C . C C C 3 7  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C E C  - C . C C CC . C C C C E
31 C . C C 0 1 3 C . C C C C l C . C C C 3 4  - C . C C C C 2 C . C C C 4 6  - C . C C CC . C C C C 4
32 C . C C C 1 2 C . C C C C l C . C C C 3 2  - C . C C C C l C . C C C 4 3  - C . C C CC .C C CC 4
33 C . C C C l  1 C . C C C C l C . C C C 3 C  - C . C C C C l C . C C C 4 C  - C . C C CC . C C C C 4
34 C . C C C I C C . C C C C l C . C C C 2 7  - C . C C C C l C . C C C 3 7  - C . C C CC . C C C C 3
■3 C C . C C C I C C . C C C C C C . C C C 2 6  - C . C C C C l C . C C C 3 E  - C . C C CC . C C C C 3
36 C . C C C C S C . C C C C C C . C C C 2 4  - C . C C C C l C . C C C 3 2  - C . C C CC . C C C C 3
37 C . C C C C E C . C C C C C C . C C C 2 2  - C . C C C C l C . C C C 3 C  - C . C C CC . C C C C 3
36 C . C C C C  E C . C C C C C C . C C C 2 C  - C . C C C C l C . C C C 2 6  - C . C C CC . C C C C 3
39 C . C C C C 7 C . C C C C C C . C C C 1 9  - C . C C C C l C . C C C 2 6  - C . C C CC . C C C C 2
4C C . C C C C l C . C C C C C C . C C C 17 - C . C C C C l C . C C C 2 4  - C . C C CC .CC CC 2
l8o
T/iELE ( 5 - 2 0
C C M  f M F C
I NTERI M M L T I P L I E R S FCP TFE EXCGENCLS V/ SRl / SELE E/ S l - F/S N
GNP C NCNCLP C CLP C R E S I C  F I NCNPES  I CF I NVEN 4 N CF F
1C1/ 5L
L/>G
C . 2 3 2 3 4 C .  C 7 5 1 S C . C 2 S 3 7 C . C 6 7 S 5 C . C 3 2 1 5  C . C C 7 6 7 - . C C C 2 5
C C. C C . C C . C C . C C . C  C . C . C
1 C . C C 5 3 C C . C C C 4 3 - C . C C  1 4 2 C . C C 4 5 7 - C . C C C S 3  C . C C 2 6 5 . CCCCC
2 C . C C 7 6 S C . C C C S 7 - C . C C  I S C C . C C 7 3 6 - C . C C 1 6 7  C . C C 3 1 3 - . C C C C 2
3 C . C C S C 4 C . C C 1 4 7 - C  . CC 1 6 6 C . C C E 7 6 - C . C C 2 C 6  C . C C 2 5 4 - . C C C C 3
4 C . C C S 4 4 C . C C 1 E 6 - C . C C l l C C . CCS  12 - C . C C 2 1 1  C . C C 1 6 7 - . C C C C 3
c C . C C 9 5 6 C . C C 2  17 - C  . C C C 4 5 C . C C E Ê 3 - C . C C I S 2  C . C C C S 3 - . C C C C 3
6 C . C C 9 5 6 C . C C 2 4 C C . CCC 14 C . CCE IE - C . C C I E E  C . C C C 4 2 - . C C C C 3
7 C . C C 9 5 C C . C C 2 5 7 C . C C C 6 2 C .  C C 7 3 6 - C . C C l l C  C . C C C I I - . C C C C 3
R C . C C 9 3 7 C . C C 2 6 6 c . c c c s e C . C C 6 5 C - C . C C C 7 3  - C . C C C C 7 - . C C C C 2
g C . C C 9 1 S C . C C 2 7 6 C . C C 1 2 4 C . C C 5 6 6 - C . C C C 3 C  - C . C C C I C - . C C C C 2
1C C . C C 8 S 6 C . C C 2 7 S C . C C 1 4 C C . C C 4 E 7 C . C C C I C  - C . C C C 2 C - . CC C C 2
11 C . C C 8 6 6 C . C C 2 7 S C . CC 15  1 C . CC4  15 C . C C C 4 5  - C . C C C 2 2 - . C C C C l
12 C . C C 8 3 1 C . C C 2 7 7 C . C C 1 5 6 C . C C 3 5  1 C . C C C 7 5  - C . C C C 2 2 - . CCCC 1
13 C . C C 8 C 3 C . C C 2 7 3 C . C C  1 5 7 C . C C 2 S 4 C . C C I C C  - C . C C C 2 1 - . C C C C l
14 C . C C 7 6 6 C . C C 2 6 7 C . C C  1 5 6 C . C C 2 4 4 C . C C 1 2 1  - C . C C C 2 C - . C C C C l
15 C . C C 7 3 1 C . C C 2 5 S C . C C  1 5 2 C . C C 2 C  1 C . C C 1 3  7 - C . C C C I E - . CCCCC
16 C . C C 6 S 4 C . C C 2 5 C C . C C  M 6 C. CC 1 6 4 C . C C 1 4 S  - C . C C C  17 - . CCCCC
17 Ç . C C 6 5 1 C . C C 2 4  1 C . C C  1 4 2 C . CC 1 3 3 C . CC 1 5 7  - C  . CCC 16 - . CCCCC
l e C . C C 6 2  1 C . C C 2 3  1 C . C C  1 3 6 C. CC 1C5 C . C C 1 6 3  - C . C C C I E - . CCCCC
I S C . C C 5 8 5 C . C C 2 2 C C . CC 1 3 C C . CCCE 3 C . CC 1 6 6  - C  . CCC H - . CCCCC
2C C . C C 5 5 C C . C C 2 1 C C . C C 1 2 3 C . C C C 6 3 C . C C  1 6 7  - C . C C C 13 - . CCCCC
21 C . C C 5  17 C . CC I PS C . C C  1 1 6 C . C C C 4 7 C . C C 1 6 6  - C . C C C 1 2 - . CCCCC
2 2 C . C C 4 6 5 C . C C 1 8 P C . C C  l i e C . C C C 3 3 C . C C 1 6 4  - C . C C C  11 . CCCCC
2 3 C . C C 4 5 ^ C . C C 1 7 C C . C C 1 ( 3 C . C C C 2 2 C . C C 1 6 C  - C . C C C I C . CCCCC
2 4 C . C C 4 2 4 C . C C 1 6 6 C . C C C S 7 C . C C C 1 3 C . C C 1 E 6  - C . C C C C S . CCCCC
2 5 C . C C 3 S 6 C . CC 1 5 6 C . C C C S  1 C . CCCC5 C . C C 1 5 1  - C . C C C C S . CCCCC
26 C . C C 3 7 C C . C C 1 4 6 C . C C C 6 5 - C . C C C C l C . C C 1 4 5  - C . C C C C E . CCCCC
2 7 C . C C 3 4 5 C . C C 1 3 S C . C C C E C - C . C C C C 6 C . C C 1 3 S  - C . C C C C 7 . CCCCC
2E C . C C 3 2  1 C. C C  1 3C C . C C C 7 4 - C  . C C C I C C. C C  1 3 3  - C  . CCCC7 . CCCCC
2S C . C C 2 S S C . C C I 2 2 C . C C C 6 S - C . C C C 1 3 C . C C 1 2 7  - C . C C C C 6 . CCCCC
3C C . C C 2 7 6 C . C C l  14 C . C C C 6 5 - C . C C C I 5 C . C C 1 2 1  - C . C C C C 6 . CCCCC
3 1 C . C C 2 5 E C . C C I C 6 C . C C C 6 C - C  . CCC 17 C . C C 1 1 4  - C . C C C C 6 . CCCCC
3 2 C . C C 2 4 C C . C C C S S C . C C C 5 6 - C . C C C I E C . C C 1 CE - C . C C C C 5 . CCCCC
3 3 C . C C 2 2 3 C . 0 C C S 2 C . C C C 5 2 - C . C C C  I S C . C C 1 C 2  - C . C C C C E . CCCCC
3 4 C . C C 2 C 7 C . C C C 6 6 C . C C C 4 E - C . C C C I S C . C C C S 6  - C . C C C C 4 . CCCCC
3 5 C . C C 1 9 2 C . C C C 6 C C . C C C 4 5 - C  . CCC IS C . C C C S C  - C . C C C C 4 . CCCCC
3 6 C . C C 1 7 6 C . C C C 7 4 C . C C C 4 2 - C  . CCC IS C . C C C 8 E  - C . C C C C 4 . CCCCC
3 7 C . C C 1 6 4 C . C C C 6 S C . C C C 3 S - C . C C C I S C . C C C 7 S  - C . C C C C 3 . CCCCC
3 6 C . C C 1 5 2 C . C C C 6 4 C . C C C 3 6 - C  . CCC IS C . C C C 7 4  - C . C C C C 3 . CCCCC
3S C . C C 1 4  1 C . C C C 5 S C . C C C 3 3 - C . C C C I E C . C C C 6 S  - C . C C C C 3 . CCCCC
AC C . C C 1 3 C C . C C C 5 5 C . C C C 3 1 - C . C C C  17 C . C C C 6 5  - C . C C C C 3 . CCCCC
181
T/SELE (E-21)
INTERIM NLLTIFLIEFE FCP TFE EXCGENCLS V/!R1/!ELE CFHPR — [
CF [EM C CF CC INC CF T INEC CF FP PS CF LC/SNS CPE M C [ SC'T P
TCT^L -[.[492^ -C.CC7E2 - C .211^4 -C. 3 5 55C -C. 15816 C . C442 .2 15 15
L/!G
C C.C C.C C.C -C.31132 C.C C . C63 1 .C
I C.CC632 - c , c c c c e  C.CC<;42 -C.C8634 C.C4E75 -C . C226 .C665 1
2 C.C1C76 -C.CCC 14 C.CICÉI -C.CI566 C.C5512 C . CC 16 .C62E 1
2 C.CII67 -C.CCC2C C.CCé'Ç -C.CCIEI C.C4E55 -C . CCC5 .C4555
4 C.CI013 -C.CCC25 C.CC214 C.CC2CC C.C3351 c . CCC4 .C3C2^
5 C.CC751 -C.CCC2E -C.CC24C C.CC215 C.C1E55 c . CCC2 .C15IE
6 C.CC47J - C . C C C 2 C  -C.CCCIE C.CC171 C.CC727 c . CCC2 .C1 175
7 C.CC215 -C.CCC2C -C.CC513 C .CC128 - C .CC15 2 c . CCI 1 .CC657
E C.CCCI 2 -C.CCC31 -C.C I 131 C.CC1C 1 -C.CC7E4 c . CGC 1 .CC3E7
9 -C.CC147 -C.CCC31 -C.C12E3 C.CCC86 - C . C 1 2 2 1 c . CCCl .CC 168
1C -C.CC263 -C.CCC31 -C.C13E1 C.CCC78 -C.C151 1 c . CCC 1 .CCCCC
11 -C.CC34E -C.CCC3C -C.C1435 C.CCC73 -C.C1652 c . CCCl - .CCC23
12 -C.CC35E -C.CCC25 - C . C 1455 C.CCC7C -C.C1753 c . CCCl - .CC C75
13 -C.CC431 -C.CCC25 - C . C 1445 C.CCC68 - C . C 1336 C. CCCl - .CC 1C7
14 -C.CC44E -C.CCC2E -C.C M 2 5 C.CCC66 -C.C1E35 c . CCCl - .CC 126
15 -C.CC453 -C.CCC26 -C.C13E7 C.CCC64 -C.C18I2 c . CCCl - .CC 136
16 -C.CC45C -C.CCC25 - C . C 1335 C.CCC62 -C.Cl 765 c . CCCl - .CC14 1
17 -0.CC441 -C.CCC24 -C.C12E5 C.CCC55 -C.C17C5 c. CCCl — .CC 14 1
18 -C.CC42E -C.0CC23 - C . C 1227 C .CCC57 - C . C 1636 C . CCC 1 - .CC 135
15 -C.CC412 -C.CCC22 - C . C 1167 C.CCC54 -C.C1561 c . CCCl - .CC 136
20 -C.CC354 -C.CCC2C -C.C11C6 C .CCC5 1 - C . C 1483 c . CCCl - .CC 13 1
21 -C.CC3Î6 - ( .CCC15 -C.C1C45 C.CCC48 -C.C14C5 c . CCC 1 - .CC 125
22 -C.CC356 -C.CCCIE -C.CC5E5 C.CCC46 -C.C 1326 c . CCCC - .CC115
23 -C.CC337 - C . C C C 17 -C.CC526 C.CCC43 - C . C 1245 C. CCCC — .CC 1 13
24 -C.CC31E -C.CCC16 -C.CCE7C C.CCC4C - C . C 1175 c . C CC C - .CC IC7
25 -C.CC255 - C.CCC15 - C . C C E 15 C.CCC3E -C.C11C2 c. CCC C — . C C I C I
26 -C.CC281 - C .CCC14 -C.CC763 C.CCC36 -C.C1C33 c . CCC C - .CCC55
27 -C.CC263 - C .CCC13 - C . C C 7 14 C.CCC33 -C.CC566 c . C CC C — .CCC85
28 -0.CC247 - C . C C C 12 -C.CC666 C.CCC31 -C.CC5C3 c . C CC C — .CCC83
25 -C.CC23C -C.CCCII -C.CC622 C.CCC25 -C.CC843 c. C CC C - .CCC78
3C -C.CC215 -C.CCCII -C.CC515 C.CCC27 -C.CC7E6 c . CCCC - .CCC 73
31 -C.CC2C1 -C.CCCIC -C.CC535 C.CCC25 -C.CC732 c . CCCC - .CCC6E
32 -C.CCIE7 -C.CCCC5 -C.CC5C2 C.CCC24 -C.CC681 c . CCCC - .CCC63
33 -C.CC174 -C.CCCC5 -C.CC467 C.CCC22 -C.CC634 c . CCCC - .CCC55
34 -C.CC162 -C.CCCC8 -C.CC434 C.CCC2C -C.CC585 c . CCCC — .CCC55
35 -C.CC151 -C.CCCC7 -C.CC4C3 C.CCC15 -C.CC547 c. CCCC - .CCC51
36 -C.CC14C -C.CCCC? -C.CC374 C.CCCIE -C.CC5CE c. CCCC - .CCC47
37 -C.CC13C -C.CCCCC -C.CC347 C.CCC16 - C . C C 4 7 1 c . CCCC - .CCC44
38 -C.CC121 -C.CCCC6 - C . C C 3 2 1 C.CCC15 -C.CC437 c. CCCC - .CCC4 1
35 -C.CCl12 -C.CCCC5 -C.CC258 C.CCC14 -C.CC4C5 c. CCCC - .CCC3E
4C -C.CCIC4 -C.CCCC5 -C.CC216 C.CCC13 -C.CC375 c . CCCC - .CCC35
182
I f ei E (5-21)
C C M  I N LE C
I N TE R lY M L T I P L I E P S  FCR TEE E X C G E N C L S  V f R I f E L E C E R P R - T C
GNP C NCNCLP C CLR G RESIC FI NCNRES I C h  INVEN f
TCTfL - 2 . 6 2 4 IC -1.I72S2 -C.45E21 -1.3 7184 -0.50154 -0.11960 .00385
LfG
C C.C C.C C.C 0 .0 0.0 0.0 .0
1 -C.C6SE6 -C.CC572 C.C1E65 -0.06 16 0.01224 -C .C 34 86 - .00000
2 -C.1167E -C.C13E6 C.C2f4E -0.10 99 C.02425 -0.04765 .00023
3 - C . 13824 -C.C2166 C.C26T4 -0.13 4 7 0.03117 - C .04102 .00040
4 - C . 1463 1 -C.C2E 12 C.C1E59 -0.14 48 0.03279 -0 .02809 .00048
5 -C. 14884 -C .033 14 C.CCE5E -0.13 40 0.(3040 -0.0 1627 .00(49
6 - C . 14915 -C.C36S2 -C.CCCEC -0.12 12 C.02546 -0 .00 7 7 8 .00047
7 -C.1483C - C .03967 -C.CCE53 -0.11 84 0.01917 -0.00243 .00042
8 -0.14651 -C.C4159 -0.01^42 -0 . 10 54 0.0 1238 0.00066 .00036
9 -0.1^363 - C . C 4 2 E 1 -C.C1E65 -0.09 35 0.00569 C .00229 .CC030
10 -C . 1403/: -0 .04345 -C .02 M 9 -0.07 91 -0.00055 0.00306 .00025
11 -0.13613 -0.04358 -C.02324 -0.06 51 -0.006 13 C .00334 .0002 I
12 -C. 1 3 135 -0 .04 3 30 -C. 0 2 4 1 6 -0.05 29 -0.01095 0 .00336 .000 16
13 -0.12614 -0.04267 -0.C2447 -0.04 24 -0.01501 0.00325 .000 13
14 -C. 1206 3 -0 .04 1 75 -0 .02432 -0.03 32 -0.0 183 1 0.00308 .000 10
15 -C. 1 1494 -C.C4C6C -C.C23P6 -0.03 45 -0.02092 C .00289 .00CC8
16 -0.1C9I6 - C .03928 -0.023 16 -0.02 52 -0 .0229 1 C . 00270 .00006
17 -0.10341 -C.037E2 -0.02232 -0.02 44 -0.02434 C .002 5 1 .00004
IE -0.09770 -0.03626 -0.02137 -0.0 1 11 -0.02530 0.00233 .00003
19 -0.09211 -0.03464 -0.C2C37 -C.C 1 4 3 -0.02584 C .002 16 .00002
20 -0.0F667 -0.03299 -0.01934 -0.0 1 32 -0.02604 0 .0020 1 .00001
21 -0.08142 -0.03 132 -C.01E30 -0.00 71 -0.02595 0.00186 .00000
22 -0.07636 -O.C29c6 - C . C 1727 -0 .00 53 -C.C2562 C.CC173 - .CCOCC
23 -0.0715 1 - C.02803 - C . 01626 -0.0 0 72 -0.02511 0.00 160 - .00001
24 -0.06689 -0.02642 -0.01528 -0.00 23 -0.02445 0 .00 M 9 - .0000 1
25 -0.06250 -C.C24E7 -0.01433 -C.CC CC -0.C2367 C.CC 138 - .CCCC 1
26 -0.05833 -0.02337 -0.0 1342 -C.CC 0 1 -0 . 022 8 1 C. 00128 - .00001
27 -0.05439 - C .02 192 - C.01255 0 .00 79 -0.02189 0.00118 - .00002
28 -0.05067 -0.02053 -C .01172 c . c o 43 -C.02093 C . 001 10 - .00002
29 -0 .04716 -0 .0 192 1 -0 .0 1094 0.00 92 -0.01995 0.00 102 - .00002
30 -0.04387 -0.01795 -0.01020 0.00 30 -0.01895 C .00094 - .00002
31 -0.04077 -0.01676 -0.(0950 0.00 58 -0.0 1796 0.00087 - .00002
32 -0 . 03787 - C . 0 1563 -C.CCEE4 0.00 78 -0.01698 0.00080 - .00002
33 -0.03516 -0.0 1456 -0.00822 0.00 9 1 -0.0 1603 C.000 74 - .0000 1
34 -0.03262 -0.01356 -0.00764 C.CC 98 -0.0 150 9 C.00 069 - .0000 1
35 -0.03025 -0 .0 126 1 -0 .007 10 0.00 0 1 -0.01419 0.00064 — .0000 1
36 -0.02804 -0.01172 -0.00659 0.00 Cl - C . O 1332 0.00059 - .00001
37 -0.02598 -0.01089 -0.00611 0.00 97 -0.01249 0.00054 - .0000 1
38 -0.02406 -0 .0 1C 1 1 -0 .00566 0 . 0 0 9 1 -0.0 1169 0.00050 - .0000 1
39 -0.02227 -0.00938 -0.00525 c . c o 83 -0.01093 C .C0046 - . 0 0 0 0  I
40 -0.02061 -0.00870 -0.00486 0 . 0 0 74 -0 .0 1 02 1 0 . 0 0 0 / 3 - . 0 0 0 0  1
N CE F
183
Tf ELE (5-22)
INTERIM M L T I P L I E P S FCP TEE EXCGENCLS I£EL E EXCC EXF
CE [EM r CE cc^^c CE TIEEC CE FF PS CE LC£NS CFEN M C C ISC' 7 R
TC7£L C. 1 304 4 C .CC72 1 C.3E451 -C.C1732 C.51122 - C.CCC15 C .C4 2 3 2
LA C
C C .CC265 C .CCC55 C . C C M l  -C.CCCEI C.C2C75 -C.CCCCl C.C
I C.C1145 0 .00C73 C.C785E - C . C C 178 C.C7E47 -C.CCCC2 C.CC38C
2 C . C H 6 C C .CCC57 C.C3675 - C . C C 164 C.C4556 -C.CCCC2 C.CC34C
2 C . C 1025 C . C C C 4 7 C.C2515 -C.CC13E C.C3515 -C.CCCCl C.CC31C
4 C .CC885 C .CCC4C C.C2C53 -C.CCl 15 C.C256E -C.CCCCl C .CC2E3
c C.CC774 C . C C C 3 5 C.CIE47 -C.CCC57 C.C2555 -C.CCCCl C .CC256
6 C .CC68C C .CCC3 1 C.C165E -C.CCCË4 C.C2313 -C.CCCCl C.CC23 1
7 C .CC6C4 C .CCC2E C .C1455 -C.CCC74 C.C2C75 -C.CCCCl C .CC2CE
E C.CC54 1 C.CCC25 C.C1362 -C.CCC66 C.C1E82 -C.CCCCl C.CC1E7
q C.CC4E6 C .CCC23 C.C1242 -C.CCC6C C.C1711 -C.CCCCl C.CC 165
1C C.CC443 C .CCC2 1 C.C1136 -C.CCC54 C.C 1 56 2 -C .CCCCl C .CC 153
11 C .CC4C3 C .CCC 15 C.C1C42 -C.CCC45 C . C 1425 -C.CCCCl C .CC135
12 C .CC36E C.CCCIE C.CC557 -C.CCC45 C . C 13IC -C.CCCCC C.CC 127
13 C.CC3 3 7 C .CCC 16 C.CCE75 -C.CCC42 C.C 12C3 -C.CCCCC C.CC116
14 C.CC31C C .CCC 15 C.CCEC5 -C.CCC3E C.C11C6 -C.CCCCC C .CC 1C6
1 5 C . C C 2 8 A C .CCC 14 C.CC745 -C.CCC35 C.C 1C IE -C.CCCCC C .CCC57
16 C .CC262 C . C C C 13 C.CC6E6 -C.CCC32 C.CC537 -C.CCCCC C .CCC85
17 C .CC24 1 C.CCC12 C.CC632 -C.CCC3C C .CCE63 -C.CCCCC C.CCC82
IE C .CC222 C.CCC I 1 C.CC5E3 -C.CCC2E C.CC755 -C.CCCCC C .CCC76
19 C.CC2C4 C.CCCIC C.CC537 -C.CCC25 C.CC733 -C.CCCCC C.CCC7C
2C C.CCIEE C .CCCC5 C.CC455 -C.CCC23 C.CC675 -C.CCCCC C.CCC64
2 1 C.CC173 C.CCCCE C.CC456 -C.CCC22 C.CC622 -C.CCCCC C.CCC55
2 2 C .CCI6C C.CCCCE C.CC421 -C.CCC2C C.CC574 -C.CCCCC C .CCC54
23 C.CCI47 C.CCCC7 C.CC3E8 -C.CCCIE C.CC525 -C.CCCCC C.CCCEC
24 C.CC 136 C .CCC C7 C.CC357 -C.CCC17 C.CC4E7 -C.CCCCC C .CCC46
25 C.CC125 C .CCCC6 C.CC 2 25 -C.CCC 16 C.CC445 -C.CCCCC C.CCC43
26 C.CCIIE C.CCCC6 C.CC3C4 -C.CCC 14 G .CC4 14 -C.CCCCC C .CCC35
27 C .CCIC6 C .CCCC5 C.CC2EC -C.CCC13 C.CC3EI -C.CCCCC C.CCC36
28 C.CCG5E C .CCCCE C.CC25E -C.CCC12 C.CC352 -C.CCCCC C.CCC33
25 C.CCC5C C .CCCC4 C.CC23E -C.CCCl 1 C.CC324 -C.CCCCC C.CCC31
3C C.CC0E3 C .CCCC4 C .CC2 15 -C.CCCIC C.CC2 5E -C.CCCCC C .CCC2E
31 C.CCC77 C .GCCC4 C.CG2C2 -C.CCCIC G.CC275 -C.CCCCC C.CCC26
32 C .CCC7 1 C.CCCC3 C.CC1E6 -C.CCCC5 C.CC253 -C.CCCCC C.CCC24
33 C.CCC65 C .CCCC3 C.CC171 -C.CCCCE C.CC233 -C.CCCCC C.CCC22
34 C. CCC6C C .CCCC3 C.CCIEE -C.CCCC7 C .CC2 15 -C.CCCCC C .CCC2C
o c C.CCC55 C.CCCC3 C.CC145 -C.CCCC7 C.CC15E -C.CCCCC C .CCC 15
36 C.CCC5 1 C .CCCC2 C .CC134 -C.CCCC6 C . C C 182 -C.CCCCC C.CCC 17
37 C.CCC47 C.CCCC2 C.CC123 -C.GCCC6 O.CC 168 -C.CCCCC C.CCC 16
3E C.CCC43 C.CCCC2 C.CC113 -C.CCCC5 C . C C 155 -C.CCCCC C.CCCIE
35 C.CCC4C C .CCCC2 C.CCIC4 -C.CCCC5 C.CC 142 -C.CCCCC C.CCC 14
4C C.CCC3 1 C.CCCC2 C.CCC56 -C.CCCCE C . C C 131 -C.CCCCC C .CCC 12
184
I f E L E  ( 5 - 2 2 )
C C h  T f M E C
INTERIM MLLTIPLIFRS FCP TFE EXCGENCLS VtfP U e L E EXCG E F
CNP C NCNCLF C CLR G PES 1C F 1 NCNPES I CF INVEN /S N CF F
TC
L^G
3.345CC 1.CE537 0.672E3 -0.26487 0.9400 1 -0.08834 .00090
C 1 . 1 528C C .09457 0.06787 C.C 0.00522 - C . O 1486 .00(0 1
I C . 15617 C .08346 0.07092 -0.00341 0.03574 -0.0 3053 .0000 1
2 C. 15714 C .0 7 5 24 0.05741 -0.00598 0.04269 -0.0 2 2 2 .00(02
3 C. 14962 C . C 6 E 4 9 0.04668 -0.00791 0.04573 -0.0 337 .00003
4 C . 1384£ C .06252 0.03930 -0.00931 0.04681 -0.0 (EE .00004
5 C . 1269 I 0 .057 12 0.03407 -0.01028 0.04666 -0.0 067 .00004
6 C. 11619 C .0 5 2 2 1 0.03012 -0.0 1087 0.04570 -0.0 097 .00004
7 C. 1C65C C .047 75 0.026 9 8 -0.01118 0.04420 -0.0 125 .00(04
e C.C977E 0 .043 7 0 0 .02437 -0 . 0 1 12 5 0.042 38 -0.0 142 .00C04
q C.C8989 C.040 0 3 0.02215 -0.0 1116 0.04035 -0.0 147 .00004
1C C.CF272 C .03669 0 .0202 1 -0 .0 109 3 0.0382 1 -0.0 146 .00(0^
11 C.C761E C.0 33 6 7 0.01849 -C.C1C61 0.03604 -0.0 14 1 .00004
12 C.C7C19 f .0 30 9 1 0.0 1696 -0.01023 0.(3388 -0.0 134 .00(04
13 C.C6469 0 .0284 1 0.0 1 558 -0 .00980 0.03176 -0.0 126 .C0C03
14 C.C5963 0 .026 1 2 0.0 1432 -0.00935 0.02971 -0.0 117 .00003
15 C.C5497 0.02403 0.013 18 -0.00888 0.02774 -0.0 1(9 .00003
16 C.C5068 C .022 1 1 0 .0 1 2 1 3 -0 .0084 1 0.02586 -0.0 10 1 .00003
17 C.G46 7 3 0.02036 0.0 1118 -0.00794 0.02408 -0.0 094 .00003
18 C.C43C9 0.01875 0.01030 -0.00748 0 .0 22 39 -0 .0 ( E7 .00002
19 C.C3973 0.0 1727 0.00949 -0.00703 0.02080 -0.0 CEO .00002
2C C.C3662 0.0 159 1 O.OOE7 5 -0.00660 0.01931 -0.0 0 74 .00002
21 C.C3376 0.0 1466 0 .00 806 -0 .006 1 8 0.01791 -0.0 068 .00002
22 C . C 3 U 2 0.0135 1 0.00743 -0.00578 0.01660 -0.0 063 .00002
23 C .02869 C .0 1245 0.00685 -0.00540 0.(1537 -0.( 058 .00002
24 C.C2644 0.01147 0.00631 -0.00504 0.01423 -0.0 (53 .00002
25 C.C24 37 0.01057 0.005E2 -0.00470 0.01317 -0.0 049 .0000 1
26 C.C2246 C .00974 C.00 536 -0 .00 4 38 0 .0 12 IE -0.0 045 .00001
27 C.C2C7C 0.00898 0.00494 -0.00407 0.0 1127 -0 .0 042 .0000 1
28 C.C 1CC7 0.00827 0.00455 -0.00379 0.01041 -0.0 038 .00001
29 C . C 1757 0.00762 0.00420 -0.00352 0.00962 -0.0 035 .COCCI
3C C.C 1619 0.00702 0.00387 -0.00327 0.00889 -C.C 033 .COCCI
31 C.C149 1 0.00647 0.00356 -0.00303 0.0082 1 -O.C (30 .COCCI
32 C.C1373 0.00596 0.00328 -0,00281 0.0075E -0.0 028 .0000 1
■a 3 C.C1265 0.00549 0.00302 -0.00261 0.00700 -0.0 025 .0000 1
34 C.C1165 0 .00506 0.00279 -0.00242 0.00646 -0.0 023 .0000 1
■a c C.C 1073 0 .00466 0.00257 -0.00224 0 .00596 -0 .0 022 .COCCI
36 C.CC98E 0.00429 0.00236 -0.00207 0.00550 -C.C 020 .OCCCl
37 C.CC91C 0 .00396 0 .002 18 -0 .00 192 O.CO507 -0.0 0 18 .0000 1
38 C.CC83E 0.00364 0.00200 -0 .CO 177 0.00467 -0.0 017 .0000 1
39 C.CC772 0.00336 0.00185 -0.00)64 0.0(43 1 -0.0 0 15 .00000
4C C.CC71C 0.00309 0.00170 -0.00 152 0.00397 -0.0 0 14 .00(00
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l/îELE (5-23)
I M E P  lY M L T  IPL lEPS FCR ThE EXCGENCL5 \./5Rl/!ELE FtF V- 1
Ch CEM r Ch CCI^C Ch T I M E  CF FF RS Ch IC/ShS CPEh h CISC'T R
TCT/SL
L/SG
C.I337C C .CC5 l l C. 29 5 24 -C .C 1582 C.4CC32 -C .CCC 1 C.C3226
C C .C176C C .CCCC9 C.CC673 -C.CC1C8 C . C 1192 -C.CCCC C.C
1 C.C1C97 C .CCC 15 C .C 1331 -C .CCI 16 C .C 1 796 -C .CCCC C.CCC5E
2 C.CC7E3 C.CCC 19 C.CI421 -C.CCICC C.C 1 8 8 7 -C.CCCC C.CCCC8
3 C.CC62P C .CCC2 1 C.C141 1 -C.CCC86 C.C1E7 9 -C.CCCC C .CC123
4 C.CC54E C . C C C 2 3 C . C 1385 -C.CCC75 C.C184 7 -C.CCCC C.CC 136
C C.CC5C3 C .CCC23 C . C 1352 -C.CCC68 C.C 18C5 -C.CCCC C .CC 142
e C.CC475 C .CCC23 C.CI313 -C.CCC64 C.C1754 -C.CCCC C.CC 144
7 G.CC453 C .CCC23 C.C1269 -C.CCC6C C.C1696 -C.CCCC C .CC 143
e C .CC434 C .CCC22 C.C 12 19 -C .CCC57 C . C 1632 -C.CCCC C.CC14C
<3 C.CC416 C .GGC2 1 C.C 1 167 -C .CCC54 C.C1564 -C.CCCC C.CC 136
1C C.CC39E C.CCC2C C.C 11 12 -C .CCC52 C.C1492 -C.CCCC C.CC131
11 C.CC38C C .CGC 19 C.C1C56 -C.CCC49 C .C142C -C.CCCC C.CC 126
12 C.CC36 1 C.CCCIE C .C ICC l -C .CCC46 C .C 1 3 46 -C.CCCC C.CC 12C
13 C.CC343 C.CCC 17 C.CC945 -C.CCC44 C.C1273 -C.CCCC C .CC 114
14 C.CC324 C .CCC 16 C .CC89 1 -C .CCC4 l C.C 12C2 -C.CCCC C.CC 1C8
15 C.CC3C6 C .CCC 15 C.CC838 -C.CCC39 C . C 1131 -C.CCCC C.CC1C2
16 C.CC289 C .CCC 14 C.CC787 -C.CCC37 C.C 1C63 -C.CCCC C .CCC97
17 C.CC271 C .CCC 14 C.CC738 -C.CCC34 C.CC998 -C.CCCC C .CCC9 1
le C .CC255 C .CCC 13 C.CC691 -C.CCC32 C.CC935 -C.CCCC C .CCC86
19 0.CC239 C .CCC 12 C.CC646 -C.CCC3C C.CC8 7^ -C.CCCC C.CCCSC
2C C.CC223 C .CCC 1 1 C.CC6C3 -C.CCC28 C.CCE17 -C.CCCC C.CCC75
2 I C.CC2C9 C.CCCIC C.CC563 -C.CCC26 C.CC763 -C.CCCC C .CCC7C
22 C .CC195 c .CCCIC C.CC524 -C.CCC25 C.CC711 -C.CCCC C.CCC66
23 C.CC182 c  .CCCC9 C.CC488 -C.CCC23 C.CC662 -C.CCCC C.CCC6 1
24 C .CC169 C.CCCCE C.CC454 -C.CCC2 1 C.CC616 -C.CCCC C.CCC57
25 C.CC15E C .cccce C.CC422 -C.0CC2C C .CC 5 7 3 -C.CCCC C .CCC53
26 C . C Cl 4 7 C.CCCC7 C.CC392 -C.CCC18 C.CC533 -C.CCCC C .CCC5C
27 C.CCl 36 c .CCCC7 C.CC364 -C .CCC17 C.CC495 -C.CCCC C.CCC46
2G C.CC12? c  .CCCC6 C.CC338 -C.CCC16 G.CC459 -C .CCCC C.CCC43
29 C.CCllE c .CCCC6 C.CC313 -C.CCC15 C.CC426 -C.CCCC C .CCC4C
3C C.CCIC9 C .CCCC5 C.CC291 -C. CCC14 C.CC395 -C.CCCC C.CCC37
3 1 C.CCICI C .CCCC5 C.CC269 -C.CCC13 C.CC366 -C.CCCC C.CCC34
32 C.CCC94 C .CCCC5 C.CC249 -C.CCC12 C.CC339 -C.CCCC C .CCC32
33 C.CCC87 C .CCCC4 C.CC23 1 -C.CCC 1 1 C.CC314 -C.CCCC C .CCC29
34 C. CCC8C C.CCCC4 C.CC214 -C.CCCIC C.CC291 -C.CCCC C .CCC27
35 C.CCC74 C .CCCC4 C .CC 198 -C.CCCCS C.CC269 -C.CCCC C .CCC25
36 C.CCC69 C .CCCC3 C.CC183 -C.0CCC9 C.CC24 9 -C.CCCC C .CCC23
37 C.CCC64 C.CCCC3 C.CC 169 -C.CCCCE C.CC23C -C.CCCC C.CCC22
33 C.CC059 C .CCCC3 C.CC156 -C.CCCC7 C.CC212 -C.CCCC C.CCC2C
39 C.CC054 C.CCCCl C.CC144 -C.CCCC7 C .CC196 -C.CCCC C .CCCIE
4C C.CC05C C.CCCC2 C.C C 133 -C.CCCC6 C.CC181 -C.CCCC C.CCC17
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TABLE (5-2:
C C M  I M E C
I M E P I M  M L T I P L I E P S FCP TFE EXCGENCLS VAFIAELE FEPN V- 1
G^P C NCNCLP C CUP C FES IC FI NCNFES 1 CF INVEN ANN CF F
TC7AL
LAG
2.371C2 C . 76937 C.5C5EC C.46CCC 0.72 144 -0.06559 0 .0 0 06 6
C C . 1C952 C .CCB98 0.0 109? 0.09509 0.00299 -0.00651 C.OOOCO
I C . I 1199 C.C159C 0.0 1E26 0 . 0609 1 0.00609 -0.01117 0 .0 0000
2 C . 1 14 4 6 C .C2 1 27 0.02 173 0 .C664C 0.01257 -0.0095 1 ( .0 0 000
3 C . 1 15C3 C.C2532 C.02312 0.05747 0.0 1626 -0.007 17 0 .0000 1
4 C . 11362 C .02824 0.02247 0.04 799 0.0 1927 -O.C0535 C.CCOC 1c C .11C74 C .03C IB 0.C2327 0 .C39 82 0 .0 2 1 63 -C.CC4 16 C .COCCI
6 C . 1C69C C.C3132 0.02276 0.(3260 0.02342 -0.00340 0 .00002
7 C. IC24E C.C3 16 1 0 . C 2 2 C 7 0.02660 0 .024 72 -C. 0029 2 0.CCCO2
B C . C97 74 C.C3 17B C.C2126 0.02 170 0.02559 -O.CC256 0.00002
q C . C 9 2 B 4 C .03 136 C.C2C37 0.0 1736 0.02609 -0.00234 0.00002
1C C.CB79C C .C3C64 0.0 1944 0.0 1369 0.02627 -0.002 14 0.(0002
11 C.CE3CC C.C2971 0.0 1649 0.0 1059 0.(2619 -0.0019 6 0.00002
12 C.C7819 C .C2B6 I 0.C1753 0.00799 0.02569 -0.00163 0.00002
13 C.C7351 C.C274 1 C.01657 0 .0056 1 0.0254 1 -0.00 169 0.00002
14 C . C 6 e 9 9 C .02614 C . C 1563 0.0040 1 0.02479 -0.00157 0.00002
15 C.C6465 0.02463 0.01471 0 .0025 1 0.02405 -0.00 146 0.00002
16 C.C6049 C.C2352 C . 0 1 3 6 2 0.00128 0.02322 -0.00135 0 .00002
17 C .C5653 C.C2221 0.0 1297 0.00026 0.02233 -0.00125 0.00002
IB C.C527? C .02093 0.0 12 14 -0 .0 00 5 3 0.02140 -0.00116 0.00002
19 C. C49? 1 C.01967 O.Ol 136 -0.00 1 18 0.02043 -0.00107 0.00002
2C C .C4565 C .C1646 C .C 1061 -0.00 169 0.01946 -0.00099 0.00002
2 1 C.C426B C .C 1730 0.00990 -0 .00208 0.0 1646 -0.00092 0 .0000 2
22 C.C3969 C .016 IF 0.CC923 -0.00237 0.01750 -0.00065 0.00002
23 C.C3689 C.C1512 C.CCE60 -0 .00256 0.0 1655 -0.00079 0.CCCO2
24 C.C342? C.C141I c.ccecc -0 .00272 0 .0 156 1 -0 .000 73 0.00002
25 C.C318 1 C.01315 0.CC744 -0.00261 0.01470 -0.00067 0 .00002
26 C.C295 ! C .01225 C.CC69 1 -0.00265 0 .C 1 3 6 3 -0 .0 0 0 6 2 0.00001
27 C.C2736 C.C1 140 0.00642 -0.00286 0.01296 -0.00057 0.0000 1
2B C.C2536 C .C 1C6C C.CC596 -0.00263 0.01217 -0.00053 0.00001
29 C.C2349 C.CC9B4 0.00553 -0 .002 79 0.0 1140 -0.00049 0.00001
3C C.C2115 C.CC9 14 C.CC5 12 -0 .002 72 0.01066 -0.00045 0.0000 1
31 C.C2G13 C .00646 0.00475 -0.00264 0.00996 -0.00042 0.00001
22 C.C 1863 C.CC767 C.CC44C -0.00254 0.00929 - C .00039 0 .0000 1
33 C.C1723 C.CC729 C.CC4C7 -0.00244 0.00667 -0.00036 0 .0000 1
34 O.C 1593 C .00676 0.00377 -0.00234 0.00607 -0.00033 O.COOC 13 c C . C 1473 C.CC626 0.00349 -0.00223 0 .00752 -C.000 30 O.CCOC 1
36 C.C1361 O.CC579 0.00322 -0.00212 0.00699 -0.00026 0.00001
37 C.C 125? C.CC536 0.00296 -C .0020 1 0.00650 -0.00026 O.CCOC 1
38 C.C 116 1 0 .CC496 0.CC275 -C.CO 190 0.00604 -0.00024 0.OCCCl
39 C .C 1C72 0 .CC45F 0.00255 -0.00 179 0.00561 -0.00022 0 .0000 1
4C C.CC99C C .00424 0.00235 -0.00 169 0.00520 -0.00020 0 .0000 1
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I f E L E  ( 5- 2 4 1
I N T E R I M  M L T I F L I F P 5  FCR TFE E X C G E N C L S  V/SPI/SELE V E N T -  1
TCTAL
L/IG
C
1
2
3
4
c
6
7
f
9
1C
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18 
19 
2C 
21 
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 
29 
3C 
3 1
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39 
4C
CF CEV C CF CriNC CF II NEC CF FF RS CF LC^NS C 
-C.3499E - C .01245 -C.ECE27 C.C5641 -1,37233
C3983 
C38 7C 
C32C4 
C26CE 
C2151 
CI81 I 
C 1555 
C 1359 
C12C4 
C1C79 
C .CC975 
C.CC887 
C.CCPl l 
C.CC743 
C.CC683 
C.CC629 
C.CC579 
C.CC534 
.CC493 
CC455 
CC42C 
CC3EE 
CC358 
CC33C 
C.CC3C5 
C.CC281 
C.CC259 
C.CC239 
C.CC221 
C.CC2C4 
C.CC18E 
C.CC173 
C.CC159 
C.CC147 
C.CC135 
C.CC125 
C.CC115 
C.CCICC 
C.CC096 
C.CCC9C 
C.CC083
C
•C , 
■C.
■c,
•c,
•c,
c.CCC6 I 
C.CCC79 
c .CCCE 1 
C.CCC78 
C.CCC73 
C.CCCCE 
C .CCC62 
.CCC57 
.CCC53 
.CCC49 
.CCC45 
.CGC4 1 
.CCC38 
C.CCC35 
C .CCC33 
C.CCC3C 
C .CCC2E 
C .CCC26 
C .CCC24 
.CCC22 
.CCC2C 
.CCC 19 
.CCC 17 
.CCC16 
C.CCC 15 
C .CCC 14 
C .CCC13 
C.CCC12 
C.CCCl 1 
C.CCCIC 
C .CCCC9 
C.CCCCE 
C.CCCCE 
C . C C C C l  
C . C C C C l  
C.CCCCC 
c .0CCC6 
c .CCCC5 
C .CCCC5 
C .CCCC4 
C .CCCC4
C
•C,
•C,
■C
c,
.C5936 
,C86C3 
C7C63 
C572C 
C4EC 1 
-C.C4 154 
-C.C36 7 1 
-C.C3292 
-C.C29E 1 
-C .C27 18 
-C.C24E9 
-C.C22E7 
-C.C21C5 
-C.C194C 
-C .C 179C 
-C.C1652 
-C.C1525 
-C.C 14C8 
-C.C13CC 
-C.C 12CC 
-C.C 1 1C8 
-C.C IC23 
-C .CC944 
-C.CCE71 
-C.CCEC4 
-C.CG742 
-C.CC684 
-C.CC631 
-C.CC5E2 
-C.CC536 
-C.CC495 
-C.CC456 
-C.CC42C 
-C.CC387 
-C.CC357 
-C.CC329 
-C.CC3C3 
-C.CC279 
-C.CC257 
-C.CC23? 
-C.CC2 18
C.C 1196 
C.CCE57 
C.CC556 
C.CC382 
C .CC285 
C.CC227 
C .CC 19C 
C.CC 164 
C .CC 145 
C.CC 13 1 
C .CC 1 19 
C.CC1C8 
C.CCICC 
C .CCC92 
C.CCC84 
C.CCC78 
C.CCC 72 
C.CCC66 
C .CCC6 1 
C.CCC57 
C.CCC52 
C .CCC48 
C .CCC45 
C .CCC4 1 
C.CCC38 
C.CCC35 
C .CCC32 
C . C C C 3 C 
C.CCC2E 
C .CCC25 
C.CCC23 
C .CCC22 
C.CCC2C 
C.CCCIE 
C.CCC17 
C.CCC 16 
C .CCC 14 
C.CCC 13 
C.CCC 12 
C.CCC 1 1 
C.CCCIC
- C . C 5 12
C C 9 3 2
C [
6 1 -
f
E 
6 
A
■3
2 
2 
2 
2
SC'T R 
. C E 9 9 7 
.C
.CC^E 1 
.CC65E 
.CC6E 1 
.CC642 
.CC5E4 
.CC523 
.C0467 
.CC41E 
.CC376 
.CC339 
.CC3CE 
.CC2EC 
.CC256 
.CC235 
.CC215 
.CC 198 
.CC 182 
.CC16E 
. C C 155 
.CC 143 
.CC 132 
.CC 122 
.CC 112 
.CC 1C4 
.CCC96 
.CCC8E 
.CCCE I 
.CCC75 
.CCC69 
.CCC6^ 
.CCC59 
.CCC54 
.CCC5C 
.CCC46 
.CCC42 
.CCC39 
.CCC36 
.CCC33 
.CCC3 1 
.CCC2E
188
1/SBLE (5-2^)
C C M  I M E C
I M E S i y  M L T I P L I E P S  FC P TEE E X C G E N C L S  V/!RI/!ELE I N V EN T-  I
CNP C NCNCLF 0 CLR 0 FES 1C F I NCNF E S  1 OF I NVEN N CF F
TCT/ ! L - 5 . 7 1 1  12  - I . E  1 2 1 5  
L/iG
-  I . 5 3 4 0 6 0 . 5 6 3 1 1 - 2 . 3 3 4 2 8 - 0 . 5 5 3  11 - . 0 0  1 8 5
C - C . 7 1 3 3 C  - C . C 5 E 5 2 - 0 . 1 1 5 5 6 0 . 0 - 0 . 0 7 1 1 * - 0 . 4 0 1 6 5 - . 0 0 0 0  1
1 - C . 4 E 8 E 6  - C . C 8 3 6 2 - c . 1 6 2 1 8 0 . 0 0 4 3 3 - 0 . 1 0 8  14 - 0 . 1 3 8 4 5 - . 0 0 0 0 1
2 - C . 3 5 6 2 C  - 0 . 0 5 5 1 2 - c . 1 3  1 3 4 0 . 0 0 5 6 2 - 0 . 1 1 5 6 1 - 0 . 0 55  6 5 - . 0 0 0 0 3
3 - 0 . 3 4 2 4 5  - C . 0 5 5 1 6 - 0 . 1 0 6 5 0 0 . 0 1 4 3 6 - 0 . 1 2 3 0 6 - 0 . 0 2 8  13 - . 0 0 0 0 5
4 - C . 3 0 4 5 0  - C . 0 5 5  10 - 0 . 0 8 8 8 6 0 . 0  1 8 0 1 - 0 . 1 2 2  1* — 0 . 0 2 8 1 - . 0 0 0 0 6
5 - C . 2 1 5 8  I - 0 . 0 5 6 6 7 - 0 . 0 7 6  15 0 . 0 2 0 7 2 - 0 . 1 1 8  75 - 0 . 0 4 5 3 - . 0 0 0 0 8
6 - 0 . 2 5 1 8 6  - 0 . C 5 2 E 5 - 0 . 0 6 6 1 6 0 . 0 2 2 4 5 - 0 . 1 1 3 5 2 - C . C 0 1 4 - . 0 0 0 0 8
1 - 0 . 2 3 1 2 1  - O . C E 6 2 E -  0 . 0 5 5 4 3 0 . 0  2 3 4  2 - 0  .  1 0 8 3 1 0 . 0 1 * 2 - . 0 0 0 0 5
8 - 0 . 2 1 3 C 5  - 0 . C 8 3 5 I - 0 . 0 5 3 5  1 0 . 0 2 3 8 2 - 0  .  1 0 2 3 3 0  . 0 2 4 5 - . 0 0 0 0 5
5 - C .  1 5 6 6 2  - C . 0 1 8 5 3 -  0 . 0 4 8 5 8 0 . 0 2 3 1 1 - 0 . 0 5 6 2 5 0 . 0 2 5 6 - . 0 0 0 0 5
10  - 0 . 1 8 1 6 3  - 0 . 0 7 3 5 8 - 0 . 0 4 4 3 4 0 . 0 2 3 4 1 - 0 . 0 5 0 2 3 0 . 0 3 1 1 - . 0 0 0 0 8
11 - 0 . 1 6 7 8 6  - 0 . 0 6 8 1 5 -  0 . 0 4 0 6 3 0 . 0 2 2 8  1 - 0 . 0 8 4 3 1 0 . 0 3 0 5 - . 0 0 0 0 8
1 2  - 0 . 1 5 5 1 6  - 0 . 0 6 4 IC - c . 0 3 1 3 4 0 . 0 2 2 0 5 - 0 . 0 1 8 1 5 C . C 2 5 8 - . 0 0 0 0 8
13  - 0 . 1 4 3 4 2  - 0 . 0 5 5 6 6 - 0 . 0 3 4 3 7 0 . 0 2 1 1 5 - 0 . 0 1 3 3 5 C . C 2 8 2 - . 0 0 0 0 7
14  - 0 . 1 3 2 5 5  - 0 . 0 5 5 4 6 -  0 . 0 3  1 6 1 0 . 0 2 0 2 5 - 0 . 0 6 8 3 1 0 . 0 2 6 4 - . 0 0 0 0 7
1 5  - 0 . 1 2 2 4 8  - 0 . 0 5 1 4 5 - 0 . 0 2 5 2 1 0 . 0  1 5 2 8 - 0 . 0 6 3 5 3 0 . 0 2 4 7 - . 0 0 0 0 7
16 - 0 . 1 1 3 1 6  - 0 . 0 4 7 1 6 -  0 . 0 2 6 5 5 C . 0  1 8 2 5 - 0 . 0 5 5 0 2 0 . 0 2 2 5 - . 0 0 0 0 6
17 - 0 . 1 0 4 5 2  - C . 0 4 * 2 6 -  0 . 0 2 4 8 8 0 . 0 1 7 3 0 - 0 . 0 5 4 8 0 0 . 0 2 12 - . 0 0 0 0 6
1 8  - 0  . 0 5 6 5 2  - C . 0 4 0 5 5 - 0 . 0 2 2 5 7 0 . 0  1 6 3 3 - 0 . 0 5 0 8 5 0 . 0 1 5 6 - . 0 0 0 0 5
15 - 0 . C 8 5 1  I - C . 0 3 7 5 4 - 0 . 0 2  1 2 0 0 . 0  1 5 3 7 - C  .  0 4  7 16 C . 0 1 8 1 - . 0 0 0 0 5
2 0  - 0 . 0 8 2 2 6  - 0 . 0 3 5 1 0 -  0 . 0 1 5 5 7 0 . 0  1 4 4 5 - 0 . 0 4 3 1 1 0 . 0 1 6 7 - . 0 0 0 0 5
2 1  - 0 . 0  1 5 5  I - C . 0 3 2 4 6 - 0 . 0 1 8 0 6 C . C  1 3 5 6 - 0 . 0 4 0 5 0 0 . 0 1 5 4 - . 0 0 0 0 4
2 2  - 0 . 0 1 0 0 5  - 0 . 0 3 0 0 0 -  0 . 0  1 6 6 1 0 . 0 1 2 1 1 - 0 . 0 3 7 5 1 0 . 0 1 4 2 - . 0 0 0 0 4
2 3  - 0 . 0 6 4 6 2  - 0 . 0 2 7 1 2 - 0 . 0  1 5 3 5 0 . 0  1 1 8 5 - 0 . 0 3 4 1 2 0 . 0 1 3 1 - . 0 0 0 0 4
2 4  - 0 . 0 5 5 6  1 - 0  . 0 2 5 6 0 - 0 . 0 1 * 2 0 0 . 0 1 1 1 1 - 0 . 0 3 2  13 0 . 0 12 1 - . 0 0 0 0 3
2 5  - 0 . 0 5 4 5 7  - C . 0 2 3 6 4 - 0 . 0 1 3 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 3 8 - 0 . 0 2 5 7 3 0 . 0 1 1 1 - . 0 0 0 0 3
2 6  - 0 . 0 5 0 6 5  - 0 . 0 2 1 8 3 -c . 0 1 2 0 8 0 . 0 0 5 6  8 - 0  . 0  2 7 4 5 0 . 0 1 0 3 - . 0 0 0 0 3
2 7  - 0 . 0 4 6 1 4  - 0 , 0 2 0  14 - 0 . 0 1 1 1 4 0 . 0 0 5 0 2 - 0 . 0 2 5 4 2 C . C 0 5 5 - . 0 0 0 0 3
2 8  - 0  . 0 4 3 0 5  - 0  . 0  1 8 5 s - 0 . 0  1 0 2 7 0 . 0 0 8 4 0 - 0 . 0 2 3 5 0 0 . 0 0 8 7 - . 0 0 0 0 3
2 5  - 0  .  0 3 5 7 2  - 0  . 0  1 7  15 - 0 . 0 0 5 4 1 C . 0 0 7 8  1 - 0 . 0 2 1 7 1 0 . 0 0 8 0 - . 0 0 0 0 2
3 0  - 0  .  0 3 6 6 0  - 0 . 0  1 5 8 2 - 0 . 0 0 8 1 3 0 . 0 0 1 2 1 - 0 . 0 2 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 7 4 - . 0 0 0 0 2
3 1  - 0 . 0 3 3 7 3  - 0 . 0 1 4 5 5 - 0 . 0 0 8 0 5 0 . 0 0 6 1 5 - 0 . 0 1 8 5 3 C . C 0 6 8 - . 0 0 0 0 2
3 2  - 0 . 0 3 1 0 8  - 0 . 0 1 3 4 5 - 0 . 0 0 1 4 2 0 . 0 0 6 2 7 - 0 . 0 1 7 1 1 0 . 0 0 6 3 - . 0 0 0 0 2
3 3  - 0 . 0 2 8 6 4  - C . 0 1 2 4 0 - 0 . 0 0 6 8 4 0 . 0 0 5 8 2 - 0 . 0 1 5 1 5 0 . 0 0 5 8 - . 0 0 0 0 2
3 4  - 0  . 0 2 6 3 8  - C . O l  1 4 3 - 0 . 0 0 6 3 0 C . 0 0  5 4 0 - 0 . 0  1 4 5 8 C . O 0 5 3 - . 0 0 0 0 2
3 5  - 0 . 0 2 4 3 1  - 0 . 0 1 0 5 4 - 0 . 0 0 5 8 1 0 . 0 0 5 0 0 - C . O  1 3 4 6 0 . 0 0 4 5 - . 0 0 0 0 1
3 6  - 0 . 0 2 2 3 5  - 0 . 0 0 5 1 1 -  0 . 0 0 5 3 5 0 . 0 0 4 6 4 - 0 . 0  1 2 4 2 0 . 0 0 4 5 - . 0 0 0 0  1
3 7  - 0 . 0 2 0 6 2  - 0 . 0 0 8 5 5 - 0 . 0 0 4 5 3 0 . 0 0 4 2 5 - 0 . 0  1 1 4 5 C . O 0 *  1 - . 0 0 0 0  1
3 8  - 0  .  0 1 8 5 5  - 0  . 0 0 8 2 4 -  C . 0 0 4 5 4 0 . 0 0 3 5 8 - 0 . 0 1 0 5 1 0 . 0 0 3 8 - . OCOO 1
3 5  - 0 . 0 1 7 4 5  - 0 . 0 0 7 6 0 -0 . 0 0 4 1 8 0 . 0 0 3 6 8 - 0 . 0 0 5 1 4 0.0 0 3 5 - . 0 0 0 0 1
4 0  - 0 . 0 1 6 1  I - 0  . 0 0 7 0 0 -0 . 0 0 3 8 5 0 . 0 0 3 4  1 - 0 . 0 0 8 5 5 0.0 0 3 2 - . COCO 1
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T/!ELE (5-25}
I NTERI M M L T I P L I E P S FCP TEE EXCGENCLS V/ >RI ^ELE C F f C - 1
CE [ EM C CE CCI NC CE T I M E  CE FP RS CE LC/ JNS CPEN C [ S C ' T  P
I C l ^ L
L/>G
C . 2 2 9 1 9 0 . 0 1 0 6 2 0 . 6 1 6 0 3  - 0 . 0 3 3  10 0 . 6 9 6 4 3  - 0 . 0 0 36 . 0 6 6 0 3
C C . C C 7 3 6 C . 0 0 0 2 9 0 . 0  1 0 9 6  - 0  . 0 0  2 2  1 0 . 0 5 6 7 6  - 0 . 0 0 03 . 0
1 C . C l l 8 C 0 . 0 0 0 4 8 0 . 0 3 4 1 9  - 0 . 0 0 2 7 0 0 . 0 6 3  16 - 0 . 0 0 03 . 0 0  1 5 5
2 0 . 0 1 3 3 5 0 . 0 0 0 5 7 0 . 0 3 9 7 3  - 0 . 0 0 2 4 9 0 . 0 5 6 2 6  - C . C C 0 3 . 0 0 2 7 2
3 C . 0 1 3 4  1 0 . 0 0 0 6 0 0 . 0 3 6 7  1 - 0 . 0 0 2 1 6 0 . 0 5 2  9 2 - 0 . 0 0 02 . 0 0 3 3 7
4 C . C 1 2 6 T 0 . 0 0 0 5 9 0 . 0 3 6 0 5  - 0 . 0 0 1 8 8 0 . 0 4 6 4 3  - C . 0 0 0 2 . 0 0 3 6 3
5 C . C 1 2 1 1 0 . 0 0 0 5 7 0 . 0 3 3 2 6  - 0 . 0 0 1 6 6 0 . 0 4 4 6 7  - C . C O 0 2 . C C 3 6 7
t C . C 1 1 3 2 0 . 0 0 0 5 4 0 . 0 3 0  7 6  - 0  . 0 0  1 5 0 0 . 0 4  1 4 3  - 0 . 0 0 02 . 0 0 3 5 6
1 C . C 1 0 5 6 0 . 0 0 0 5  1 0 . 0 2 6 5 5  - 0 . 0 0 1 3 7 0 . 0 3 8 5 3  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 C 3 4 3
P C . C C 9 8 5 0 . 0 0 0 4 8 0 . 0 2 6 5 5  - 0 . 0 0  1 2 6 0 . 0 3 5 9 0  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 3 2 5
S C . C C 9 1 6 0 . 0 0 0 4 5 0 . 0 2 4 7 2  - 0 . 0 0 1 1 7 0 . 0 3 3 4 6  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 3 0 6
1C C . C C 8 5 6 0 . 0 0 0 4 2 0 . 0 2 3 0 2  - 0 . 0 0  1 0 6 0 . 0 3 1 1 9  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 2  6 7
11 0 . C C 7 9 6 0 . 0 0 0 3 9 0 . 0 2  1 4 3  - 0 . 0 0 1 0  1 0 . 0 2 9 0 6  - C . O C 0 1 . 0 0 2 6 9
12 C . C C 7 4 3 C . 0 0 0 3  7 0 . 0 1 9 9 5  - 0 . 0 0 0 9 4 0 . 0 2 7 0 6  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 5  1
13 C . C C 6 9 2 0 . 0 0 0 3 4 0 . 0 1 6 5 6  - 0 . 0 0 0 6 7 0 . 0 2 5 1 6  - C . O O 0 1 . 0 0 2 3 4
14 0 . C C 6 4 4 0 . 0 0 0 3 2 0 . 0  1 7 2 5  - 0 . 0 0 0 8  1 0 . 0 2 3 4 2  - O . C C 01 . C 0 2  16
15 C . C C 5 9 9 0 . 0 0 0 2 9 0 . 0 1 6 0 2  - 0 . 0 0 0 7 5 0 . 0 2 1 7 6  - C . O C 01 . 0 0 2 0 3
16 C . C C 5 5 7 0 . 0 0 0 2 7 0 . 0 1 4 6 7  - 0 . 0 0 0 7 0 0 . 0 2 0 2 1  - 0 . 0 0 01 . 0 0  1 8 9
17 C . C C 5 1 7 0 . 0 0 0 2 5 0 . 0 1 3 8 0  - 0 . 0 0 0 6 5 0 . 0 1 6 7 5  - O . C C 0 1 . 0 0  1 7 5
16 C . C C 4 6 C C . 0 0 0  2 3 0 . 0  1 2 7 9  - 0 . 0 0 0 6 0 0 . 0 1 7  3 9  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0  1 6 3
19 0 . C C 4 4 5 0 . 0 0 0 2 2 0 . 0  1 1 8 6  - 0 . 0 0 0 5 6 0 . 0  16 12  - 0 . 0 0 01 . 0 0  15 1
2C C . C C 4 1 3 0 . 0 0 0  20 0 . 0 1 0 9 6  - 0 . 0 0 0 5 2 0 . 0  1 4 9  3 - 0  . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0  1 4 0
2 1 C . C C 3 6 3 0 . 0 0 0 1 9 0 . 0 1 0 1 6  - 0 . 0 0 0 4 6 0 . 0 1 3 6 3  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0  1 3 0
2 2 C . 0 0 3 5 4 0 . 0 0 0  17 0 . 0 0 9 4 1  - 0 . 0 0 0 4 4 0 . 0  1 2 6 0  - 0 . 0 0 00 . 0 0  1 2 0
23 0 . 0 C 3 2 E 0 . 0 0 0 1 6 0 . 0 0 6 7 0  - 0 . 0 0 0 4 1 0 . 0 1 1 8 4  - 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 1
2 4 C . C C 3 C 3 0 . 0 0 0 1 5 0 . 0 0 6 0 4  - 0 . 0 0 0 3 8 0 . 0 1 0  9 5 - 0 . 0 0 00 . 0 0  1 0 3
25 0 . 0 0 2 8 1 C . 0 0 0  14 0 . 0 0 7 4 3  - 0 . 0 0 0 3 5 0 . 0  10  12  - 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 9 5
26 0 . 0 0 2 5 9 0 . 0 0 0  13 0 . 0 0 6 6 ?  - 0  . 0 0 0 3 2 0 .  0 0 9 3 5  - C . C C CC . 0 0 0 8 6
2 7 0 . 0 0 2 4 0 0 . 0 0 0  12 0 . 0 0 6 3 5  - 0 . 0 0 0 3 0 0 . 0 0 6 6 ^  - C . O C 0 0 . 0 0 0 6 1
2 6 0 . 0 0 2 2 2 0 . 0 0 0  1 1 0 . 0 0 5 6 6  - C . 0 0 0 2 8 C . 0 C 7 9 P  - C . C C 0 0 . 0 0 0 7 5
2 9 0 . 0 0 2 0 5 0 . 0 0 0  10 0 . 0 0 5 4 1  - 0 . 0 0 0 2 6 0 . 0 0 7 3 7  - 0 . 0 0 CO . 0 0 0 7 0
3 0 0 . 0 0 1 8 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 9 C . 0 C 4 9 9  - C . C C C 2 4 0 . 0 0 6 8 0  - C . O C CO . 0 0 0 6 4
3 1 0 . 0 0 1 1 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 4 6 1  - 0 . 0 0 0 2 2 0 . 0 0 6 2 6  - 0 . 0 0 CO . 0 0 0 5 9
3 2 0 . 0 0 1 6 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 4 2 5  - 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 0 . 0 0 5 7 9  - C . O C 0 0 . 0 0 0 5 5
3 3 0 . 0 0 1 4 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 3 9 2  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 9 0 . 0 0 5 3 5  - O . C C CC . 0 0 0 5  1
3 4 0 . 0 0 1 3 7 0 . 0 0 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 3 6 2  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 7 0 . 0 0 4 9 3  - 0 . 0 0 CO . 0 0 0 4 7
3 5 0 . 0 0 1 2 7 C . 0 0 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 3 3 4  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 6 0 . 0 0 4 5 5  - 0 . 0 0 CC . 0 0 0 4 3
3 6 0 . 0 0 1 1 7 0 . 0 0 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 3 0 6  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 5 0 . 0 0 4 1 9  - 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 4 0
3 7 C . O O l O F C . C C C C 5 0 . 0 0 2 6 4  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 3 0 . 0 0 3 8 7  - 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 3 7
3 8 C . 0 0 C 9 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 5 0 . 0 0 2 6 1  - 0 . 0 0 0 1 2 0 . 0 0 3 5 6  - O . C O CO . 0 0 0 3 4
3 9 0 .  0 0 0 9  1 0 . 0 0 0 0 4 0 . 0 0 2 4 1  - O . O C C l l 0 . 0 0 3 2 9  - C . O C 0 0 . 0 0 0 3  1
4 0 0 . 0 0 0 6 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 4 0 . 0 0 2 2 2  - 0 . 0 ( 0 1 1 0 . 0 0 3 0 3  - 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 2 9
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C C M  I M E C
I N T E R I M  M L T I P L I E P E  fCR TEE E X C G E N C L S  V /! P I/! E L E (fFfC - 1
GNP C NCNCLP C CLP C PES IC F I NCNPFS I CE INVFN /! N CE F
TCTAL
L^G
5.C 17C5 1.62797 1.34745 -0.42577 2 .4940 5 -0 .0 2664 .00 143
C C.3411Ç 0.02799 0.18536 0.0 0.16642 -0.04057 .00000
1 C. 3 5295 0.04986 0.12123 -0.00139 0.15666 0.02459 .00000
2 C. 3 26 32 0.064(2 0.09 164 -0.00363 0.14946 0.02461 .0000 1
3 C.2 9724 0.0722 1 0 . 076 1 0 -0 .006 1 4 0.14027 0.01480 .00002
4 C. 2 72 1 5 0 .076 2 6 0.06645 -0.00652 0.13122 0.00673 .00003
5 C. 2 5097 0.07757 0.05976 -0.01060 0.12254 0.00 167 .00004
6 C. 2 326 1 0.07704 0.05469 -0.0 1230 0.11433 -0.00115 .00005
7 C .2 162 1 0.07530 0.05050 -0.0 1362 0.10663 -0.00259 .00005
0 C.2C12 1 0.07276 0.04665 -0.0 1459 0.09942 -0.00323 .00005
<; C . 1 67 3 C 0.06973 0.04357 -0.01525 0.09270 -0.00345 .00006
ic C. 1 743C 0.06640 0.04055 -0.01564 0.06642 -0.00344 .00006
11 C . 16212 0.06291 0.037 7 6 -0.01561 0.06057 -0.00 3 31 .00006
12 C. 15C66 0.05937 0.03514 -0.01579 0.07510 -0.00313 .00006
13 C . 13995 0.05564 0.03269 -0.0 1563 0.06996 -0.00293 .00006
14 C . 1299C 0.05238 0.03039 -0.0 1534 0.06520 -0.00273 .00005
15 C .12049 C.04902 0.02623 -0.01496 0.06072 -0.00253 ,00005
16 C. H  169 0.045 79 0.0262 1 -0.0 145 1 0.05653 -0.00234 .00005
17 C.IC34E 0.0427 1 0.02432 -0.01400 0.0526 1 -0.002 16 .00005
le 0.09582 0.03977 0.02256 -0.01345 0.04694 -0.00200 .00005
19 0.08869 C .03699 0.02090 -0.01266 0.04551 -0.00164 .00004
2C 0.06205 0.03436 0.01936 -0.01229 0.04230 -0.00 170 .00004
21 0.C758E 0.0319 1 0.017 9 3 -0.01169 0.03930 -0.00157 ,00004
22 0.07015 0.02960 0.01659 -0.0 1109 0.03650 -0,00145 .00004
23 0.06483 0.02744 0.01535 -0.0 1050 0.03366 -0,00133 .00003
24 C .05990 0.02542 0.0 14 19 -0.0099 1 0.03 144 -0.00 123 .00003
25 0.05533 C.02353 C.0 1 3 12 -0 .009 35 0.029 16 -0.00 113 .00003
26 0.05109 0.02171 0.01212 -0.00660 0.02 7 03 -0.00105 .00003
27 0.04716 0 .020 14 0 . 0 1 1 2 0 -0 .00 6 26 0.02 5 05 -0.00096 ,00003
26 0.0^353 0.0 1662 0.01034 -0.00775 0.02321 -0.000 69 .00002
29 0.04017 0.0 1721 0.00955 -0.0072 7 0 . 0 2 149 -0 .0 0 0 62 .00002
3C C.03706 0.0 1590 0.00662 -0.00660 0.01990 -0.00075 .00002
3 1 0.03419 0.0 1469 0.006 14 -0.00636 0.0 1641 -0.00069 .00002
32 0.03153 0.01356 0.00751 -0.00593 0.0 1704 -0.00064 .00002
33 0.02906 0.01252 0.00693 -0.00554 0.01576 -0.00059 .00002
34 0 . 0 266 1 0.01155 0.00639 -0.005 16 0.01457 -0.00054 .00002
35 0.02472 0.01066 0.005 69 -0.0046 1 0.01347 -0,00050 .0000 1
36 0.02276 0.00964 0.00543 -0.00447 0.0 1245 -0.00046 .0000 1
37 0.02100 0.00907 0.00501 -0.00416 0.01150 -0.00042 .00001
36 C .0 1935 0 .008 37 0.00462 -0.00366 0.01062 -0.00039 .0000 1
39 0.01763 0.00771 0.00426 -0.00359 0.0098 1 -0.00036 ,00001
4C 0.01643 0.00711 0.00392 -0.00333 0.00906 -0.00033 .00001
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Dynamic Structural Response Patterns of the Model 
In the following discussion of the multiplier results from the 
model, primary emphasis will he given to the dynamic effects of a sus­
tained unit change in one of the exogenous variables on the components 
of the money supply and other monetary sector variables. The effects 
on the "real" sector income components and on the rate of price change, 
while not necessarily secondary in the Fed's analysis of the economy, 
are considered secondary here because of the primary orientation of the 
model and this analysis. An exception to this latter statement is 
necessary because of the apparent (often) undue amount of emphasis 
given to the level and change in the level of income. The level and 
time path of income will, for this reason, receive more emphasis than 
the other real sector elements.
The effects of some of the "exogenous" variables will be excluded 
from the discussion— principally the lagged levels of DD, CC, TO, FR 
and I^. The reason for this exclusion is that these variables are not 
truly exogenous. They enter directly into determining the amount of 
change in the current period that was experienced by DD, CC, TD, FR and 
I^. They were only considered "exogenous" in this analysis because their 
associated change variables (current and lagged) were the endogenous 
variables. The total exclusion of these "exogenous" variables would 
have had little, if any, effect on the overall result being analyzed. 
Much the same argument could be made for exclusion of the current level 
of loans and the current change in the level of income. But their 
inclusion was regarded as necessary because of the part they play in the 
Fed's decision-making process.
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Before entering the analysis proper, one more point must be
brought out. Occasionally a group of interim multipliers have a sign
which is not, a priori, expected. The occurrence of this can be explained
mathematically. For example, in Table (5-IO), the impact multiplier of
a unit change in the level of loans has a slight but positive effect on
ADD. The first period multiplier, however, is negative:
ADD è (DD^ - DD^_^)
= -.01679
This tells us that:
è™t-i ^
h L 3 L
or that:
This means that the influence of the previous period so "overpowers" the 
current period effect, that the endogenous variable appears to be over­
correcting for the previous period's level. This might also be observed 
to be a "cyclic" effect.
From Table (5-IO) it can be seen that the sustained impact of a 
unit (one billion dollar) increase in loans has little immediate effect 
on demand deposits. The multiplier effects for the subsequent four 
quarters appear to reflect the act of paying back the loan. However, 
the residual effect of this continued increase eventually results in a 
sixty-two and one-half million dollar increase in DD. Apparently 
changes in coin and currency are little affected. Nor is the level of 
time deposits except for the first period which may also reflect a large
193
amount of loan repayment. So also could repayment account for several 
quarters of positive additions to free reserves. It seems that the 
reaction of open market operations and of the discount rate are delayed 
one period— perhaps an adjustment period. When they do reflect this change, 
though, OMO is only slightly altered; after the first period, the impact 
on the discount rate decays rapidly.
GWP reflects a substantial growth with the peak, impact coming in 
the first period. This is a result of the one-period lag in the impact 
of a change in loans on the level of residential construction. Overall 
it appears that, because of income growth, a positive impact on changes 
in free reserves, and a not too inflationary impact on other things, a 
change in loans of this magnitude would not occasion any overt OMO to 
offset undesirable trends. Nor would it tighten the economy to the extent 
that the Fed would have to move significantly to restrict the flow of 
loanable funds (through raising the discount rate).
Table (5-H) reflects the multiplier effects of a unit change in 
the quarterly level of income change. As should be expected, the 
increased level of income change would raise the desire— demand— for 
more DD, CC, TD, and loans. The combination of all these increased 
demands would lower the level of "free" reserves. Apparently the 
increased loan demand would eventually lead to Federal Reserve action.
This action would seem to come as a result of a desire to limit the 
further expansion of loans and diminution of the level of free reserves.
Note should be taken of two interesting development in the real sector 
variables. First, the initial impact of this change seems to be to spur 
long-term investment and consumption. But, it seems that the continuation
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of this percentage increase soon becomes evident. Shortly thereafter, 
the level of nondurable consumption reaches a peak. Secondly, it seems 
that housing, as a result of this increase, soon gets "over-built." As 
a result, investment in this area must decline. Again the Federal 
Reserve appears to be relatively unconcerned about this type of growth.
The multipliers of the proxy representing the expected rate of 
income increase in the next period are presented in Table (5-12). A 
one percent increase in this expected rate appears to lead to a reduced 
demand for demand deposits, time deposits, and loans. Whether this 
reflects a lessened degree of uncertainty, an improved ability to "match" 
income flows, or some other factor or combination of factors, the initial 
impact on free reserves is to "free" a large amount of these reserves. 
Part of this comes from the impact effect on open market operations; the 
Fed substantially increases OMO to take up part of the slack, thus pro­
viding reserves in anticipation of this increase. Apparently, however, 
the Fed sees itself as overreacting and, for several subsequent periods, 
successively alternates policy positions in an attempt to correct for 
previous errors. It also seems that the ability to "forecast" this 
increase, together with the improved free reserve position, allows for an 
easing of the discount rate. The prospect of this increase in the next 
period evidently has only a minimal effect on the real sector variables. 
It thus appears that this increased expectation has significant effects 
only upon variables directly related to the Federal Reserve.
Table (5-13) contains the multipliers that evolve from a sus­
tained increase of one percent in the rate of worker productivity.
Whether the increase results from increased effort, more efficient
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production, improved technology, or some other factor or grouping of 
factors, the primary influence of this change is thought to be reflected 
by increased output. And, at the next level, increased income. The 
magnitudes of the total and quarterly multipliers bear this out. As 
expected, if the distribution of this increased income goes to the workers 
and other factors of production, this would be mirrored by increased 
consumption, particularly of nondurables and services, and by further 
investment in plant and equipment. On the monetary side, this increased 
activity should lead to an additional demand for loans (both consumer 
and industrial)— reflected both by increases in AL and r^— and a decline 
in the level of free— an increase in the level of borrowed— reserves.
Wot quite as expected were the rather large multipliers for the effects 
on changes in time deposits.
One noticeable feature of this increased productivity is the 
effect on, and the multipliers for, the annual rate of change in prices. 
Apparently the increased availability of goods leads to a negative price 
change multiplier which is decaying but remaining negative. If this is 
the case, it might serve as an empirical justification for tentatively 
accepting either a "demand-pull" or an expected rate of wage increase 
type of theory concerning price level advances. In any case, it appears 
that the Fed would prefer to use discount rate adjustments rather than a 
significant shift in open market policy to adjust for this change.
As mentioned before, it appears that the Federal Reserve has 
tended to support a significant term structure of interest rates. This 
is a measure of the difference between the levels of the long-term and 
the short-term rate of interest. This supposition seems to be upheld in
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terms of the multipliers (Table (5-1^)). It appears that the Fed 
initially reduces its level of purchases in response to a one percent 
increase in the level of the term structure. But for some reason it 
appears to over-compensate. It, therefore, spends the next few quarters 
trying to correct, by continually overreacting, for past mistakes. The 
multipliers for free reserves also reflect the decline in the level of 
OMO (a reduction in the provision of additional reserves).
The multipliers for a one percent change in the level of the 
short-term interest rate— as measured by the Treasury bill rate— are 
presented in Table (5-15)• These multipliers contain some interesting 
conclusions. The reduction in the demand for each of the money supply 
components and for bank loans is by far the largest, in terms of the 
multipliers, during the current period. Obviously the lagged effects 
have at least some ameliorating effect on these levels in successive 
periods. As a result of this, the multiplier for free reserves is 
(except initially) positive. Open market operations move initially to 
"mop-up" some of these excess reserves and, thereafter, make oniy small, 
positive additions to bank reserves. The discount rate, as expected, 
initially follows the increase in the short-term rate; surprisingly, 
however, it follows without a lag. The effect of the sustained short­
term rate increase erodes rather rapidly. After eight quarters, the 
discount rate appears to respond to other influences; perhaps it just 
considers the continued short-term rate increase as a given.
It also appears that the effect on income of this change is 
delayed. Actually, almost all of the initial income multiplier increase 
results from a positive, extremely large multiplier for inventory change
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and a much smaller one for nondurable consumption. The trend of the 
income and multipliers, however, are quickly reversed. It is unex­
pected that the inventory change multipliers should continue to be posi­
tive. Also of interest are the rather small total and interim multi­
pliers for the effects on the annual rate of change in prices. In terms 
of recent (late I960's - early I970's) experience, one might expect 
larger price multipliers than observed here.
The multipliers for an increase in the level of the long-term 
interest rate. Table (5-I6), differ markedly from those of the short­
term rate. With the exception of GNP and I^^, it took almost one year 
for the multipliers of the other endogenous variables to reach their 
peaks. Apparently a unit change in the level of the long-term interest 
rate is acceptable to the monetary policy authorities and the economy 
as a whole; at least no immediate, negative reaction is observed. Whereas 
the short-term interest rate is often considered as a cost factor— the 
cost of capital, cost of holding liquid assets, and/or cost of operation 
of a business (all "negative" levels)— it appears that the long-term 
rate may frequently serve as a proxy for the level of potential invest­
ment return. If possible, this intuitive hypothesis seems to be borne 
out by the multiplier results.
It takes between four to six quarters for the multipliers of the 
money supply components and the change in bank loans to reach a peak.
This is also reflected in the free reserve multiplier. These multipliers 
decay quite slowly. This would seem to indicate that the demand for 
these components could be relatively more interest-elastic than has been 
shown previously in this paper. This result, however, does not invalidate
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the prior proposals that these components are interest-inelastic with 
respect to interest rate changes. It only implies that perhaps these 
components are not as interest-inelastic as previously observed. In 
terms of the monetary sector variables, it is again seen that the Fed 
does not seem inclined to alter OMO policy sufficiently to offset this 
interest rate rise. The multiplier effect on the discount rate is also 
quite interesting— the multipliers do not peak until the seventh quarter. 
Also, there exists at least a one quarter lag before any effect is felt 
at all.
As mentioned, the role of proxy for the expected level of invest­
ment return is well reflected in the multipliers of the real sector 
variables. The impact multipliers for income and nonresidential invest­
ment are large and are at their peak levels during the current period.
This might be interpreted in one of two ways. Either this sizeable 
effect is misleading because of the potential developments in the D.agged 
variables which have not yet had time to have their effect, or the mag­
nitude of these multipliers at least partially substantiates the proxy 
role. Nondurable and durable consumption multipliers peak laler. Thir; 
reflects, at least to some degree, the continued advancement of income.
The negative multipliers of residential investment can easily be explained. 
To the group of investors in this market, an advance in the long-term 
rate represents an increase in the cost of financing the purchase, con­
struction, or selling of a house. As was the case with the short-term 
rate, the very small multipliers for the annual price change variable were 
quite unexpected.
Since balance of payments problems can be explained in terms of
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either an unfavorable trade balance or an unfavorable international 
liquidity position, the negative multipliers for the major money supply 
component(s) and the lack of effect on the demand for coin and currency 
can be attributed to the latter case. It appears, however, that the 
negative effects of a continued balance of payments problem are soon 
dissipated and the existence of this problem is merely tolerated. 
Apparently, the demand for loans, as illustrated by the multiplier, 
declines early. But it seems that this demand soon becomes accustomed 
to the continuation of this problem and resumes a more normal increase. 
The early decline, in part at least, reflects the reduced availability 
of funds for capital investment because of the outflow of funds for 
international investment.
Open market operations, as expected, react to this problem by 
providing additional reserves to a market experiencing an outflow of 
funds. The large free reserve multiplier also reflects this. As usual, 
the Fed is seen to overreact in its provision of reserves through open 
market operations. And it spends the next several periods continually 
trying to compensate for this error. This is also reflected in the 
multipliers. The negative discount rate multipliers are generally unex­
pected. One would think that with market rates rising in an attempt to 
re-attract investment funds or to reflect an absence of ••loanable funds, 
the discount rate would follow suit. But the signs of the multipliers 
would indicate that perhaps the rate declined in an effort to increase 
the attractiveness of loans.
The multiplier effects on the real sector variables are under­
standably small. Although income continues to increase, the effect of 
the unit increase in the level of the balance of payments problem on
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income is rather small. This reflects, perhaps, a general lack of stimu­
lation in production. The negative multipliers of the price change 
variable are quite unexpected. If they had been significantly larger, 
they would have been very difficult to account for. One would normally 
expect prices to advance with continued payments problems. Apparently 
what the multiplier reflects is not a negative relationship, but one in 
which the effect of a unit change in the exogenous variable is substan­
tially greater in the previous period than in the present period:
^  CHP
'b B-P 3  B-P
Although the power to alter the level of reserve requirements 
against demand and time deposits is one of the policy "tools" of the 
Federal Reserve, this tool was used so seldom during the period that 
there seemed to be no significant loss of generality— increased bias —  
if this variable was considered exogenous instead of endogenous (vis : 
Teigen, I969). The multiplier effects on the real sector variables seem 
reasonable in sign; it is difficult to judge what would be reasonable 
in terms of magnitude. But the reactions in the monetary sector to a 
unit change in the change of required reserves seem to be a little less 
obvious. Apparently the effects of this change are lagged in their 
influence on the money supply and on the demand for loans. But the 
increase in required reserves causes an immediate reduction in free 
reserves. This seems to be compensated for by a small OMO action and by 
discount rate additions until the effect of this change is "normalized."
The multiplier effect of a unit increase in government expendi­
tures (or in some other component, or group of components, of exogenous 
expenditures). Table (5-22), is reflected by an immediate and equal
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increase in the level of income. In addition to this gain, the rise in 
consumption and investment expenditures resulting out of this enlarged 
level of income in the current period will also increment the multiplier 
on income to a level fifteen percent higher than the initially augmented 
level. This expansion of income should (and does for the most part) mul­
tiply the levels of the income components. An exception, however, is 
the case of residential investment. Apparently this factor is more 
responsive to interest rate changes which might arise because of an 
increased demand for a "fixed" availability of goods. Two other interest­
ing points are revealed by the "real" sector multipliers. First, the 
sustained increment of a unit change in is, apparently, quickly dis­
counted (decayed) in terms of its effects on income growth. Second, the 
price multipliers resulting from this action are extremely small. If 
this rise in demand does, in actuality, increase the demand for a fixed 
stock of goods rather than providing just another source of demand for 
an oversupply of previously produced goods, then the bidding for the 
"scarce" goods should force the price level up. But this is not the 
case, according to the multipliers.
Again we observe in the monetary sector that the Fed takes vir­
tually no open market action to offset the effects of this increase in 
E^. It apparently allows the discount rate to make the adjustments to 
the declining multiplier on free reserves and the rising one on bank 
loans. The multipliers of this effect on the money supply are about as 
expected with one noteable exception— the multiplier on time deposits is 
twice that on demand deposits.
It seems that increases in permanent income (Table (5-23)) multiply
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the level of demand, for all the money supply components— plus loans— as 
well as for all the components of income. And it has very little effect 
on the price level. This reflects a hypothesis that the demand for any 
of these is almost totally immutable below some level, and that the level 
of demand is often thought to be related to some level of "normal" income. 
As this level rises, so should the demand for these variables.
An increase in the rate of capacity utilization, as expected, 
has much the same effect as an increase in the rate of worker productivity. 
There are, however, two exceptions to this generalization. The capacity 
rate change has little if any multiplier effect on price changes. This 
conclusion from the model may or may not be acceptable. If this rise 
brought into use machines which are otherwise considered marginal, one 
should expect the higher costs to be passed on in the form of price 
increases. If this productive machinery was not marginal, only idle, 
then the multiplier results would be more plausible. The other exception 
relates to the influence on consumption of the two changes. The improve­
ment in productivity is more likely to be passed on to the worker in the 
form of salary increments than is the increased use of available capacity. 
Thus, for the former one should expect a larger multiplier effect on con­
sumption— especially consumption of nondurables and services. For the 
latter, one should expect a larger multiplier for nonresidential invest­
ment— in plant and equipment. This is, in fact, the
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Initially the orientation of this thesis was to explain the 
alternative economic framework from which most of the leading authorities 
in the field draw their assumptions and, on the basis of which, reach 
vastly differing conclusions as to the direction and impact of monetary 
policy activities. To do this it was first necessary to lay a foundation 
which would explain the nature and role of the policy-making body, the 
methods and tools of its operation, and the most basic problems confront­
ing its operation.
To accomplish this, the first section opened with an explanation 
of the organization and operations of the Federal Reserve and of its 
primary policy-making branch, the Federal Open Market Committee. Included 
also was a short history of the development of the policy tools and a 
rather abbreviated discussion of the lag estimation problem. This is a 
problem which often causes individuals to totally discredit monetary 
policy even though fiscal policy is subject to a quite similar type of 
lag. From this, the analysis moved to the central issue of this section.
There are basically two alternative theoretical frameworks for 
the analysis of economic developments. These approaches differ in many 
important aspects, especially with reference to the monetary side of 
economic analysis. This has led to quite divergent views with respect
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to the level, impact, and residual effects of the current monetary 
policy position. The more prevalent neo-Keynesian tradition was contrasted 
with the newer "neo-Classical"— monetarist— approach. It was observed 
that most of the disagreements in interpretation and analysis resulted 
from each theory's emphasis on a different aspect of the problem to 
explain the same phenomena. The primary differences in the theoretical 
frameworks involve two important assumptions regarding; (l) the effects 
of the level, and changes in the level, of prices; and (2) how the real 
and the monetary sector variables react to changes either in the policy 
tools or in some other factors. The neo-Keynesian approach assumes con­
stant prices since "real" and nominal quantities are equal. It empha­
sizes the substitution effects of a change in the relevant variables.
The monetarist theory assumes that prices are determined within the 
system, usually by the level or changes in the level of the money supply. 
Thus, "real" and nominal value are not necessarily equal or equivalent.
This approach emphasizes the income and wealth effects of a change in the 
relevant variables.
As a result of these divergent approaches, it becomes obvious 
why the analysis of economic change differs so greatly. The former 
theory uses interest rates to measure the effects of monetary policy 
since these rates are directly affected by a change in the nominal money 
supply. The latter approach defines interest rates as just another fac­
tor in determining "the" price level. The primary variable used to analyze 
the effectiveness of monetary policy is typically some monetary aggregate 
(money supply, change in the money supply, monetary base, etc.). Thus, 
not only the measures that they employ as indicators of effectiveness
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and as targets at which to aim, hut also their interpretation of the 
immediate, final, and total effects of some given monetary action can 
lead to widely-disparate theoretical conclusions.
There was no attempt in this analysis to draw specific conclu­
sions with respect to the superiority or increased forecasting ability 
of one theoretical approach over another. The presentation of the struc­
tural frameworks as they relate to the monetary sector was necessary to 
justify each theory's selections of the appropriate indicators and tar­
gets of policy action. Nor do the developments in this paper provide an 
adequate basis for the comparison of theories. The primary policy vari­
ables of the monetarist approach— the monetary base and the money supply—  
are endogenous to the model. Therefore, a relatively meaningful analysis 
can be presented on their behalf. However, the principal policy vari­
ables in the "Keynesian" theory— the spectrum of market interest rates—  
are exogenous to the system. Since these factors are not on a similar 
basis, a comparison of the theories is not theoretically possible.
As a result of the lack of fiscal policy measures and because of 
the assumed exogeneity of governmental actions in the model, it was not 
possible to compare the effectiveness of fiscal versus monetary policy.
To do this would first require making governmental income and expenditures 
endogenous. Then, as factors under governmental control, one would also 
need to make the tax rate schedules and possibly some budgetary measures 
endogenous. This would substantially increase the size of the model. But 
it would also increase the model's importance and relevance.
The remainder of the paper involved establishing some empirical 
basis from which to draw policy conclusions. Then these conclusions
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were analyzed in light of the results that would be expected a priori.
This analysis should provide a foundation from which the theoretical 
and empirical relevancy of the model can be judged.
Conclusions
The model contains two measures which are considered as indicators 
of monetary policy activity. The change in the level of free reserves 
is used as a very short-term indicator. It is available on a day-to-day 
(or an even more frequent) basis, and is a well-accepted operational 
variable. For the "longer" short-term indicator, the "adjusted" mone­
tary base (UBR + CC) was used. Actually the rate of change in (UBR + CC) 
was used as a proxy for the "dynamic" operations in the open market. It 
measures the net effects of policy activities on the available supply of 
reserves and it is not biased by currency flows.
In the more intermediate term, the indicators are supposed to 
reflect the effects of given policy actions on various components of the 
monetary sector. The targets should reflect these effects on the compon­
ents of the real sector. The indicators and targets employed in the 
model were changes in the money supply— demand deposits + coin and cur­
rency outstanding + time deposits— and the levels of several key market 
interest rates— primarily the short- and long-term interest rates on 
government securities. These rates, however, are considered exogenous. 
Therefore, they receive less analytical attention in the model. The 
goal proxies for the ultimate objectives were assumed to be the level 
and the change in the level of income, the rate of change in prices, 
the level of unemployment (or its reciprocal), a balance of international 
payments, and a desired relation between the long- and short-term
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interest rates.
There are numerous interesting conclusions which have evolved 
from the estimation of the model and from the calculations of the elas­
ticities and multipliers. Instead of reconstructing the full reasoning 
behind the explanation of these, it might be best to make a summary list­
ing of the main conclusions. This list, however, is neither exhaustive 
(in fact it is quite selective), nor do the sequence in which the conclu­
sions appear represent an ordering by importance.
(1) The demand for demand deposits appears to support a "Fried- 
monian"-type thesis that the demand for this major component of the 
"narrowly-defined" money supply is primarily a function of permanent 
income and the interest rates ;
(2) The demand for time deposits function quite closely approxi­
mates those for the other money supply components. This might— and in 
the present case, did— lead to the inclusion of time deposits in the 
definition of "the" money supply. All appear basically to be functions 
of income (however defined), interest rates, and the lagged values of 
the dependent variable;
(3) In the 2SLS estimations, with the exception of the relation­
ship between the yield on time deposits and the demand for these deposits, 
the relative importance of the effects of the interest rate terms on the 
demand for money was lessened in comparison to the OLSQ, estimates. Thus, 
these components appear to be not as interest-responsive (possibly less 
interest-elastic) as originally estimated. The small short-run elastici­
ties for these also reflect the reduced responsiveness;
(4) The multiplier effects on these money supply components.
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however, reflect an opposite trend. This might indicate that although 
the short-run effects may not he sizeable, the long-term effects of a 
sustained increase in the interest rates are definitely important in 
determining the level of demand;
(5) It might seem incongruous that changes in free reserves are 
positively related to discount rate movements and negatively related to 
market interest rate changes. However, an increase in the discount rate 
could limit loan expansion (a use of available reserves) which would help 
preserve the current level of "free" reserves. But an increase in market 
interest rates— especially in the short-term rates— makes investment of 
"free" funds relatively more attractive;
(6) It was possible to relate open market operations to the 
levels of variables in each of the three major policy categories: indi­
cators (change in free reserves, and the proxy for OMO— the "adjusted" 
monetary base); targets (the money supply which is endogenous and vari­
ous interest rates which are exogenous); and the goal proxies (income 
and the current change in income, balance of payments problem proxy, and 
the term structure of interest rates). But we were not successful in 
including the rate of change in prices and the rate of unemployment ;
(7) The multipliers for those policy variables which are included 
showed that they seldom have very significant effects on the movement of 
OMO. It is shown, though, that OMO are relatively responsive to income 
change, balance of payments problems and interest rate differentials. 
Apparently they are significantly less responsive to the rate of price 
change and to the unemployment level;
(8) This previous conclusion contradicts, in part, several
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other,people's findings (e.g., Dewald and Johnson, 1963> and Willes 
1967-H) regarding the response function for open market operations 
of the Federal Reserve. These other studies typically give prominence 
to some combination of income and/or change in income, change in 
prices, and unemployment or its reciprocal. However, a careful reading 
of the Minutes of the FOMC over the period would give a different impres­
sion. They seem to respond to changes in income, interest rate levels 
and changes, balance of payments problems, and, less generally, to price 
changes. They seldom seem to respond to the level or rate of unemployment;
(9) From the multipliers it appears that the Fed makes use of 
discount rate changes rather than changes in the level of open market 
operations to offset variations in the levels of other variables. This 
is not expected a priori. In quarterly terms, the Federal Reserve uses 
OMO to react basically just to changes in the expected rate of income 
change and in the balance of payments situation. It uses or allows dis­
count rate changes to react to changes in other variables such as loans, 
income, productivity, and the interest rates. Perhaps the prime reason 
for this result is the fact that this is a quarterly model. Day-to-day 
changes in OMO are hidden whereas the much more infrequent movements of 
the discount rate are emphasized. One should expect the results to be 
different if one had a shorter-term model;
(10) The Federal Reserve's reaction to an increased change in the
level of income (AY^>AY^ seems to be to limit further expansion by
holding down the growth in loans. This may be accomplished by discount 
rate increases and allowing "free" reserves to decline;
(11) The Fed overreacts to an increase in the expected rate of
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change in income hy initially increasing OMO too much. It then spends 
the next several quarters continually overreacting in an attempt to 
offset previous actions. But it appears that the ability to forecast 
this change permits them to allow banks a slightly "looser" free reserve 
position. The combination of these allows for an easing of the discount 
rate;
(12) Because the increase in balance of payments problems results 
in negative effects on the money supply components (although the magnitude 
of these effects declines quickly), the Fed is quick to use OMO to pro­
vide additional reserves. This is reflected also in the large free 
reserve multiplier. As usual, the Fed overreacts. This, at least in 
part, accounts for the rapid erosion of the negative effects;
(13) It appears that the Federal Reserve has tended to support a 
specific, though probably implicitly-determined, level or range of dif­
ferences between the long- and short-term rates of interest. As long
as the changes in the long-term rate are greater than those in the short­
term rate, no matter whether the rates are rising or falling, the Fed 
seems to reduce its level of activity. But, as usual, it seems to over­
react. It then spends several quarters (continuing to overreact) in an 
attempt to correct for previous mistakes. This action can be observed 
in both the multipliers for the long- and short-term interest rates and 
those for the term structure variables.
Possible Extensions
There are a multiplicity of extensions which might arise out of 
an econometric study of this sort. The most obvious of these is reesti­
mation and respecification of the equations, making additional changes in
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(or combining) variables or equations. This type of improvement, 
together with the reduction in the degree of aggregation, are the most 
widely recognized methods of improving a model. But there are many 
other ways. Most notably, one could establish a separate relationship 
for Government expenditures, thus distinguishing it from other exogenous 
expenditures. This might also be done for net exports and for services.
An important extension of this model would involve opening up 
new avenues of linkage between the variables of both sectors. Presently 
these sectors are related through income, loans, interest rates, and the 
"real" sector variables in the demand for loans equation (c^ and I^). 
Further, one should improve the specification of the price change equa­
tion, and perhaps change it to a quarterly rate of price change. Finally, 
one should include more interest rate— yield— variables (e.g., yields 
on loans. Federal funds, CD's) and make most, if not all, of them endo­
genous. Thus, they could more correctly be used as target measures.
In addition to these extensions to the model itself, there are 
alternative tests which could be made of the model’s specifications. One 
could estimate the system of equations as a recursive set and compare 
these analytical results with those which are available from the methods 
used here. One could also make both short- and long-term forecasts, 
simulating economic activity for a future period or time path (Ooldberger, 
1959)• And one could also perform simulations by inducing parameter 
changes. In this way, the simulations would reveal the stability of 
both the parameter estimates and the multipliers. All of these test the 
quality and correctness of the specifications. Certainly a comparison 
of short- and long-run elasticities would be in order. This test would
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determine the stability of these elasticities over time.
Finally, one might want to attempt to specify a utility function 
which would explain (predict) Federal Reserve reactions to a given level 
of change in any important economic variable. One might employ the 
results of this model in searching, from among an ordered set of utility 
functions specified for the Federal Reserve, for a reasonable, but 
realistically tentative, policy-oriented utility function. A success­
ful specification of this function would make available a whole "Pandora's 
box" of relevant policy information. One prime example would be the 
"trade-offs" used by the Fed in its attempts to achieve and maintain 
some combination of ultimate economic objectives.
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APPENDIX A
LISTING OF TEIGEN‘S MODEL
AD = 6.5723 + .O728Y - .0015(r .Y) - .0065(r^^-Y) - .2311D_^ - 8.7011s^
- 5.04458g - 3.486s_
= .948 S.E. = 1.0239
= .1995 + .000058(r^^*Y) + .000005(r^*Y) - .0002Y - .0003Y
+ .00763^ + .0117Sg + .0007s 
= .737 S.E. = .0035
AT = -3.8905 + .0046(r 'Y) - .0039(r^*Y) + .0148Y - .0270T_^ + 1.0292s^
+ l.5044sg + .4o688g 
R^ = .751 S.E. = .7426
Ag^ = .6609 + .02l4r^ + .0106(r^-r^) - .6950(|*) + .03298^ + .0246s^ 
pf = .647 S.E. = .0158
A(^) = -.0268 + .0094r^ + .2100(|^) - .0566(^) + .0543s^ + .01998g
-1 -1
+ .02438.
R^ = .630 S.E. = .0069
(r^-r^) = 1.2363 - .70l4r^ - .00702^ + .05262^ + .0665Zg + .0474z
R^ =: .960 S.E. = .1177
OMO = -.0034 + .3028(1^ )  - .5466(WDY) - .2206(^) + .0022r + .0035(B-P)
-1  P
.0325AIC + .OI6IART - .2995(0M0) ,
- X
R^ = .875 S.E. = .0109
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222
= .1676 + .3358r, + 6.386U(wdy) + .6253(r,) ,d. D d -X
= .9U8 S.E. = .3306
Y = + 1“  ^+ + AI^ + E®
= 14.2010 + .0830Y + .1376AY + 46.6237(^) + .85790^^ T - 32.3903s,
p
- 10.72738g - 15.3966s2
= .998 S.E. = 1.8899
= .7173 + .O232Y + .2058AY + 27.2 7 0 9 ) + .70810^ + 2,1366s
P
+ .15028g + 2.1763s.
R^ = .976 S.E. = 1.3909
I = -5.6198 + .0233Y + .0148AY + 7 .54(cap)_^ + 1.025AL + i4 .34(chp)
+ .7407l^^_i - .0 9 8 6 s + .07938gl"^_i - .0252s_l"^_i 
R^ = .993 S.E. = .6932
= -46.6454 + .036OY + .0253AY - .2691r + .1057NHE - .0056v_^
+ 22.4445(|) - .0004dp_^ + .48l8l^_^ - ,1253s^ + 5.06l8sg
+ 5.2473s.
R^ = .957 S.E. = .8671
AI^ = 12.7476 + .0822Y + .009IAY + I.556OAL + .3678AUF - .7011^ + .2091AI^_^
+ 19.7038^ + 4.8266sg + 8.2486s.
R^ = .888 S.E. = 2.1213
CHP = .0008 + .1017(WTY) - .OOO(GAP) - .0003(B-P) + .9465(CHP)_^
R^ = .817 S.E. = .0044
L A C C E D  E N D O G P N O U S  V A R I A B L E S  C O N T R i e u T I C N  T O E A C H  O F  T HE  R E G R E S S I O N  E Q U A T I O N S
u>
N A 4 E  3 =  
£ 0 J  AT IL N
VAR I A B L E  
N AM E
P E G R E  S .  
C O E P F ,
T
S T A T I S T I C
V A R I A B L E  
NAME
R E G P E S .  
C O E F E .
T R 2 DW SE
CH
CH
CH
DU
D3
DD
CC  -  1 
C H D D - 1 
OD -  1
0 , 0 0 0 9 5  
0 . 5 0  5 2 0  
0 . 0 0 2 2 0
7 . 3 0 2 7 8  
1 1 . 2 1 2 0 4  
2 .  1 8 1 2 9 C H D D - 1 0 . 6 5  8 4 8 1 6 . 7 8 8 7 7
0 . 0 7 2 8 1  
0 . 4  1 4 6 9  
0 . 4 5 4 0 5
0 . 6  9 6  9 5
1 .  6 9 2 6 7  
1 . 5 8 7 9 7
0 . 9 2 6 4 0  
0 . 7 3 6 0 5  
0  . 7  1 6 2 4
CH
CH
CH
CC
CC
CC
CC -  1 
C H C C -  1 
CC - I
0 . 0 0 9 4 3  
0 . 9 6 7 5 5  
0 . 0 0  1 1 5
1 1 . 1 7  1 6 5
2 7 . 2 2 9 4 5  
I . 5 6 9 4 4 C H C C - 1 0 . 8 8 7 6 8 1 4 . 9 6 4 3 1
0 . 2 7 1 6 5
0 . 8 2 7 1 9
0 . 8 3 4 2 0
0 . 2 3 9 0 2  
2  . 3 4 6 4 7  
2 .  2 5 8 0 7
0 . 2 2 5 6 2  
0  . 1 0 9 8 9  
0 . 1 0 8 4 5
CH
CH
CH
T U
TJ
TU
TO -  I 
C H T O - 1  
TD -  1
0 . 0 2 1  3 9  
0 . 5 6 1  1 5  
0 . 0 0  4 8 2
3 . 9 3 7 6 7  
1 3 . 7 7 8 7 9
1 . 6 8 0 0 9 C H T O - 1 0 . 7 3  0 7  7 7 . 3 7 2 3 4
0 . 0 9 3 ! 4  
0 . 4 8 1 4 1  
0 . 5 0 2 6 8
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2 .  0 3 2 9 2  
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1 . 6 1 8 9 9
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P R
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P R  -  1 
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- 3  . 9 9 4 7 5 C H E R - 1 0 . 6  1 9 3 2 6 . 1 5 0 6 2
0 . 0 3 6 1 5  
0 . 2 3 9 1 9  
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1 . 6 6 0 0 5  
1 . 8 9 6 7 4
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0  .  1 6 7 1 4  
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CH
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L
L
L
L -  I 
CH L - 1  
L -  1
0 . 0 2 4 2 4  
0 . 9 5 7 9 3  
0 .  0 0 9 8 9
2 0 . 7 5 6 2 0  
2 3  . 5 5 4 6 7  
3 . 7 4 7 8 2 CH L - 1 0 . 5 9 9 0 1 5  . 8 2 9 6 2
0 . 5 8 8 2 3  
0 . 6 7 0 3 4  
0 . 7 2 8 1 9
0 . 8 3 1 3 5  
2 . 4 5 7 5 6  
7 . 0 7 9 3 6
1 . 4  1 6 8 2  
1 . 2 6 7 7 0  
1 . 1 5 9 8 1
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D I S K C I S  - 1 1 . 0  1 7 0  3 1 0 9 . 5 2 7 9 2 0 . 9 4 7 0 6 I . 0 6 6 4 6 0 . 2 6 5 6 8
N O N O  C C N O -  1 1 . 0 1 5 4 0 1 3 5 4 . 3 6 2 5 5 0 . 9 9 9 4 9 1 . 7 5 8 4 8 1 . 9 5 7 0 8
DUR C C D - I 1 . 0 1 6 9 4 2 6 2 .  0 1 6 8 5 0 . 9 8 9 7 9 2 . 0 8 5 8 7 1 . 7 5 8 5 8
R £  S = I R E S I - 1 1 . 0 0 6 4  1 1 7 6  . 9 3 3 1 5 0 . 9  1 4 7 2 1 . 0 0 3 4 6 1 . 1 3 2 3 9
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0 . 0 2 8 9 9
9 . 4 7 7 8  1 
1 3 . 3 8 0 9  1 
2 . 7 0 9 4  3 r I N V - 1 0 . 6 6 1 0 6 7  . 0 0 4 6 2
0 . 1 7 9 8 0  
0 . 4 7 7 2 1  
0 . 5 2 9 5 4
0  . 6 9 1  1 2  
2 .  1 8 6 1 4  
2 . 0 0 0 4 2
4 . 5 3 1 2 4  
3 .  6 1  7 5 9  
3 .  4 5 7 6 7
ANCH P CH P -  1 1 . 0 2  3  7 S 4 6 . S 0 7 1 0 0 , 9 2 0 3 0  1 . 2 2 3 6 2  0 . 0 0 4 4 1
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SOURCES OF DATA
Endogenous Variables
1. Monetary variables.
The following data are in billions of current dollars, seasonally 
adjusted. The data were monthly averages of daily values which 
were then averaged quarterly. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis (from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
ADD = DD^ - DD^ ^ Demand deposits at all commercial banks.
ACC = CC^ - CC^ ^ Coin and currency in the public's hands.
ATD = TD^ - TD^ ^ Time deposits at all commercial banks.
AFR = FR, - FR, ^ = (ER, - MBB.) - (ER,  ^- MBB, ^) = Free reserves.
ER = Excess reserves of member banks.
MBB = Member bank borrowings from the Federal 
Reserve.
AL = L - L, - Commercial and industrial loans at commercial
banks.
A(UBR + CC) A(TR - MBB + CC)
(UBR + CC) , (TR - MBB + CC) .— X —X
Open Market (TR - MBB + CC) - (TR - MBB + CC)^_^
Operations = (TR - MBB + CC), ^
Proxy ' 't-1
TR = Total reserves of member banks.
r^ = Discount rate at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Quoted
as percent per annum (3*5^ = 3 *50)
2 . Real sector variables.
The following variables are in billions of current dollars, seasonally 
adjusted. The data are quarterly totals at annual rates. Source: Fed­
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis (from the U. S. Department of Commerce).
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Y = Gross national product = Income
= Consumption of nondurable goods.
c'^  = Consumption of durable goods.
I = Fixed investment in residential structures.
= Fixed investment in nonresidential structures.
The following variables— Source: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Business Statistics, I967 edition; and Survey of Current Business 
(1967 through April, 1970)*
AI^ = Change in nonfarm business inventory, seasonally adjusted in
current dollars. It is in terms of quarterly totals at annual
rates.
CPI - CPICHP =   t-h = Annual rate of change in prices.
CPI = Consumer price index (1957-1959 = 100), a weighted aggre- 
_ gative monthly index, quarterly averaged.
P = Weighted average price series employing weights used by 
deLeeuw (1965) and Teigen (I969) to approximate a series 
of "permanent" income and prices.
Exogenous Variables 
1. Interest rates.
The following are quarterly averages quoted in terms of percent per
annum (3«5^ = 3«50). Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
r, = Treasury bill rate on new issues of 3-month bills. Averaged 
monthly rates.
r^ = Long-term government bond yields. Averaged monthly rates.
TRM = (r^-r^) = Term structure of interest rates.
r^^ = Yield on time deposits. The rate for 1953-19^0 is derived by 
interpolating an annual series of yield quotations from the 
Annual Reports of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
The series since 196O followed the new issue rate on six 
month CD's— Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (from
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
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The following are the multiplicative forms of the interest rates—  
the rates multiplied by the level of income (r«Y). These are the 
substitute earning assets into which money is considered to be easily 
transferable. The three broad groups are represented by the (r^»Y),
(r^^*Y), and (r^«Y),
ART = RKR,, - RKR = Change in the required reserve ratio which
t t-1 member banks must apply against their time
deposits.
RRR = Reserve requirement ratio against time deposits. Fol­
lowing the division of the broad classification "time 
deposits" and the establishing of differing reserve 
requirements (effective July lU, I966), the ratio used 
was a weighted average based on the (approximate) dollar 
volume in each category.
L = = Commercial and industrial loans at commercial banks.
Real sector variables.
AY = Y^ - Y^ ^ = Quarterly change in income (y ).
Y = Permanent income (lagged one period). Calculated using the 
^ -1 deLeeuw formula previously used to find P.
Y^l - Y_3
WDY = — ------- = A proxy for the expected annual rate of change in
^  ^ income in the next quarter (annual change in
income "led" one period divided by a one-year 
moving total of income).
= Exogenous expenditures = Y - C - C - I  - I  - AI .
Its main component is government expenditures, but it also 
includes net exports and changes in farm business inventories.
INV ^ = Level of all manufacturing inventories, book value, season­
ally adjusted (quarterly averages of end-of-the-month data) 
in billions of current dollars. Source: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Business Statistics, I967 edition, and Survey of 
Current Business ( I967-March, 1970)«
AProd = Productivity change. The annual series published by Jorgenson 
and Griliches (1967) was interpolated into a quarterly series 
using the formula AProd = 0 .79816 + O.OOU5 T, where T is a 
quarterly measure of time (T in 1953-1 = 33)« And the values 
from 1965 through 1969 are projected on the basis of this regres­
sion equation, (year 1955 = lOO).
CAP ^ =^ Rrâte of capacity utilization in the manufacturing, mining,
j^îd utilities sector (30 manufacturing, mining, and utilities 
industries). New series of the Wharton Index of Capacity 
Utilization, lagged one period. Provided by F. Gerard Adams,
227
Economie Research Unit of the Department of Economies of the 
University of Pennsylvania. In percentage berms (95*^)•
B-P = Proxy for the balance of payments problem. Bince the short­
term interest rate is the most important in international 
liquidity and capital flows, it is used as the basis of this 
rate. It is multiplied times a dummy variable which equals 
zero (o) for the years 1953-1900 when the U.S. experienced 
few of these problems; and unity (l) for the ensuing years.
